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The first paper, “Farm and Non-farm Occupational and Earnings Dynamics in 
Rural Thailand”, explores individual occupational and earnings dynamics in rural 
Thailand during 2005-2010. We find significant occupational transitions, mainly 
involving moving out of farming and into non-farm employment, rather than starting 
businesses, especially enterprises that employ others. Using stochastic dominance, we 
identify an occupational ladder, with the most remunerative employment as a non-
farm business owner/employer, and the worst as an agricultural worker. Occupational 
transitions into the rural non-farm economy are associated with statistically significant 
earnings gains while transitions into farming are associated with earnings losses. 
These results are confirmed with a variety of methods to control for prospective 
unobserved heterogeneity. However, a small number of individuals become and 
remain non-farm employers, reflecting the difficulty in operating non-farm businesses 
that employ others.  
The second paper, “The Correlates and Dynamics of Rural Household Non-
farm Business and Entrepreneurial Job Creation in Thailand”, explores the 
characteristics of those non-farm household entrepreneurs who expand their 
businesses by hiring non-family members, as well as the push and pull factors that 
play a role in supporting job creation within the rural non-farm economy and the 
 dynamics of rural non-farm business status. More than 90 percent of rural non-farm 
enterprises are self-employed without non-family workers and rarely grow larger into 
enterprises that provide jobs outside the family. Instead, we observe a tendency for 
microenterprises and small-medium enterprises to contract in size. Non-farm 
businesses who hire more workers have more household assets, smaller agricultural 
land holdings, and lower opportunity costs of labor related to other household 
activities. Credit availability also plays an important role in starting an enterprise and 
hiring more workers.  
The third paper, “Intersectoral and Gender Heterogeneity in the Marginal 
Earnings Gains Associated with Education in Indonesia”, studies how individual 
earnings respond to added educational attainment given intersectoral labor market 
heterogeneity and gender differences, as well as the potential signaling that comes 
from educational credentialing in the job market. We focus on the problem of non-
random selection into sector of employment. Using the Indonesian Family Life Survey 
data from 1993-2007, we use parents’ occupation and education as instruments 
influencing individuals’ sector of employment. We find evidence of both sheepskin 
effects associated with the completion of specific, multi-year stages of schooling and 
intersectoral differences in the estimated marginal earnings gains associated with 
educational attainment, all of which vary between females and males. These findings 
carry significant implications for understanding patterns of private investment in 
education if not all children are equally likely to enter all careers and marginal 
earnings gains associated with educational attainment vary markedly among future 
work patterns. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the process of structural transformation, the rural non-farm economy 
(RNFE) serves as a key linkage between the agricultural sector and the macroeconomy. 
Lewis (1954) saw the non-farm sector as potentially dynamic and expanding. In his 
view and in the dual economy models that followed from his seminal work, the RNFE 
can absorb a surplus farm labor supply from rural households to mix with industrial 
capital, providing more productive use of labor and hence earning higher returns and 
providing an engine for economic growth. With agricultural transformation, higher 
labor productivity in agriculture allows households to allocate more time to non-farm 
activities or to migrate to the urban industrial sector (Timmer, 2009). Anticipating this, 
rural households invest their profits from agriculture in human capital formation, 
raising non-farm labor productivity. All of these mechanisms lead to a growing rural 
non-farm sector and gradual shrinkage in the intersectoral differences in the marginal 
returns to labor (Barrett et al., 2010). However, the process of integrating farm labor 
into the non-farm economy and equalizing factor returns across sectors takes a long 
time as it requires well-functioning labor and capital markets throughout an economy. 
Hence, we observe intersectoral differences in earnings and returns, as well as in 
productivity in most developing countries.  
The RNFE is increasingly seen as a pathway out of poverty in low- and 
middle-income countries (Timmer 1988, 2002). The benefits from agricultural 
transformation and productivity growth are not distributed equally to all farmers and 
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labors in agricultural sector. In particular, many land-constrained rural households do 
not reap these benefits and are too often left out of the agriculture-led economic 
growth process. Their earnings fall behind the rest of the economy. That is when the 
RNFE comes to play a crucial role because its heterogeneity in size and activities may 
accommodate rural households from various backgrounds and endowments, including 
those that might otherwise be left out of agriculture-led growth. Most rural households 
earn at least some income from non-farm sources, as non-farm workers or 
owner/operators of non-farm businesses, or both (Reardon 1997, Foster 2012). Rural 
non-farm incomes account for an estimated 35-50 percent of rural incomes across the 
developing world, including 51% in Asia during 1990s and 2000s (Haggblade et al., 
2007). 
Whether the RNFE has helped with poverty alleviation and promoting upward 
mobility remains debatable, however. The heterogeneity of RNFE activities implies 
there are high- and low-return activities in which different rural households can 
engage. Oftentimes, poor households appear pushed out of the agricultural sector or 
their traditional occupation into low-return non-farm activities with low capital startup 
requirements in highly competitive sub-sectors or just part-time employment. In 
contrast, high-return non-farm activities often require significant initial capital and 
skilled labor often possessed only by better-off households that can respond to the pull 
of profitable non-farm opportunities and thereby enjoy greater earning gains than do 
participants pushed into the RNFE (Barrett et al. 2001). When we focus on productive 
household assets and specific factors of production such as human, physical, and 
financial capital stocks, the poor with low capital stocks often face barriers to entry or 
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have limited involvement in more remunerative non-farm activities (Barrett 1997, 
Dercon and Krishnan 2000, Barrett et al. 2001, Haggblade et al. 2007).  
The dynamic role of the RNFE and its role in promoting upward earnings 
mobility thus remains poorly understood. This dissertation investigates further 
occupational choices across agricultural and non-agricultural sectors and their 
associated earnings dynamics (Chapter 2, “Farm and Non-farm Occupational and 
Earnings Dynamics in Rural Thailand”). Little is known about earnings and 
occupational mobility in rural Thailand. We are also able to distinguish individuals’ 
occupational status as worker, self-employed, and employers. With six distinct 
groups–each of the three occupational groups in the farm and non-farm sectors–in 
nationally representative survey data over a period of five years, we can paint a far 
richer picture of rural occupational transitions and earnings dynamics than exists in the 
prior literature.  
We find that transitions mainly involve moves into farm self-employment or 
non-farm employment rather than into non-farm self-employment, much less into farm 
or non-farm employer positions. People in the farm sector tend to move within their 
sector and some transition to non-farm employee while some of non-farm sector move 
into farm self-employment. The non-farm employers’ and employees’ earnings 
distributions stochastically dominate the other categories’ earnings distributions, while 
those associated with farm workers and self-employed farmers are stochastically 
dominated by each of the three non-farm occupational groupings. All these results 
strongly suggest a “gravity effect” on the occupation ladder. It is easier to move down 
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into lower-return occupations, especially non-farm self-employment and self-
employed farming, than up into higher-return ones like non-farm business employer 
and formal non-farm employee. However, a small number of individuals become and 
remain non-farm employers, the most lucrative occupation, reflecting the difficulty in 
operating non-farm businesses that employ others.   
 We then move to multivariate regression analysis to explore how occupational 
transitions affect directional earnings mobility, employing a conditional mobility 
model in which change in earnings or change in log earnings (annualized) are 
regressed on time-invariant and time-varying individual characteristics, using 2005-6, 
2006-7, and 2007-10 transitions. We use both individual fixed effects to control for 
unobserved time invariant characteristics and a Hausman- Taylor estimator, an 
instrumental variables approach that enables estimation of the coefficients of time-
invariant regressors while still controlling for individual-level random effects. Then, 
we test the differences on these coefficients representing gains (losses) from 
transitions. We combine all occupations within the farm sector together due to the 
small number of observations and their joint stochastic dominance by the non-farm 
options, leaving four occupation categories: farm, non-farm self-employed, non-farm 
employee and non-farm employer. On average, movements into the non-farm sector 
increase earnings relative to remaining in the farm sector. By contrast, shifting 
between non-farm sectors could result in either earnings gains or losses. In most cases 
of these mixed outcomes, transitions from any of the non-farm occupations into 
another non-farm position lead to lower earnings growth than does staying in the 
original position. 
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 Time-varying unobservables might affect both earnings dynamics and 
occupational transitions. So we refine the estimation method to predict the probability 
of occupational movements in a first stage and then use these predicted transition 
probabilities in two-stage estimation of the characteristics most strongly associated 
with earnings growth. Our instruments are changes in village characteristics, reflecting 
changes in infrastructure and agricultural circumstances that affect the occupation 
decisions but are exogenous to individual earnings changes. This identification 
strategy allows for more variation across villages while still allowing for variation in 
individual characteristics within villages. As another robustness check, we estimate a 
multinomial logit model correcting for selection bias, following Dubin and McFadden 
(1984) and Bourguignon et al. (2007), to account for the fact that occupational 
changes might be subject to both selection bias and endogeneity. The results of these 
robustness checks are consistent with the individual fixed effects and Hausman-Taylor 
estimators. In all of these estimations of earnings changes on occupational transitions 
and other controls, we consistently find that both higher individual educational 
attainment and greater household physical capital endowments strongly and 
statistically significantly increase earnings, indicating the joint importance of physical 
and human capital, as well as climbing the occupational ladder, to earnings mobility. 
These findings motivate further investigation into the roles of physical and 
human capital in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 (“The Correlates and Dynamics of Rural 
Household Non-farm Business and Entrepreneurial Job Creation in Thailand”) 
explores the correlates and dynamics of rural non-farm businesses in Thailand. This 
chapter focuses in particular on the empirical regularity that we rarely see firm growth 
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from self-employment without non-family employees into a larger firm that provides 
RNFE jobs outside the family. We explore the role of household assets as crucial to 
entry into and mobility within the RNFE sector.  
Previous studies decompose rural non-farm employment into low- and high-
productivity salaried work or self-employment (e.g., Barrett et al., 2005; Jonasson and 
Helfand, 2009; Bezu et. al., 2012). In this chapter, however, entrepreneurship status is 
classified separately by its RNFE employment generation effects, from self-
employment without employees–what are sometimes referred to as “subsistence” 
entrepreneurs–to those “transformational” entrepreneurs who create jobs for non-
family members and are thus more effective in stimulating broad-based economic 
growth (Schoar, 2010).  
We find that subsistence self-employed businesses do not automatically 
transition into transformational entrepreneurs.  This leads to an oft-observed ‘missing 
middle’ in the enterprise size distribution in developing countries, wherein the 
overwhelming majority of RNFE enterprises are very small, with no paid employees, 
and a very small number of large employers account for most paid employment, with 
very few small-to-medium size enterprises (Mead and Liedholm, 1998; de Mel et al., 
2008; Mondragon-Velez and Pena-Parga, 2010). In our study, more than 90 percent of 
rural non-farm enterprises are just self-employed without non-family workers, and 
these rarely grew larger over the 2005-2010 period we study. Indeed, we observe a 
tendency to contract in firm size for microenterprises and small-medium enterprises 
(SMEs), while only three percent graduate to a larger firm size.  
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The short period of the panel data limits our ability to make strong causal 
inferences on household assets and wealth in determining rural non-farm business 
participation. We thus use predetermined household attributes in 2005 and exogenous 
variation from rainfall and sub-district data to address likely endogeneity issues that 
necessarily complicate inference from the observed associations between household 
attributes and enterprise creation and growth performance. The predicted probabilities 
from a simple linear probability model of ownership of a rural non-farm business in 
2010 show interesting heterogeneity in the association with wealth across the 
household wealth distribution. There is a positive relationship between asset index and 
the predicted probability of operating a non-farm business across the asset index 
distribution, but there is a negative relationship between wealth (comprised of more 
liquid assets) and the predicted probability at the lower range of the wealth 
distribution. The positive asset relationship supports the hypothesis that liquidity 
constraints limit rural households from entering into self-employed non-farm 
businesses as a low return safety net, as well as households who need investible capital 
to become transformational entrepreneurs in the face of lumpy initial capital 
requirements in high-return sub-sectors. 
Besides confirming the heterogeneous wealth effects on RNFE business 
ownership, the chapter also provides more insights into other push and pull factors 
associated with the likelihood of households running a non-farm business or hiring 
more workers in rural Thailand. An ordered probit model is then used to estimate 
household choice among four rural household non-farm business statuses in 2010, 
including no non-farm business, self-employed non-farm businesses without paid 
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employees, microenterprises with one to ten paid employees, and small-medium sized 
business with more than ten employees. We find that households who run a non-farm 
business or hire more workers have greater household assets and smaller agricultural 
land holdings. As predicted in the analytical framework, they allocate less household 
labor to operating non-farm business when the average non-farm wage within 
community increases, reflecting an increase in the opportunity cost of household 
resource allocation as well as in the cost of hiring workers. Credit availability also 
plays an important role in starting an enterprise and hiring more workers. Excess 
rainfall discourages households from starting non-farm businesses, suggesting that 
rural non-farm business creation might not be a good income diversification strategy 
in Thailand, at least as compared to working in the (skilled) non-farm wage sector if 
they are able to choose both sectors. 
 The last part of the chapter explores the dynamics of rural non-farm enterprises 
using multinomial logit and bivariate probit models. We therefore have four 
alternative values for the dependent variable: never had a rural non-farm business, 
entry into, exit from, or remaining in rural non-farm business from 2006 to 2010, with 
the same set of left hand sided variables as in the previous models. The push and pull 
factors show a similar pattern as did the results with respect to the probit estimation of 
operating a rural non-farm enterprise. A college degree is associated with a greater 
likelihood that a household never owns a non-farm business, signaling a widespread 
preference for employment over entrepreneurship. Households that previously 
allocated labor to farming or non-farm employment are likely to remain in that 
occupation, indicating occupational persistence. 
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We learn that household assets and capital access are vitally important to being 
able to participate as a business owner in the RNFE, and especially to growing rural 
non-farm businesses. On the other hand, greater educational attainment is important to 
transitions into the (formal) non-farm wage employment sector, rather than into self-
employment, similar to findings in India from Kijima and Lanjouw (2005). So human 
capital formation through formal education seems to militate against RNFE enterprise 
creation and growth while financial/physical capital is crucial to that process. 
 Chapter 4 (“Intersectoral and Gender Heterogeneity in the Marginal Earnings 
Gains Associated with Education in Indonesia”) then studies how educational 
attainment is associated with (i) the probability of employment in the more 
remunerative non-farm sector, (ii) the estimated Mincerian marginal earnings from 
additional education in both farm and non-farm work, and (iii) how much of those 
estimated earnings differentials arise due to education’s role in signaling employee 
characteristics to prospective employers within each sector. By focusing on the 
Mincerian returns to education, we assume that the cost of education is only the 
earnings foregone while in school, or that the direct costs and unmeasured earnings 
while in school cancel out each other (Fields, 1980). This is an entirely descriptive 
exercise as we cannot fully control for prospective endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity. The results are nonetheless powerful in revealing important patterns in 
the relationship between education and earnings in rural areas of a middle-income 
country.   
Heterogeneity in earnings differentials associated with educational attainment 
may arise because of intersectoral differences in the marginal returns to labor quality, 
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as reflected in school completion. The agricultural household will allocate more labor 
to non-farm work if the marginal product of human capital is relatively high in non-
farm wage work (Huffman and Orazem 2007). But again, household ownership of 
fixed, sector-specific factors of production, like farmland or farming skills, combined 
with spatially heterogeneous access to public schools, transportation and 
communications infrastructure that affect labor productivity could impede or facilitate 
rural individuals’ ability and willingness to invest in education and to reallocate labor 
intersectorally if the access to these facilities is not identically distributed. The result 
can be persistent differences both in the likelihood of adult employment in different 
sectors and in the earnings gains from education across sectors. These joint differences 
remain largely unexplained in the literature, however. 
The econometric challenge arises because sector and earnings are jointly 
determined by educational attainment. Duflo (2001), Oyelere (2010), Comola and 
Mello (2013) present evidence, however, that the estimated returns to education are 
similar in both OLS and IV estimates. Given this repeated finding in the prior 
literature, endogenous schooling choices might not be a significant source of bias.  We 
therefore focus on the problem of non-random selection into sector of employment. 
We use parents’ occupation and education from at least one decade prior as 
instruments determining individuals’ sector of employment. The underlying idea is 
that intergenerational employment networks and distant past sector-specific capital 
(such as farmland) influence one’s sector of employment but conditional on sector do 
not directly affect earnings (Magruder, 2010; Hellerstein and Morrill, 2010; Kramarz 
and Skans, 2011). Not many studies using this type of information in determining 
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sector of employment that determine earnings (Krishnan, 1996).  
Ultimately, our findings emphasize that education plays a key role in job 
market sorting among different sectors, as well as in explaining earnings differentials 
across sectors and between men and women. Parental occupation and education jointly 
influence adult child’s current occupation, providing us with a credible way to control 
for selection into sector of occupation and thereby resolve an important source of 
prospective bias in the estimated marginal earnings gains associated with education. 
Once we correct for selection effects, we find clear evidence of both sheepskin effects 
associated with the completion of specific, multi-year stages of schooling and 
intersectoral differences in the estimated marginal earnings gains from schooling, all 
of which vary between females and males. These gender and intersectoral differences 
arise from both differences in labor market signaling and in the marginal earnings 
gains related to productivity of labor. The marginal earnings gains from schooling are, 
on average, highest for non-farm employees. These findings carry significant 
implications for how we explore parents’ optimal educational investments in their 
children if not all children are equally likely to enter all careers and the marginal 
earnings gains associated with education vary markedly among future work patterns.  
 The countries of interest in this study are Thailand and Indonesia. Chapters 2 
and 3 focus on the Thai rural economy using the nationally representative Socio-
Economic Survey (SES) panel collected annually between 2005 and 2007, and the 
subsequent round in early 2010. The SES data enable us to use individual observations 
over a longer period, and in a large-scale nationally representative survey, than do 
most prior RNFE studies. As a result, we can apply multiple empirical approaches for 
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robustness checks that need more than two periods of observation per individual. We 
can also use initial year attributes as initial controls and pre-determined covariates for 
regressors that are likely to be endogenous or co-determined with the dependent 
variable(s). More importantly, the data enable us to differentiate among alternative 
farm and non-farm occupations in a way that sheds light into rural development policy 
debates over whether to invest in promotinge rural household entrepreneurship as a 
means of stimulating business and employment creation. We also merge the household 
and individual level survey data with another, village-level dataset, the National Rural 
Development (NRD) census data set, to give more information on the conditions and 
infrastructure of the village and local economy. Although the Thai SES data attrition 
rate is not high, since our study follows only employed individuals and households in 
all four-survey waves, we pay considerable attention to possible biases introduced due 
to attrition, estimating and applying the inverse probability weights suggested by 
Fitzgerald et al. (1998) and Wooldridge (2002).  
The last chapter uses the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) in order to tap 
the richness of that 1993 to 2007 four wave panel data set. The IFLS enables us to 
match information on parents’ occupation and education, so as to generate credible 
instruments for the sector in which adult children work and to explore 
intergenerational effects on current individuals’ employment patterns. These controls 
enable us to address the likely endogeneity of individuals’ sector of employment so as 
to generate less biased estimates of the relationship between educational attainment 
and individual earnings across sectors and between the sexes, as discussed above. 
This dissertation represents an attempt to understand the dynamic role of the 
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RNFE on earnings mobility and occupational choice, and the prospectively 
heterogeneous role of human capital (especially that due to education) and financial 
capital on entry into, growth in, and earnings from the RNFE.  We contribute to the 
literature on the RNFE, rural entrepreneurship in developing countries, and labor 
economics. Results from the dissertation provide some interesting policy implications, 
which are discussed in each chapter. Of particular note are the following implications. 
There exists a striking mismatch between the jobs created by rural household 
enterprises, which represent less than one percent of household-owned enterprises in 
rural Thailand, and the jobs held by those who work for a salary or wages in the rural 
non-farm economy, who comprise a majority of the population. Our findings suggest 
that promoting rural non-farm employment by larger enterprises may be more 
important to rural income growth than promoting rural non-farm self-employment and 
household entrepreneurial activity that might not offer an adequately broad platform to 
facilitate agrarian transformation and rural earnings growth. Especially if promoting 
rural non-farm employment is a more expensive drain on the government budget than 
is encouraging larger, established private firms to establish new locations and jobs in 
rural areas. In addition, as we observe inter-sectoral difference in wages due to 
schooling, this has significant implications in optimal educational investments for 
parents who have different expectations in their children’s potential sector of 
employment. It also provides more understanding why we observed low educational 
investments when the estimated private returns to education in the literature are 
routinely high in low-income and middle-income countries. Although the study does 
not contribute to social returns to schooling in the way that the government use the 
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social rate in deciding their policy to implement, it at least helps in shaping the policy 
on how to promote educational attainment in respond to wage differentials in 
economies with imperfect intersectoral labor market integration. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FARM AND NON-FARM OCCUPATIONAL AND EARNING DYNAMICS  
IN RURAL THAILAND 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The rural non-farm economy (RNFE) is increasingly seen as a pathway out of 
poverty in low- and middle-income countries. As land becomes increasingly scarce, a 
transition to the rural non-farm sector becomes essential for many land-constrained 
rural households, a natural part of the ‘agricultural transformation’ intrinsic to 
economic development (Timmer 1988, 2002). Firms and activities in the RNFE 
provide essential linkages in the development process between agriculture and the 
macroeconomy, becoming a key contributor to increasing rural incomes, reducing 
poverty, and stimulating economic growth (Timmer 2002). Thus most rural 
households earn at least some income from non-farm sources, as non-farm workers, 
operating non-farm businesses, or both (Reardon 1997, Foster 2012).  
The growing number of empirical studies related to the RNFE can be divided 
into two general groups. The first group investigates the determinants of RNFE 
participation, either at household or individual levels (Gibson and Olivia, 2010; 
Jonasson and Helfand, 2010). The second group focuses on the impacts of RNFE 
participation on household income, rural poverty, and inequality (Reardon et al., 2000; 
Ferreira and Lanjouw, 2001; Cherdchuchai and Otsuka, 2006; Matsumoto et al., 2006; 
Hung et al., 2010). The literature relies overwhelmingly, however, on (repeated) cross-
sectional evidence. The dynamic role of the RNFE and occupational transitions on 
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rural household earnings has yet to be investigated intensively; Block and Webb 
(2001), Bezu et al. (2012) and Bezu and Barrett (2012) are notable exceptions that use 
longitudinal household-level data from Ethiopia, while Foster (2012) explores related 
issues using household-level panel data from India. Past research suggests that those 
engaged in highly productive non-farm activities typically enjoy upward earnings 
mobility (Barrett, Reardon and Webb 2001; Block and Webb 2001; Lanjouw, 2001; 
Bezu et al., 2012; Bezu and Barrett, 2012). Of course, it is also likely that individuals 
with higher initial wealth and human capital are more able to engage in high-return 
non-farm activities and benefit most from the RNFE, so there could be significant 
selection effects involved in this oft-found association (Barrett et al., 2005). As 
Banerjee and Newman (1993) theorize, in the presence of capital market imperfections, 
the ex ante poor tend to choose wage labor while the ex ante rich become 
entrepreneurs. Banerjee and Newman also emphasize the interplay between ‘the 
distribution of income and wealth’ and ‘the dynamics of occupational choice’, 
suggesting that people in developing countries do not have free choice over their 
occupations but rather face significant structural constraints. 
Evidence from many countries reveals considerable heterogeneity in the 
RNFE. But most household businesses consist either of self-employed enterprises 
without paid, non-family employees or small-sized firms with limited firm expansion 
(Fafchamps 1994; Haggblade et al., 2007). These businesses face several constraints, 
such as access to capital, skilled labor, entrepreneurial ability, and government registry 
requirements. Subsistence self-employment does not automatically transition into the 
enterprise growth that increases both the business owner’s household income and 
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employment within their region (Mondragon-Velez and Pena-Parga, 2008; de Mel et 
al., 2008; Schoar, 2010). It therefore seems important to differentiate between non-
farm self-employment without hired workers and those household enterprises that hire 
non-family members, which we term entrepreneurs. Little is known empirically about 
the earnings transitions between farm work, rural non-farm employment, and rural 
non-farm self-employment – with or without employees, especially with adequate 
controls for prospective unobserved heterogeneity associated with selection into 
distinct occupational groups.  
The same sort of differentiation exists and similar transitions are occurring 
within the farming sector in many developing countries.  Landless rural households 
commonly must rely on unskilled employment on others’ farms to earn a meager 
living.  These farmworkers are commonly the poorest members of rural communities. 
Farmers who neither work for others nor employ paid non-family workers historically 
represent a large-share of semi-subsistence producers. These are typically the 
‘smallholders’ around whom much of the rural and agricultural development discourse 
revolves. More skilled farmers with access to capital often expand their operations, 
adding paid employees as their transition from semi-subsistence to commercial 
cultivation.  But the transitions among farm worker, self-employed farming and farm 
employer status, as well as among those non-farm categories and three analogous 
occupational categories in the RNFE, remain poorly documented.      
This study helps to fill these gaps by exploring rural farm and non-farm 
occupational and earnings dynamics in rural Thailand, differentiating between 
employment, self-employment and entrepreneurship (i.e., an employer of paid non-
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family workers) in both the farm and non-farm sectors. More explicitly, the research 
questions this paper explores are as follows. First, what patterns of occupational 
transitions exist among farm workers, self-employed farmers, farm employers, non-
farm employees, the non-farm self-employed, and non-farm employers in rural 
Thailand? Second, how do occupational transitions affect directional earnings 
mobility? Which occupational shifts – e.g., from farm to non-farm employee or from 
non-farm self-employed to non-farm employer – are associated with people increasing 
or decreasing earnings when controlling for other characteristics?  
 There have been a few previous studies on occupational mobility in developing 
countries (Fuwa, 1999; Quadrini, 2000; Mondragon-Velez and Pena-Parga, 2008). 
Mondragon-Velez and Pena-Parga (2008), in particular, explore the transitions 
between unemployed, wage-earner, self-employed and business owner status in seven 
main cities in Colombia. They mainly focus on the determinants of entry into and exit 
from urban self-employment and business ownership. They find that most newly self-
employed and entrepreneurs transition from wage employment rather than from 
unemployment. However, they find extremely low transitions from self-employment 
to entrepreneurship (and vice versa). In studies of the determinants of income 
mobility, Cichello et al. (2005), Woolard and Klasen (2005), and Fields et al. (2005) 
found that the conditional effects of occupation and sector of employment were 
statistically significant in South Africa and Latin America.  
This paper uses the nationally representative Thai Socio-Economic Survey 
(SES) panel data collected annually between 2005 and 2007, and the subsequent round 
in early 2010. This study thus uses more rounds of nationally representative panel 
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data, with far more individual observations over a longer period, than any of the prior 
RNFE studies. This enables us to employ multiple empirical approaches, some of 
which would not be possible with simply two observations per individual or a much 
more modest number of observations, in order to more robustly identify the effects of 
occupational transitions on earnings dynamics in a nationally representative sample. It 
also enables us to differentiate among alternative farm and non-farm occupations in a 
way that matters fundamentally to rural development policy debates. 
Little is known about earnings and occupational mobility in rural Thailand. 
Isvilanonda et al. (2000) indicate the growing importance of income from non-rice 
crops and non-farm activities, using survey data from six villages in 1987 and 1998. 
They find that while the number of the poor declined, income inequality has increased. 
Cherdchuchai and Otsuka (2006), using the same baseline survey data in 1987 and a 
new survey in 2004, investigate a structural shift of household income away from farm 
to non-farm income sources. Unlike Isvilanonda et al. (2000), they find that non-farm 
employment expansion reduces the income gap and the difference in poverty 
incidence between prosperous and poor regions. However, neither of these two papers 
investigates earnings mobility as it relates to occupational transitions.  
We find significant occupational transitions over the course of just five years, 
mainly involving moves into farm self-employment and non-farm (salaried or wage) 
employee positions rather than into farm laborer, non-farm self-employment or farm 
or non-farm employer positions. A fairly strict ordering exists among different 
occupational groups, with farm workers’ earnings distribution first-order stochastically 
dominated by that of self-employed farmers, which is itself dominated by the farm 
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employer earnings distribution each year. No robust dominance ordering exists 
between farm employers and the non-farm self-employed, but the earnings 
distributions of non-farm employers and employees stochastically dominate those of 
the non-farm self-employed (without employees) and of all the farm sector earnings 
distributions. Given such an occupational ladder, transitions from farming into non-
farm employment therefore result in statistically significant income gains, on average, 
while moves into farming are associated with reduced earnings.  
That core finding of an occupational ladder is reinforced by directional 
earnings mobility regression analysis when tracking the same individuals over time. 
Only a small number of individuals become non-farm employers, the most 
remunerative occupation group, reflecting the difficulty inherent to establishing and 
maintaining a business with employees. Moreover, less than one percent of these 
household enterprises employ ten or more family members (Chawanote 2013), 
indicating limited employment generation potential through household-based non-
farm enterprises in rural Thailand. Our findings suggest that promoting rural non-farm 
employment by attracting established businesses, government or not-for-profit 
agencies may be more important to rural poverty reduction than promoting rural non-
farm self-employment in the hope that this leads to entrepreneurial rural non-farm job 
creation and higher rural household incomes.  
 
2.2 Data and background 
Thailand is a lower middle-income country by the World Bank’s classification, 
with GDP per capita of $8,004 in 2009. According to the World Bank 
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(http://data.worldbank.org/country/thailand), the $2/day per person poverty headcount 
ratio was 11.5 percent of population in 2004, down from 16.7 percent after the 1997-
98 financial crisis. The labor force participation rate was 73.2 percent of the total 
population ages 15 and above. Roughly 1.3 percent of the total labor force reported 
being unemployed between 2005 and 2009. Approximately 67 percent of the 
population from 2005 to 2009 lived in rural areas, with a steadily declining share 
employed in agriculture. 
The Thai SES panel data were collected by the National Statistical Office 
(NSO) of Thailand in 2005 – 2007 and 2010. The repeated cross-sectional rounds of 
the well-respected SES have been used frequently by leading researchers (e.g., Schultz 
1990, Paxson 1992, Mammen and Paxson 2000, Giné and Townsend 2004, Felkner 
and Townsend 2011). Beginning in 2005, NSO began tracking households and split-
off individuals from sample households to create proper panel data, although these 
panel data appear not to have been exploited much, if at all.1 We therefore take 
particular care to explore attrition patterns and their implications (Appendix A), so as 
to enhance the usefulness of this rich longitudinal data set for future researchers. 
For the first three rounds (2005-7), the survey was recorded in May, while the 
last (2010) round was surveyed in January. The survey has two main segments: i) 
household information on every member in the household, and ii) individual 
information on household members aged 15 years or older. Part one includes general 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The SES panel data have been used for internal government reports and by some research 
institutes in Thailand. But we can find no English language publications that exploit these 
important data, likely due to the facts that printed information on the panel is only available in 
the Thai language, thereby sharply limiting awareness of their availability, and that the data 
are not freely available to the public, but require a purchase contract with NSO approving their 
release and use.  
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information on household members, household characteristics and assets, and income 
from agriculture. Part two includes survey questions on education, health care, 
employment, incomes, expenditures, financial status (debt and savings), migration, 
and opinions on public policies. The survey covers every province in Thailand and 
randomly selects blocks of districts, sub-districts and villages, and finally selects ten 
households per village as in a two-stage stratified random sampling. 2 All statistics we 
report are adjusted for sampling weights.  
Table 2.1 summarizes the Thai SES panel data.3 The 2005 round surveyed 
6,000 households with a total of 16,310 individuals and 9,897 individuals in rural 
areas. All individuals age 15 and over were tracked in the following years’ surveys.  
Any adult who left the core household was tracked so long as they remained within 
Thailand and a new address for that split-off individual could be found by the survey 
team. Some individuals are missing from one round, but reappear in later rounds once 
they could be tracked again. We use only the balanced panel, in other words, only 
individuals present in all four rounds of the SES.  	  Due to split-off households and 
attrition, the total number of individuals aged 15 years or older surveyed in all four 
rounds is 12,758, of whom 7,831 lived in rural areas.  Given the substantial attrition, 
we take special care to control for the possible bias this might introduce (Appendix A). 
Since the Thai SES panel only surveys at household and individual level, we 
match it with another village-level dataset. A rural development census, the National 
Rural Development (NRD) data set, was collected at the village level by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Each rural sub-district in the SES panel data has only one village. 
3 Further explanation of the rural sample across years and attrition issues are provided in 
Appendix 2A. 
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Community Development Department of Thailand.4 NRD data that match the Thai 
SES panel data are only available for April to June 2005 and April to May 2007 and 
2009. The data cover general conditions of the village and local economy, including 
the availability of public services and infrastructure, health and sanitation, village 
educational achievement, and agroecological conditions.   
 
Table 2.1: Summary information on SES sample 
 
Year Individuals Rural Individuals Households Rural Households 
2005 16,310 9,897 6,000 3,680 
2006 16,542 10,208 6,020 3,752 
2007 16,490 10,350 5,955 3,783 
2010 17,045 10,915 6,244 4,002 
Observed all 4 years 12,758 7,831 5,229* 3,362* 
Observed all 4 years (age ≤ 70) 11,484 7,000   
% Rural by 3 year total  61.4%  64.3% 
* Based on the household ID that was recorded in 2005. 
 
 
2.2.1 Definition of rural non-farm employment 
We use only the Thai SES panel data on individuals who were employed in 
rural areas, including unpaid workers for household businesses, and those who were 
15-70 years old. Over the five-year period of SES data collection, the unemployment 
rates in the rural areas included in the study ranged from 0.5 to 1.1 percent while 
employment rates ranged from 76.1 to 79.9 percent.5 In the employment section of the 
SES, respondents were asked for their primary occupation, work status, and company 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The data are distributed by the University of Chicago-UTCC Research Center, Bangkok, 
Thailand. 
5 Other categories in the survey are waiting for seasonal work, looking for work, retired, long 
term illness and disabilities, caring for other household members, and going to school. We 
only focus on employment status since this better represents a group of earners and eliminates 
the possible variation in occupational transitions that would come with seasonal work. 
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size6 for each of up to three jobs that they had worked in the past 12 months.	  The first 
job recorded in the dataset reflects the individual’s current main job at the time of 
survey.7 It should not be affected by seasonality for those who are in the farming 
sector, given the survey timing. May is the beginning of the rice cultivation season in 
Northern and Central regions, rice harvesting season in Southern region, and other 
harvesting season for fruits in Eastern Thailand. Even though the 2010 survey round 
was in January, it is a main cultivation period for tapioca/cassava, cane, and other 
similar crops. The options for primary occupation in the survey are farmer/fisherman 
(crops, livestock, aquaculture, fishery, hunting and gathering), production (handicrafts 
and basic manufacturing), production (industry), merchandise/own business, 
government/state enterprise employee, company/business employee, and general 
worker/laborer. The work status question includes options for employer, self-
employed without employees, working without pay for household business, 
government employee, state enterprise employee, private company employee, and 
cooperative group. These two questions – primary occupation and work status – are 
used to separate non-farm activities from farm activities at the individual level and to 
differentiate among workers, the self-employed and employers in the farm and non-
farm sectors.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The company size, measured as the total number of workers including the owner, is 
categorized as 1 worker (i.e., no employees), 2-9 workers, 10-50 workers, 51-100 workers, 
101-200 workers, 201-500 workers, or over 500 workers. 
7 Five percent of 1st jobs were reported as having ended in the 12 months prior to the survey 
while around 99 percent of the 2nd and 3rd jobs were reported as having ended in the previous 
year. The length of time in 2nd jobs was consistently an order of magnitude shorter than in 1st 
jobs and time spent in 3rd jobs was only 16-25 % that in 2nd jobs. The 2nd and 3rd jobs reflect 
seasonal jobs or jobs that ended before the current, primary one. Dropping these short-term, 
temporary positions makes no qualitative difference to the analysis we report here. 
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Unfortunately, the household survey does not directly identify a respondent’s 
employer, so we cannot match employees with employers. We do, however, know the 
size distribution of individual respondents’ employers. As reflected in Table 2.2 for 
2005 and 2010 (the 2006 and 2007 data exhibit qualitatively identical patterns), at 
most one-third of rural non-farm employees work for private businesses with fewer 
than ten employees (grey-shaded cells).8 Consistent with evidence from high-income 
countries (e.g., Hurst and Pugsley 2011), parallel analysis of household enterprise data 
from the SES panel (Chawanote 2013) finds that less than one percent of household-
owned enterprises in rural Thailand employ ten or more workers and very few of these 
enterprises exhibit any statistically significant employment growth over the 2005-10 
period. 9  The striking mismatch between the jobs created by rural household 
enterprises and the jobs held by those who work for a salary or wages in the rural non-
farm economy carries important policy implications. Donors’ and governments’ 
present emphasis on promoting rural household non-farm entrepreneurial activity 
might not offer an adequately broad platform to facilitate agrarian transformation and 
rural earnings growth.  
     
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Furthermore, employees’ reports of small-sized state owned enterprise or government 
employers almost certainly refer to respondents’ immediate department/unit rather than to the 
entire agency. If similar underreporting of private firm size occurs, that reinforces our finding. 
9 Thailand’s most recent (2007) establishment enterprise survey, which covers only the 
manufacturing sector, reports that only 5.7 percent of enterprises employ more than 15 
workers. 
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Table 2.2: Sector of individual non-farm employment, by employer size (percent) 
 
2005 Government 
State owned 
enterprise Private sector Total  
  2-9 workers 3.6 0.1 36.0 39.8 
  10-50 workers 8.4 0.4 19.1 27.9 
  51-100 workers 2.1 0.0 3.5 5.7 
  101-200 workers 1.4 0.2 3.8 5.4 
  201-500 workers 0.6 0.0 4.8 5.4 
  over 500 workers 6.6 0.8 8.5 15.8 
Total  (n=1,540) 22.7 1.5 75.8 100.0 
2010      
  2-9 workers 3.6 0.2 31.4 35.2 
  10-50 workers 12.3 0.6 19.5 32.4 
  51-100 workers 3.0 0.2 6.0 9.2 
  101-200 workers 1.5 0.3 4.9 6.7 
  201-500 workers 0.6 0.1 5.7 6.4 
  over 500 workers 3.7 0.2 6.3 10.1 
Total  (n=1,355) 24.7 1.6 73.7 100.0 
Each cell reports a percentage of total non-farm employment.  
 
The rural non-farm sector includes all economic activities in rural areas except 
primary production in agriculture, livestock, fishing and hunting, and thus includes 
any employment in manufacturing, mining, trade, construction, transportation, 
communications, government and services (Lanjouw, 2001; Haggblade et al., 2002). 
Using this definition, those who reported their primary occupation as being anything 
other than farmer/fisherman are considered as working in the non-farm sector. 
Conversely, only those who reported their primary occupation as farmer/fisherman are 
considered as working in the farm sector.  
Previous studies that decompose rural non-farm employment have categorized 
it as either low-productivity wage labor or high-productivity salaried work or self-
employment (e.g., Barrett et al., 2005; Jonasson and Helfand, 2009; Bezu et. al., 
2012). In this study, however, entrepreneurship status is classified separately from 
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self-employment without employees as this differentiates what are sometimes referred 
to as “subsistence” from “transformational” entrepreneurs, with the latter being the 
prospective source of new RNFE jobs (Schoar, 2010). Any respondent who employed 
non-family members in any (farm) non-farm activity is considered a (‘farm employer’) 
‘non-farm employer’ or ‘entrepreneur’, while anyone self-employed without 
employees, working without pay for a household business, or working in a cooperative 
group is grouped into the ‘self-employment’ category, either self-employed farming 
for those with primary occupation in farming/fishing or non-farm self-employment 
otherwise. Both employers and the self-employed refer to those who operate their own 
business and receive business profits as their primary earnings. Finally, ‘employee’ 
includes salaried and waged workers, i.e., those employed by the government, state 
enterprises, or private companies or not-for-profit agencies, and who have no claim to 
business profits.  Farm workers are employees working for a farmer; non-farm 
employees work for an enterprise outside the farm sector. 
Table 2.3 summarizes individuals’ work status in rural Thailand. The 
percentage of workers in each occupation changed only slightly between 2005 and 
2010. Although farmers and farm workers represent a plurality of rural Thai workers 
and self-employed farmers are the single largest category in 2007 and 2010 and over 
the four year panel cumulatively, more people are employed primarily in non-farm 
occupations. Non-farm employees account for the largest proportion of non-farm 
sector workers, while non-farm employers account for only one percent of the total 
employed population in rural Thailand.  Similarly, farm employers account for only 
eight percent of the total farming population (farmers plus self-employed farmers) on 
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average over the 2005-10 period.  More than 90 percent of farm and non-farm 
business owners in rural Thailand do not create jobs outside the entrepreneur’s 
household and of those who become employers, less than one percent create 10 or 
more jobs. This is an important point largely missed in the literature and in 
contemporary policy dialogues, which emphasize promoting entrepreneurship to ignite 
employment in the rural non-farm economy. That supposed engine of growth seems to 
have relatively little power. 
 
Table 2.3: Work status in rural areas 
 
Work Status (ages 15-70 years) 2005 2006 2007 2010 
 N % N % N % N % 
Unemployed 72 1.0 75 1.1 70 1.0 38 0.5 
Other work status* 1,600 22.9 1,474 21.1 1,335 19.1 1,379 19.7 
Employed status in each year 5,328 76.1 5,451 77.9 5,595 79.9 5,583 79.8 
 - Employed < 4 waves 1,238 17.7 1,361 19.4 1,505 21.5 1,493 21.3 
 - Employed status in all 4 waves 4,090 58.4 4,090 58.4 4,090 58.4 4,090 58.4 
•       Self-employed farmer 1,415 20.2 1,514 21.6 1,623 23.2 1,734 24.8 
•       Farm worker 122 1.7 66 0.9 27 0.4 58 0.8 
•       Farm employer 225 3.2 171 2.4 104 1.5 127 1.8 
•       NF self-employed 733 10.5 727 10.4 781 11.2 738 10.5 
•       NF employee 1,540 22.0 1,546 22.1 1,496 21.4 1,362 19.5 
•       NF employer 53 1.3 64 0.9 56 0.8 65 0.9 
•       Missing data on   
      occupation 2 0.05 2 0.03 1 0.01 3 0.04 
Total 7,000   7,000   7,000   7,000   
*Other work status includes waiting for seasonal work, unemployed, looking for work, retired, 
long term illness/disability, caring for other household members, student, and others.	  
 
 
In the analysis that follows, we focus on the earnings and occupational 
dynamics of only those rural working age adults (15-70 years old) who were employed 
and surveyed in all four SES rounds, so as to avoid conflating transitions between 
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unemployment and employment with transitions among occupations. This introduces 
the possibility of attrition bias, either due to exits from the sample – due to 
outmigration, death, unavailability, or another reason – or because of one or more 
periods of unemployment during the SES rounds. Appendix 2A explores the 
possibility of non-random attrition in detail, demonstrating that attrition indeed 
appears non-random, although the attrition-corrected regression results reported in the 
main body of the paper are not statistically significantly different from the uncorrected 
results in Appendix 2A, Table A5-A7.  
 
2.2.2 Earnings 
 Individual earnings are decomposed by source: farm earnings, non-farm 
business profits, and wages or salaries. Farm earnings and non-farm business profits 
are recorded at the household level. We use individual work hours per week in each 
enterprise to assign individual farm income to individual household members based on 
their share of total family labor time allocated to the farm enterprise. Similarly, non-
farm business profits are allocated to all self-employed members in the household 
proportional to time self-employed members work in the household non-farm 
enterprise. Wage and salary earnings are already recorded at the individual worker 
level, where we also know the sector of employment. All earnings are adjusted for the 
consumer price index for each region of Thailand to put them in real 2007 baht 
terms.10  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Consumer price index data by region are reported by Thailand’s Ministry of Commerce 
(www.moc.go.th). 
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We focus on structural occupational transitions and individual earnings 
mobility 2005-2007-2010. This allows us to use village-level controls available from 
the NRD (which, as indicated previously, was not fielded in 2006 and 2008).  Plus, the 
longer spell length in the dynamics analysis minimizes the role of transitory shocks 
and measurement error, reducing the possibility of overstating structural economic 
mobility (Naschold and Barrett 2011). 
Table 2.4 shows mean earnings by quartiles conditional on each occupation 
and with the lowest and highest one percent of earnings in each year cut off so as to 
eliminate extreme outliers likely to reflect measurement error.11 On average, non-farm 
employers enjoy the highest earnings while farm workers receive the lowest earnings. 
Non-farm employees earn more on average than those engaged in non-farm self-
employment in every quartile, and farm employers in the fourth quartile earn more on 
average than do individuals with non-farm self-employment. Compared against the 
2007 rural poverty line of 1,333 Baht12 per capita per month, within the first quartile 
only non-farm employees and employers on average earn above the poverty line. But 
even the second quartile of self-employed farmers and, in most years, even the third 
quartile of farm workers, having mean earnings below the poverty line. Twenty 
percent of the rural employed fall under the poverty line; almost eighty percent of the 
rural poor are in farming. However, this is based solely on occupational earnings, 
excluding income from other sources such as remittances, incomes from house/land  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Note that the core qualitative results in the analysis that follow are robust to inclusion of 
these tail observations, but parameter estimates become considerably less precise when we 
incorporate these suspicious looking values. So we favor the analysis based on the trimmed 
sample. 
12 In 2007, there were 33.72 baht per US dollar, referencing from the Office of the National 
Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB). 
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Table 2.4: Mean individual earnings (per month) by quartile and occupation 
 
2005 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd  quartile 4th  quartile Overall 
Farm self-employed 437 1,306 2,554 7,289 3,385 
 
(242) (240) (465) (4,293) (3,679) 
Farm worker 0 79 533 2,116 645 
 
(0) (44) (263) (1,530) (1,150) 
Farm employer 676 1,995 3,716 12,083 5,219 
 
(347) (445) (809) (6,253) (5,792) 
NF self-employed 1,051 2,741 4,866 12,203 5,503 
 (649) (439) (822) (6,618) (5,484) 
NF employee 2,220 4,188 6,167 15,827 7,716 
 (800) (521) (760) (7,163) (6,667) 
NF employer 3,295 6,450 9,554 22,287 10,471 
  (1,379) (752) (1,383) (6,817) (8,197) 
      2007 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd  quartile 4th  quartile Overall 
Farm self-employed 389 1,147 2,358 7,020 3,250 
 
(223) (251) (509) (4,155) (3,619) 
Farm worker -34 NA NA 2,554 446 
 
(64) NA NA (2,020) (1,326) 
Farm employer 887 2,582 5,865 14,253 6,215 
 
(615) (611) (1,420) (7,071) (6,352) 
NF self-employed 1,060 3,073 5,837 12,868 6,178 
 (648) (637) (982) (5,812) (5,484) 
NF employee 2,423 4,550 6,688 16,907 8,542 
 (879) (482) (901) (8,277) (7,461) 
NF employer 4,305 9,674 16,601 24,278 13,286 
  (2,202) (1,508) (2,301) (6,130) (8,033) 
      2010 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd  quartile 4th  quartile Overall
Farm self-employed 331 1,390 2,831 9,090 3,867 
 
(450) (301) (647) (5,966) (4,809) 
Farm worker -18 NA 196 2,758 975 
 
(74) NA (3) (2,523) (1,989) 
Farm employer 1,211 3,086 5,463 19,660 7,999 
 
(552) (491) (1,200) (12,029) (9,740) 
NF self-employed 940 3,001 5,676 13,348 5,808 
 (593) (688) (863) (5,484) (5,528) 
NF employee 2,839 5,309 8,383 21,936 10,035 
 (1,123) (628) (1,377) (9,124) (9,045) 
NF employer 3,656 6,537 14,038 25,549 11,407 
  (806) (1,127) (3,295) (7,971) (8,934) 
Units are 2007 Thai baht. The lowest and highest one percent of the rural income percentiles in each 
year have been omitted. Quartiles are based on employed status in each year. Standard deviation is 
shown in parentheses for each quartile by occupation. Estimates not available (NA) because there are 
no observations in that quartile. 	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lending, or returns from financial assets. The poor seemed to be affected most by the 
country’s 2008-9 economic downturn as the earnings averages in the first quartile in 
2010 dropped from 2007, whereas the highest quartiles still enjoyed an increase in 
earnings on average. The economic slowdown also had an impact on non-farm 
businesses since earnings of both non-farm self-employed and employers in 2010 fell 
slightly from 2007. 
Figure 2.1 presents the cumulative frequency distributions of earnings by 
occupational status and sector in 2005 and 2010. Every other category’s earnings 
distribution first order stochastically dominates that of farm workers in each period, 
and the farm employer and each non-farm category’s earnings distribution first order 
stochastically dominates that of self-employed farming in each period. 13 These are 
striking results that clearly underscore the relative undesirability of farm work and 
semi-subsistence agriculture.  
Perhaps even more striking, however, no stochastic dominance ordering 
appears between the earnings distributions of farm employers – the largest, most 
commercial farm operations in the country – and the non-farm self-employed in any 
survey year. But each is at least second-order stochastically dominated by both the 
non-farm employee and employer earnings distributions in each year and first order 
dominate them in several years.These orderings are consistent with the results 
presented in Table 2.4, where the most desirable remunerative is non-farm employer 
followed by non-farm employee, non-farm self-employment, farm employer, self-
employed farming, and farm worker last of all, in that order. There is no statistically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 We use Davidson and Duclos’ (2000) test to confirm all the stochastic dominance results 
reported here.  
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significant stochastic dominance ordering between the two dominant (non-farm 
employee and non-farm employer) distributions due to a small number of low earnings 
draws among non-farm employers. But mean earnings for non-farm employers are 
considerably higher, albeit with the gap closing over the 2005-10 period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Cumulative distribution by occupation, 2005 and 2010 
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2.3 Earnings changes and occupational transitions 
Having already observed a clear earnings distribution ordering among 
occupations in each year, we would expect that any transitions from farm work or 
from self-employed farming into rural non-farm occupations should be associated with 
increased earnings, as should transitions from farm employer or non-farm self-
employment to non-farm employee or non-farm employer status.  Conversely, 
transitions into farming, or into non-farm self-employment from the other two non-
farm occupational categories, should be associated with reduced earnings, as should 
any transitions into being a farm worker or transitions into self-employed farming 
from any occupation other than farm worker. This intuition is confirmed by extending 
the repeated cross-sectional analysis to intertemporal transitions. 
The transition matrices presented in Table 2.5 describe movement across farm 
and non-farm employment categories. The percentage change is calculated to show 
how occupational status in 2005 (row) changed by 2010 (column). Other than for farm 
and non-farm employers and farm workers, work status primarily remains the same 
across the five years, with 63-74 percent of each group remaining in their original 
occupational sector. But almost 30 percent of 2005 non-farm employers had shed their 
employees and converted to merely self-employed status by 2010 while around 40 
percent maintained their non-farm employer status for those five years, although the 
sub-sample size is small. Farm employers have an even tougher time maintaining jobs, 
as only 19 percent of those who had paid workers in 2005 still employed non-family 
members in 2010. Nearly 70 percent of those who were farm employers in 2005 had 
reverted back to self-employed farming by 2010. Although these larger, more 
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commercially oriented enterprises are the most remunerative within their respective 
sectors, it is clearly difficult to maintain a household business that employs others, 
whether in the farm or non-farm sectors. 
 
Table 2.5: Transition matrix of occupational changes 2005/2010 	  
Farm and Non-farm Farm employment 2010   Non-farm (NF) employment 2010   
employment 2005 Self-employed Employee Employer  
Self-
employed Employee Employer Total 
Farm self-employed           
 - Number 1,040 18 47  117 173 7 1,412 
 - Row percentage 73.7 1.3 4.0   8.3 12.3 0.5 100.0 
Farm employee      
	   	   	  
	  	  
- Number 62 6 2  6 46 0 122 
- Row percentage 50.8 4.9 1.6   4.9 37.7 0.0 100.0 
Farm employer 
	  
    
	   	   	  
	  	  
- Number 154 1 43  11 14 2 225 
- Row percentage 68.4 0.4 19.1   4.9 6.2 0.9 100.0 
NF self-employed           
 - Number 139 3 11  462 93 24 732 
 - Row percentage 19.0 0.4 1.5   63.1 12.7 3.3 100.0 
NF employee           
 - Number 329 30 13  127 1,028 11 1,538 
 - Row percentage 21.4 2.0 0.9   8.3 66.8 0.7 100.0 
NF employer           
 - Number 8 0 1  15 8 21 53 
 - Row percentage 15.1 0.0 1.9   28.3 15.1 39.6 100.0 
Total 1,732 58 127   738 1,362 65 4,082 
- Row percentage 42.4 1.4 3.2   18.1 33.4 1.6 100.0 
The total number of individuals here differs from that reported in Table 2 because some employed 
individuals are missing data on occupation
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At the other of the earnings spectrum, farm workers are the individuals most 
likely to transition out of that status.  Only five percent of those whose primary 
employment was as a hired farm worker in 2005 were still relying primarily on 
agricultural wage labor in 2010. More than 55 percent had escaped to self-
employment, mainly in farming but also in the non-farm sector to a substantial degree.  
The extraordinarily high rate of occupational mobility out of hired farm labor 
underscores the unattractive earnings prospects of those forced to rely on agricultural 
wage labor for their primary livelihood.  
As one would expect, transitions are more from farming into more 
remunerative non-farm employment. However, far more people slip from non-farm 
self-employment into farming than graduate into the most remunerative non-farm 
employee or employer positions. Likewise, almost 12 times more non-farm employees 
slip back into non-farm self-employment than graduate into becoming non-farm 
employers. The non-farm self-employed are more likely to transition into employer 
status than are those who did not previously run a non-farm business. But as in 
Mondragon-Velez and Pena-Parga (2008), we find an extremely low transition rate 
into being a non-farm employer, just 3.3 percent of the non-farm self-employed and 
less than one percent of each of the other four occupational categories. 
These results strongly suggest a ‘gravity effect’ on the occupation ladder: it is 
easier to move down into lower-return occupations than up into higher-return ones, 
although it is relatively easy to take a single step up the ladder, from agricultural wage 
labor to self-employed farming. These transition patterns indicate the difficulty of 
starting and expanding a non-farm business or even securing paid non-farm 
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employment, since the earnings distributions for those two occupational groups first 
order stochastically dominate the earnings distributions of the other two categories. It 
is even difficult for farmers to start or expand agricultural operations to employ non-
family members or even to maintain a farm payroll. Constraints may include 
differences in physical and human asset endowments, access to finance, social 
connections, etc. We discuss these issues more in section 4 when we investigate the 
determinants of occupational transitions.  
 Table 2.6 presents the median, mean and standard deviation percentage real 
earnings changes associated with each transition. None of the earnings changes are 
statistically significantly different from zero, reflecting the considerable dispersion 
observed in unconditional earnings transitions. The mean and median patterns are 
similar in their directional changes. Individuals who remained in their initial 
occupational categories, except farm workers, enjoyed positive mean changes in 
earnings. Movement from farming into any non-farm employment generates earnings 
gains, on average, while moving into farm employment or self-employed farming is 
associated with earnings losses, on average. But note that of the roughly 40 percent of 
non-farm employers who maintain their business and employees over the course of 
five years, most suffered a decline in earnings over the 2005-10 period.  This 
underscores the considerable challenge of maintaining, much less growing 
employment through nonfarm household enterprises in rural Thailand. 
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Table 2.6: Transition matrix of median and mean percentage change in earnings 
2005/2010 
Farm and Non-farm Farm employment 2010   Non-farm (NF) employment 2010 
employment 2005 Self-employed Employee Employer  
Self-
employed Employee Employer 
Farm self-employed        
 - Median of ΔY 225 -782 2,164  887 2,754 7,499 
 - Mean of %ΔY 1.11 -0.06 1.51  2.41 3.52 5.43 
 - (s.d.) (3.08) (1.55) (2.90)  (5.21) (5.56) (7.79) 
Farm employee        
 - Median of ΔY 1,839 0 1,111  5,889 4,628 NA 
 - Mean of %ΔY 3.84 -1.12 14.18  3.22 8.08 NA 
 - (s.d.) (5.80) NA NA  (6.47) (6.25) NA 
Farm employer        
 - Median of ΔY 542 -2,579 1,098  4,428 2,222 15,261 
 - Mean of %ΔY 1.03 -1.00 0.89  3.37 4.19 5.53 
 - (s.d.) (2.84) NA (2.12)  (3.62) (7.72) (7.86) 
NF self-employed        
 - Median of ΔY -479 -838 2,153  479 1,538 -190 
 - Mean of %ΔY 0.82 -0.23 2.47  1.09 0.98 0.69 
 - (s.d.) (3.14) (0.65) (4.33)  (3.29) (1.97) (2.61) 
NF employee        
 - Median of ΔY -1,251 -4,329 1,931  -1,056 957 5,604 
 - Mean of %ΔY 0.11 -0.74 1.60  0.36 0.32 1.02 
 - (s.d.) (1.93) (0.49) (3.35)  (1.87) (0.95) (1.16) 
NF employer 
        - Median of ΔY -2,209 NA -1,306 
 
416 2,279 -2,107 
 - Mean of %ΔY -0.27 NA -0.34 
 
-0.10 0.19 0.60 
 - (s.d.) (0.84) NA NA 
 
(0.60) (0.78) (1.30) 
Earnings changes (ΔY) are in real Thai baht, adjusted by CPI for each region of Thailand with 
base year 2007. The reported statistics omit the top and the bottom one percent of the sample 
and correct for attrition weights as described in Appendix 2A. 
 
 We can generalize this analysis to explore the full distribution of earnings 
changes associated with each transition (Figure 2.2), dropping the lowest and highest 
one percent of earnings changes. From this point on, we begin aggregating the three 
farm sector occupations (agricultural wage laborer, self-employer farmer, and farm 
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employer) because the small number of observations of farm employees and 
employers makes disaggregated, conditional mobility analysis infeasible for those 
subgroups. The fact that the farm sector occupations are strictly orderable internally 
and uniformly stochastically dominated by non-farm employment and non-farm 
entrepreneurship enables us to use this aggregation without losing important nuance 
that might matter for policy-related inferences. 
The plots in Figure 2.2 show that some earnings changes distributions first 
order stochastically dominate others, although there is no clear and consistent ranking 
among the distributions of earnings changes of initial employer positions based on 
stochastic dominance tests. For those initially in the farm sector, the transition to non-
farm employee status first order stochastically dominates staying in the farm sector. 
However, none of these earnings changes distributions reveal statistically significant, 
second order stochastically dominant transitions into non-farm self-employment, nor 
consistently significant transitions into non-farm employee or employer status. 
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        (a) Transitions from farm                    (b) Transitions from non-farm employee 
  
(c) Transitions from non-farm self-employed      (d) Transitions from non-farm employer 
 
Figure 2.2: Cumulative distribution of change in earnings  
by occupational transition between 2005 and 2007 
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2.4 Multivariate analysis of occupational shifts and earning mobility 
2.4.1 Empirical model 
 Especially given the absence of an explicit earnings change ordering among 
occupational transitions and the non-random nature of those transitions, multivariate 
regression analysis can help us better understand how changes in earnings associate 
with farm and non-farm occupational shifts. We emphasize that in these observational 
data, it is exceedingly difficult to control for all prospective sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity that might generate selection effects or spurious correlation between 
occupational transitions and earnings dynamics. We can convincingly establish 
associations only. But by employing a range of controls and estimation techniques, 
each aimed at addressing a different source of prospective bias, we can check if the 
core qualitative results are robust to a range of statistical corrections that are each 
incomplete and imperfect but as a set offer a reasonably comprehensive approach to 
check the core results. The robustness of the findings and the quality of the data give 
us confidence that the strong and consistent statistical associations we find likely 
indicate a true causal relationship between occupational transitions and earnings 
dynamics in rural Thailand.   
We employ a conditional mobility model in which change in earnings or 
change in log earnings are regressed on time-invariant and time-varying individual 
characteristics. In this class of model, changes in earnings are explained by initial 
earnings, gender, age, educational attainment, sector of employment, and geographic 
region, with occupation and sector of employment typically considered time-varying 
variables (Cichello et al., 2005; Fields, 2007). This framework allows us to explore 
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how occupational shifts change earnings when controlling for other observable 
characteristics that are almost surely correlated with both earnings dynamics and 
occupational patterns. Following Fields (2007), the conditional micro mobility model 
is defined as: 
Δ ln yit = α + β1ln yi,t-1 + t ln yi,t-1 β2 +ΔXitβ3 + Ziβ4 + ϕi + λt +εit          (2.1) 
where Δ ln yit is the change in log reported real earnings from year t-1 to year t and ln 
yi,t-1 is the prior survey year’s log reported real earnings, included as a control for 
autocorrelation.14 Because the periodicity of the SES panel changed, from one year 
revisits between the 2005, 2006 and 2007 rounds, to a three year revisit in the 2010 
round, we do not impose a single autocorrelation parameter. Instead, we add 
interaction terms between the base year earnings and year dummies for the 2006-7 and 
2007-10 transitions. Zi denotes a matrix of time-invariant individual and household 
characteristics, as observed in the initial year. Both age and age squared are included 
to control for life cycle effects that should be reflected in a positive (negative) sign on 
the linear (quadratic) term. Education is recorded as the highest level completed, with 
dummy variables for primary school, secondary school, high school/vocational school, 
and college degree and above, with less than primary school or none as a base level. 
Gender is described with a dummy variable taking value one for females, and marital 
status is described with a dummy taking value one for married persons. Since the 
observations are at the individual level, a dummy for household head is also included, 
as well as family size. An initial year asset index and household owned agricultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 We use a logarithmic specification because it substantially improves goodness of fit relative 
to using earnings levels.	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land separately from the asset index are also included to control for household capital 
endowments.15 ΔXit denotes employment transition experiences, which are represented 
by dummy variables for fifteen possible transitions, with staying in farm work as a 
base case. Finally,  is a vector of sub-district fixed effects, λ is a vector of time fixed 
effects, and εit is a mean zero i.i.d error term, corrected for clustering and potential 
heteroskedasticity.  
We hypothesize that the sectoral transitions’ coefficient estimates in the log 
earnings equation follow the same ordering found in the unconditional analyses 
reported in section 2.3, even after controlling for individual and household 
characteristics. Moreover, we can also test the differences between occupational 
transitions’ coefficients, given the initial or previous job, for earnings changes 
associated with those occupational shifts, similar to testing for stochastic dominance in 
Figure 2. That is, transitions into (out of) farming, or into (out of) non-farm self-
employment from the other two non-farm occupational categories should be 
associated with reduced (increased) earnings. 
 
2.4.2 Empirical results 
 Table 2.7 provides descriptive statistics of these variables for the whole 
sample and for each group. Given each group in 2005, the mean of the asset index is 
the highest for non-farm employers and lowest for farmers, although there is not much 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The estimation details of the asset index, constructed using factor analysis following Sahn 
and Stifel (2003), are reported in Appendix 2B. The index includes number of rooms, housing 
materials, electricity, cooking fuels, water supply, toilet, number of durable goods (e.g., 
microwave, refrigerator, air conditioner, fan, television, radio, VCD-DVD player, washing 
machine, cable television, cell phone, landline, computer and internet), number of vehicles 
(motorcycles, cars, trucks, tractors), and livestock. 
 φ
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difference in means of the asset index between non-farm self-employment and non-
farm employees. Non-farm employees have the highest proportion of college 
graduates as opposed to farmers that have the highest proportion of primary school 
graduates. 
 The estimation results, using 2005-6, 2006-7, and 2007-10 transitions and 
annualized log earnings changes, are reported in Table 2.8.16 Model (1) is estimated by 
OLS with bootstrapped standard errors and controlling for sub-district fixed effects. 
The occupational transition variables are jointly statistically significant in determining 
log earnings change. The occupational transitions’ coefficient estimates show that 
individuals who were employed in non-farm activities and who remained in their 
initial positions all enjoyed a statistically significant gain in earnings relative to 
individuals who remained in farming. Conversely, those who transitioned into farming 
from non-farm occupations suffered statistically significant earnings losses compared 
to those individuals who stayed in farming.  Meanwhile, all of the movements out of 
the farming sector result in statistically significantly positive log earnings changes. In 
every case, the highest point estimate for log earnings change is associated with 
movement into (or remaining) a non-farm employer, and is statistically significant. All 
of these point estimates are compared to the base case of staying in the farm sector. 
The conditional effects of age, education, marital status, gender, and household asset 
holdings all have the expected signs and are individually and jointly statistically 
significantly different from zero. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The estimation results with absolute earnings, rather than log earnings, are qualitatively 
similar, as reported in Appendix Table C1. 
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Table 2.7: Summary statistics of variables used in the multivariate analysis 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Description 
Individual characteristics   All in year 2005 from SES 
Age 38.48 10.86 Individual’s years of age 
Age2 1598.81 871.57 Square of individual’s years of age 
HH head 0.41 0.49 = 1 if individual is a household head; 0 otherwise 
Married 0.80 0.40 = 1 if marital status is married; 0 otherwise 
Female 0.42 0.49 = 1 if gender is female; 0 otherwise 
Education (Base: None/less than primary school)  
- Primary school 0.61 0.49 = 1 if completed the primary school (grade 6) 
- Secondary school 0.13 0.34 = 1 if completed the secondary school (grade 9) 
- High/Vocational school 0.15 0.36 = 1 if completed the high/vocational school (grade 12) 
- College and above 0.07 0.26 = 1 if completed college level or higher level 
Total working months 72.89 100.55 How long has individual been working in this 
occupation 
    
Household characteristics    
Family size 4.26 1.72 Number of members in the household 
Owned agricultural land 3.85 10.81 Agricultural area owned by household  
(100 Tarang-wa unit; 1 Tarang-wa = 400 m2)	 
Asset Index 0.24 1.05 Asset index for household wealth based on housing 
characteristics, durable goods, and agricultural lands 
    
 
  Farm work 
NF self-
employed NF employees NF employers 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Individual characteristics 
       Age 40.31 10.92 39.93 11.32 36.06 10.14 39.26 10.21 
HH head 0.43 0.50 0.37 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.78 0.42 
Married 0.84 0.37 0.84 0.37 0.75 0.43 0.90 0.30 
Female 0.40 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.37 0.48 0.14 0.35 
Education    
     - Primary school 0.75 0.43 0.62 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.42 0.50 
- Secondary school 0.10 0.30 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.37 
- High/Vocational school 0.09 0.29 0.13 0.34 0.20 0.40 0.35 0.48 
- College and above 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.17 0.15 0.36 0.04 0.20 
Total working months 78.06 111.58 63.11 86.65 71.90 94.52 76.42 94.91 
    
     Household characteristics   
Family size 4.28 1.64 4.20 1.74 4.27 1.75 4.31 2.49 
Owned agricultural land 6.62 14.84 2.22 5.07 1.86 5.92 3.35 18.17 
Asset Index -0.03 0.89 0.45 0.85 0.39 1.15 1.14 1.91 
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Table 2.8: Multivariate regressions of log earnings change on sector transitions 
and other covariates (Equation 2.1) 
 
 
Dependent V: Δ ln yit (1) OLS 
(Bootstrap s.e.) 
(2) Individual 
fixed effects (FE) 
(3) Hausman-Taylor 
(random effects) 
  Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Log(earning (t-1)) -0.82*** 0.03 -0.91*** 0.03 -0.85*** 0.02 
Log(earning (t-1))*t_06 0.02 0.04 0.01** 0.003 0.004** 0.001 
Log(earning (t-1))*t_07 0.40*** 0.03 0.01*** 0.003 0.01*** 0.001 
Sector transitions       
Farm to (farm: base)       
  NF self-employed 0.35*** 0.08 0.16 0.15 0.27*** 0.10 
  NF employee 0.66*** 0.06 0.87*** 0.30 0.78*** 0.08 
  NF employer 1.05*** 0.22 1.10*** 0.38 1.00*** 0.33 
NF self-employed to       
   Farm -0.0002 0.06 -0.12 0.24 -0.08 0.08 
   NF self-employed 0.46*** 0.05 0.37** 0.19 0.46*** 0.09 
   NF employee 0.41*** 0.06 0.62*** 0.23 0.61*** 0.09 
   NF employer 0.72*** 0.09 0.29 0.20 0.47*** 0.14 
NF employee to       
   Farm -0.24*** 0.05 0.25 0.24 0.06 0.06 
   NF self-employed 0.34*** 0.06 0.57** 0.23 0.62*** 0.09 
   NF employee 0.59*** 0.04 0.77*** 0.24 0.89*** 0.08 
   NF employer 0.89*** 0.20 1.02*** 0.29 1.08*** 0.25 
NF employer to       
   Farm 0.02 0.23 -0.06 0.27 -0.02 0.25 
   NF self-employed 0.54*** 0.10 0.22 0.24 0.35 0.23 
   NF employee 0.34** 0.15 0.41* 0.24 0.48*** 0.17 
   NF employer 0.75*** 0.09 0.22 0.28 0.50* 0.28 
Age 0.03*** 0.01   -0.05*** 0.01 
Age2 -0.0004*** 0.0001   0.0005*** 0.0001 
HH head 0.08*** 0.02   0.13*** 0.03 
Married 0.04 0.03   0.11*** 0.04 
Female -0.05*** 0.02   -0.04 0.03 
Education (Less than primary school/none:base)     
  Primary school 0.08 0.06   -0.31*** 0.07 
  Secondary school 0.15** 0.06   -0.34*** 0.08 
  High/Vocational school 0.27*** 0.07   -0.20** 0.08 
  College and above 0.61*** 0.07   0.08 0.09 
Total working months 0.0003*** 0.0001   0.0001 0.0001 
Family size -0.01* 0.01   -0.06*** 0.01 
Owned agricultural land 0.005* 0.0001   0.01* 0.004 
Asset Index 0.18*** 0.02   0.33*** 0.02 
Time effect (2006) -0.11 0.48     
Time effect (2007) -4.26*** 0.32         
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 (1) OLS 
(Bootstrap s.e.) 
(2) Individual 
fixed effects (FE) 
(3) Hausman-Taylor 
(random effects) 
Individual fixed effects No  Yes  Random effects 
Sub-district fixed effects Yes  No  No  
Constant 7.76*** 0.37 9.18*** 0.34 10.25*** 0.40 
Adjusted R2 0.70   0.54       
Wald test (bootstrapped) 4027.21***       4373.30***   
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. Variance-covariance matrices are clustered at sub-district level for 
Model (1) and (2), and are bootstrapped for Model (1) and (3). Model (2) uses attrition weights, as 
described in Appendix 2A. We omit the top and the bottom one percent of the sample used, yielding 
11,358 observations used. 
 
 
 However, other unobserved characteristics may be confounding the OLS 
estimates in Model (1). The five-year, four-round panel data offers the opportunity, 
however, to control for individual-level fixed effects so as to control for time invariant 
unobservables. We present those estimates as model (2).  Because one might be 
interested in the coefficient estimates on the time invariant individual and household 
characteristics, model (3) presents results using a Hausman-Taylor estimator, an 
instrumental variables approach that enables estimation of the coefficients of time-
invariant regressors while still controlling for individual-level random effects. 
 In the individual fixed effects model, almost all of the occupational transitions 
still have statistically significantly positive estimated effects on log earnings changes 
with an ordering in magnitude that mirrors the unconditional earnings orderings 
apparent in Figure 2.1. Only transitions from non-farm self-employment and employer 
positions into non-farm employees have greater estimated expected percentage change 
than those transitions into or remaining non-farm employers. However, there is no 
statistically significant difference between the coefficient estimates of remaining non-
farm employers and transition into non-farm employee status (Table 2.9). 
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Qualitatively similar results emerge from model (3)’s Hausman-Taylor (H-T) 
estimates. The major gains come from becoming a non-farm employee and all 
transitions out of farming are associated with gains relative to remaining in agriculture 
as a primary occupation. Although the sign and statistical significance of the H-T 
coefficient estimates of the time-invariant observed characteristics are similar to those 
in OLS estimation, the sign and significance of the H-T coefficient estimates on age 
and education are the opposite. However, if one looks at the absolute earnings (rather 
than log earnings) H-T regressions (reported in Appendix Table C1), these signs on 
age, high school and college attainment are the same as the OLS estimators and the 
coefficient estimates are statistically significant. In particular, there are noticeable life 
cycle, gender and family size effects, while both higher individual educational 
attainment and greater household assets strongly and statistically significantly increase 
earnings. 17  
 Table 2.9 presents the estimated differences in log earnings changes among 
occupational transitions compared within each possible past occupation, instead of 
remaining in farming as a base case, similar to the earnings dominance tests in Figure 
2.2. The results confirm that moving to the farm sector from any non-farm occupation 
leads to statistically significantly lower earnings changes. Moving into the farm sector 
results in earnings changes 46-54 percentage points lower as compared to staying in 
non-farm self-employment. On average, movements into the non-farm sector increase 
earnings relative to remaining in farming. By contrast, shifting between non-farm 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 As described in Appendix 2A, when we correct for non-random attrition using inverse 
probability weights, the coefficient estimates do not change significantly. See, in particular, 
Appendix Tables A5-A7. 
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sectors results in mixed outcomes. In the fixed effects models, for someone who is 
self-employed, becoming a non-farm worker increases earnings 33 percentage points 
relative to becoming a non-farm employer. In most cases, transitions from any of the 
non-farm occupations into another non-farm position lead to lower earnings growth 
than does staying. The lone exception is transitions from non-farm self-employment to 
being a non-farm employee, which is associated with a 15-25 percentage point 
increase in earnings, reinforcing the general impression that self-employment is less 
desirable than permanent salaried or wage employment. That result appears to hold 
even when controlling for characteristics and constraints. 
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Table 2.9: Change in estimated log earnings differences by sectoral transition 
 
                                  Model from Table 8: (1) OLS (2) FE (3) H-T 
Sectoral transitions differences differences differences 
From farm:     
to NF self-employed vs. to NF worker -0.31*** -0.71*** -0.51*** 
to NF self-employed vs. to NF employer -0.70*** -0.94** -0.73** 
to NF worker  vs. to NF employer -0.39* -0.23 -0.21 
    
From NF self-employed: 
   to farm vs. stay NF self-employed  -0.46*** -0.50*** -0.54*** 
to farm vs. to NF worker -0.41*** -0.75*** -0.69*** 
to farm vs. to NF employer -0.72*** -0.42** -0.55*** 
stay NF self-employed vs. to NF worker 0.05 -0.25* -0.15* 
stay NF self-employed vs. to NF employer -0.26*** 0.08 -0.01 
to NF worker vs. to NF employer -0.31*** 0.33** 0.14 
    
From NF worker: 
   to farm vs. to NF self-employed -0.58*** -0.32** -0.56*** 
to farm vs. stay NF worker -0.84*** -0.52*** -0.83*** 
to farm vs. to NF employer -1.14*** -0.77*** -1.02*** 
to NF self-employed vs. stay NF worker -0.25*** -0.20** -0.27*** 
to NF self-employed vs. to NF employer -0.55*** -0.45** -0.46* 
stay NF worker vs. to NF employer -0.30 -0.25 -0.19 
    
From NF employer: 
   to farm vs. to NF self-employed -0.52** -0.28 -0.37 
to farm vs. to NF worker -0.32 -0.47* -0.50* 
to farm vs. stay NF employer -0.73*** -0.28 -0.52* 
to NF self-employed vs. to NF worker 0.19 -0.19 -0.13 
to NF self-employed vs. stay NF employer -0.22* -0.01 -0.15 
to NF worker vs. stay NF employer -0.51** 0.18 -0.01 
Note: A negative entry implies that the latter transition (e.g., from farm to NF worker, 
in the first row) yields a higher expected log earnings change than does the former 
(e.g., from farm to NF self-employed, in the first row); and vice versa for positive 
entries.  *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant differences at the 10, 5 and 1 % 
levels, respectively. 
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2.4.3 Robustness checks 
 Although the previous regressions use individual fixed effects to control for 
unobserved time invariant characteristics in an attempt to disentangle the influence of 
occupational shifts on changes in earnings, time-varying unobservables could still 
drive both changes in earnings and in occupation, leading to spurious correlation that 
would undercut the argument that occupational transitions drive earnings gains. One 
important prospective class of time-varying factors unobserved in the SES data that 
could have such effects is village-level environmental and infrastructure variables. 
Improvements in village-scale infrastructure – roads, water, electricity, etc. – can 
change both the absolute and relative productivity of different occupations, thereby 
causing individual occupational transitions and hence earnings changes. Controlling 
for changes in infrastructure can therefore substantially obviate this prospective 
problem. Moreover, there might be costs associated with changing sectors and these 
costs (e.g, job search), are likely to decrease with the number of jobs and the rate of 
job growth in the local economy (Neal 1995). We therefore also control for total 
months spent working in the respondent’s current job and changes in the ratio of total 
households working in particular occupations within the village. The ratios are 
calculated from the NRD data set to represent village employment conditions that 
could affect occupational switching in the village. 
One approach to addressing the concern that time-varying unobservables might 
affect both earnings dynamics and occupational transitions is to predict the probability 
of these occupational movements in a first stage and then to use these predicted 
transition probabilities in two-stage estimation of equation (2.1). In order to do that, 
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we have to first estimate the occupational transition probabilities using multinomial 
logit models, then use the predicted probabilities of occupational transition as 
explanatory variables in the second stage, log earnings regression. Our instruments are 
changes in village characteristics, reflecting changes in infrastructure and agricultural 
circumstances that affect the occupational choice decisions. This identification allows 
for more variation across villages while still allowing for variation in individual 
characteristics within villages. The first stage multinomial logit estimation details are 
discussed in Appendix 2D. 
Table 2.10 reports the results of both OLS and instrumental variables 
regressions, with control variables from the previous survey round and annualized log 
earnings changes (2005-7 and 2007-10) as the dependent variable. Since we estimate 
each regression separately given the initial occupation in the first stage, the second 
stage must also be separately estimated for the three occupations besides non-farm 
employer. Because of the small number of observations of non-farm employers, we 
cannot estimate a multinomial logit for the base position of non-farm employers. The 
average of the predicted probabilities in each initial group is the same as the percent 
share reported in the transition matrix given each original occupation (Table 2.5). In 
each equation, each sector transition is compared to staying in the original sector. The 
magnitudes of the control variables’ coefficient estimates and their statistical 
significance are similar in both the OLS and IV estimations. But although the IV 
estimates on occupational transitions are generally consistent in sign and magnitude 
with the OLS estimates and with Table 2.8’s pooled estimates, and jointly statistically 
significant, only a few of them are individually statistically significant. This likely  
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reflects both the usual instrumental variables problem of lost efficiency and the 
problem of splitting the sample into smaller subsamples conditional on initial 
occupation, thus generating imprecise parameter estimates.18 
As another robustness check we estimate a multinomial logit model correcting 
for selection bias, following Dubin and McFadden (1984) and Bourguignon et al. 
(2007). Occupational changes might be subject to both selection bias and endogeneity. 
If each group of individuals that shifts occupation differs systematically in their 
unobservable characteristics (e.g., skills, motivation, ability), then regression results 
based on individuals’ observed characteristics will be biased. This method has been 
implemented mostly in studies of wage determinants since individuals self-select into 
their industry of employment. It is likely that unobservable characteristics affecting 
wage rates also simultaneously determine selection into the sector in which individuals 
work. As described in Appendix 2E, we look at occupational changes that affect 
earnings changes. Instead of only estimating coefficients, we calculate 
for j,k = 0, 1, 2, 3. The estimated average earnings changes are 
presented in Table 11. Most of them are statistically significantly different from zero 
and show the expected signs, consistent with the earnings orderings manifest in the 
unconditional analyses described earlier. On average, shifting from farming to non-
farm self-employment and non-farm employee sectors increases earnings change the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 When predicted probabilities are used as instruments of the actual transitions, we readily 
reject the null hypothesis of underidentification based on the Kleibergen Paap 
underidentification LM and Wald tests. Although the models are identified, only for the 
farmer-based equation do we reject the null with an Anderson-Rubin test for weak-
identification-robust inference. 	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most, by 32 and 57 percentage points, respectively. However, the coefficients of the 
second stage regression, especially the coefficients on the selection bias correction 
terms are statistically insignificant (Tables E1-E3). But the results of this robustness 
check are consistent with the previous, individual-level fixed effects and Hausman-
Taylor estimates, as well as with the unconditional earnings orderings displayed in 
Figure 2.2. So the core story appears robust to any of a variety of different approaches 
that attempt to correct for prospective statistical weaknesses in any single estimation 
strategy we can apply. 
 
Table 2.11: Average log earnings changes from  
the selection bias correction estimations 
 
 
 Std Dev. 
Farm to   
   Farm              0.05*** 0.38 
   NF self-employed             0.32*** 0.73 
   NF employee             0.57*** 0.73 
                   
NF self-employed to 
     Farm             -0.03 1.09 
   NF self-employed             0.06*** 0.36 
   NF employee             0.10*** 0.66 
   NF employer             0.12* 0.36 
NF employee to 
     Farm             -0.44 0.29 
   NF self-employed             -0.10*** 0.30 
   NF employee             0.03*** 0.11 
   NF employer             0.24*** 0.36 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. We omit the top and the bottom one percent of the sample  
used. Estimation of transition from farm to NF employer is omitted since there are only nine  
observations. 
 
 
 
E[Δ ln y | Pˆ( j  to k),Z ]
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2.5 Conclusions 
Economic growth almost always involves a transition from heavy dependence 
on farming to non-farm rural activity. This study reports on widespread occupational 
transitions in rural Thailand over a five year period, 2005-2010. Such transitions 
mainly involve moves into farm self-employment or non-farm employment more than 
into non-farm self-employment, much less into farm or non-farm employer positions. 
While more commercially-oriented farming with non-family employees offers 
demonstrably superior earnings to being a farmworker or self-employed farmer, it is 
still dominated by steady work as a non-farm employee or employer.  The non-farm 
employers’ and employees’ earnings distributions stochastically dominate the other 
categories’ earnings distributions, while those associated with farm workers and self-
employed farmers are stochastically dominated by each of the three non-farm 
occupational groupings. As a result, transitions into the rural non-farm economy are 
associated with statistically significant earnings gains, while transitions into farming 
are associated with earnings losses.  
But not all non-farm occupations are equally lucrative. It is more common to 
move down into lower-return occupations, especially non-farm self-employment and 
self-employed farming, than up into higher-return ones, reflecting a ‘gravity effect’ on 
the upper rungs of the occupation ladder. The vast majority of rural Thai workers 
appear able to quickly escape agricultural wage labor, the very lowest step on the 
occupational ladder, however. 
Multivariate regression results, especially from our preferable model in 
Hausman-Taylor estimates, confirm that the biggest gains arise from becoming a non-
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farm employer and all transitions out of the farm sector are associated with gains 
relative to remaining in agriculture as a primary occupation. Moreover, both higher 
individual educational attainment and greater household physical capital endowments 
strongly and statistically significantly increase earnings, indicating the joint 
importance of human and physical capital, as well as climbing the occupational ladder, 
to earnings mobility. These results suggest that rural Thai individuals are heavily 
constrained in their occupational choices. 
Although the most remunerative employment is as a RNFE business owner 
and employer, only a small number of individuals become non-farm employers, 
reinforcing the point that most people are not natural entrepreneurs (Kilby 1971). This 
result confirms similar findings from other developing and developed countries that 
observe far more subsistence self-employment than business owners generating paid 
employment for others (Mead and Liedholm 1998, Hurst and Pugsley 2011). The very 
small rate of transition into being a non-farm employer reflects the difficulty inherent 
to starting a business, while the fact that less than 40% of non-farm employers remain 
non-farm employers for five years – and less than 20% of farm employers remain farm 
employers that long – underscores the challenges of even maintaining a business with 
employees.  
Moreover, there is a striking mismatch between at least two-thirds of rural non-
farm employees working for an enterprise with ten or more employees, versus less 
than one percent of household enterprises employing ten or more people. Yet, most 
non-farm rural development  programs emphasize self-employment and enterprise 
development, especially through micro-finance (Haggblade et al. 2007). Rural Thai 
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households face considerable challenges in starting and maintaining, much less 
expanding, a farm or non-farm business and those household enterprises create few 
jobs. So the greatest prospects for taking advantage of the earnings gains routinely 
associated with occupational transitions out of farming appear to come from finding 
salaried or wage employment with non-household enterprises. Rural development 
policy might therefore aim to increase remunerative non-farm employment 
opportunities by established, larger-scale employers and rely less on trying to 
stimulate self-employment in the hopes that it will spark entrepreneurial activity and 
rural employment generation.               
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APPENDIX 2A 
ATTRITION ANALYSIS 
 
Since only 7,000 individuals, ages 15-70 years old, appear in all four SES 
waves while total rural individuals in the same age range each year cover more than 
9,000 individuals in the initial, 2005 round, there is a potential concern that non-
random attrition might bias inferences based on the balanced panel. This appendix 
explores issues related to attrition in this panel and explains how we have addressed 
those issues.  
Table A1 shows the changes in rural individuals across all four waves. Only 1-
2 percent of rural residents moved to urban areas from one survey round to the next. 
So rural outmigration is not a significant potential source of selection problems.  
 
Table A1: Sample individuals in rural areas, ages 15-70 years 
 
Year Total rural 
Total 2005 
rural  
remaining 
Missing Added in Rural to urban 
Urban to 
rural 
2005 9,153 9,153 0 0 
  2006 9,415 8,443 710 972 87 58 
2007 9,475 7,892 551 1,583 72 67 
2010 9,984 7,000 892 2,984 196 106 
 
 
We restrict attention to just those rural individuals who were employed in all 
four rounds, so as to avoid conflating transitions between unemployment and 
employment with transitions among occupations. Roughly 10-15% of the sample 
transitioned between unemployment and employment between rounds. As a 
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consequence, selection bias could be an issue if there are significant differences in 
characteristics between those individuals present and employed in all four survey 
waves and those who were rural residents in 2005 but not present and employed in all 
four waves, given attrition – due mainly to changing household composition (due to 
deaths or individuals aging out of the workforce as the survey progressed) – or 
transitions in and out of unemployment.  
 Given the possibility of selection problems from restricting our analysis to 
those rural residents who were surveyed and employed in all four waves, we test for 
differences in mean characteristics between individuals in the retained subsample and 
those who were initially surveyed in the 2005 round. Table A2 shows that most of 
each group’s characteristics are statistically significantly different but the key 
dependent variable, changes in log earnings, do not show a significant difference 
between the groups. As expected, those who were employed in all four waves and 
remained in the subsample have higher earnings on average than the full rural sample 
surveyed in 2005. 
Since tests of mean group characteristics show significant differences, we need 
to test for possible attrition bias. We follow the procedure suggested by Baulch and 
Quisumbing (2011), first estimating an attrition probit regression, then running the 
tests proposed by Becketti, Gould, Lillard and Welch (1998, hereafter BGLW), then 
adjusting using inverse probability weights, as suggested by Fitzgerald et al. (1998) 
and Wooldridge (2002).  
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Table A2: Mean characteristics tests across groups 
Variables All rural 2005 Subsample  t-stat 
Age 39.25 38.56 -3.77*** 
HH head 0.34 0.41 12.30*** 
Married 0.66 0.80 17.63*** 
Family size 4.31 4.26 -1.58 
Education 
   - Primary school 0.57 0.61 5.57*** 
- Secondary school 0.17 0.13 -7.39*** 
- High/Vocational school 0.16 0.15 -1.94* 
- College and above 0.05 0.07 5.35*** 
Total working months 62.36 72.51 5.00*** 
Owned agricultural land 3338.06 3762.43 3.11*** 
Asset Index 0.13 0.23 5.84*** 
Earnings 2005 5465.97 6301.63 7.59*** 
Earnings 2006 5560.43 6605.51 7.94*** 
Earnings 2007 5582.39 6435.02 10.20*** 
Earnings 2010 6310.29 7191.22 8.61*** 
Log earnings 2005 7.76 8.05 8.94*** 
Log earnings 2006 7.76 8.05 10.57*** 
Log earnings 2007 7.94 8.16 13.37*** 
Log earnings 2010 8.08 8.23 8.82*** 
Δ Log earnings 0506 -0.04 -0.01 1.45 
Δ Log earnings 0607 0.16 0.10 -2.88*** 
Δ Log earnings 0710 0.10 0.07 -2.01** 
Δ Log earnings 0507 0.13 0.10 -1.21 
Δ Log earnings 0510 0.21 0.18 -1.09 
          ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. Mean testing uses the survey individual weight. 
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Table A3: Attrition probit regressions 
  (1) (2) 
Pseudo-R2 0.1527 0.2547 
Wald Tests (P-value)   
Rural village attrition rate 0.000 0.000 
Log (earnings) 05 0.000  
Assets 0.213 0.051 
Village variablesa 0.750  
Demography and Educationb 0.000 0.000 
Other variablesc 0.000 0.000 
No. of observationsd 7000 9897 
a Village variables include dummy variables for electricity available to all households in the village, 
insufficient water for agriculture, year-round trafficable road, agricultural loss and stagnant flood, ratio 
of asphalt/concrete section to total of the most convenient route to the nearest major district, travel time 
to the nearest district, number of soil problems, and ratios of households in the village working in 
establishment, manufacturing, employment, and agriculture. b Demography and education variables 
include age, age2, household head, gender, marital status, and number of household members. c Other 
variables include demographic and education variables, asset variables, and region dummies. Variance-
covariance matrices are clustered at sub-district level.  d In both columns, we use all observations in the 
initial rural survey. Since there are many missing values from log(earnings) and village variables, the 
number of observations in column (1) has dropped as reported. 
 
We first run a probit regression where the dependent variable takes the value of 
one for an individual who dropped out of the sample after the first wave (from aging 
out of the workforce, dying, becoming unemployed, or moving and being 
untraceable), then regressing that dichotomous dependent variable on baseline 
variables that could affect both the likelihood of attrition and the outcome variable of 
interest (earnings). The attrition probit regressions reported in Table A3 column 1 
include individual and household characteristics, household owned agricultural land 
and asset index, log earnings in the initial survey round, rural village attrition rate,19 
dummy variables for each of the five main regions in Thailand, and village 
characteristics variables in 2005. The pseudo R2 statistic can be interpreted as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Village attrition rate is the ratio of total individuals dropped out of the survey after the first 
wave to total individuals in the village in 2005. 
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proportion of attrition that is non-random. Wald tests are then performed to test 
whether observables jointly explain the predicted attrition probability. As shown in 
Table A3 column 1, the pseudo R2 values are relatively low. Log earnings in 2005 and 
demographic variables (age, age2, household head, female, and marital status) are 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level, and jointly explain the 
attrition rate. On the other hand, village variables and asset variables insignificantly 
determine attrition probabilities. Many unemployed individuals have missing values of 
log earnings in 2005, however, as well as some missing values for village 
characteristics variables. If we exclude log earnings and village characteristics 
variables from attrition probit regressions, as shown in Table 3A column 2, we can use 
all the observations from the 2005 survey. This attrition probit yields a higher pseudo 
R2. We can strongly reject the null hypothesis that attrition is unrelated to individual 
and household characteristics. 
 The BGLW test is based on an F-test of the joint significance of the attrition 
dummy and the interactions between attrition dummy and the explanatory variables 
when regressing the first wave outcome variable on the determinants of outcome 
variable, plus attrition dummy and its interactions. Hence, the model estimation is 
defined as 
Δ ln Earnings0506,i = δ0 + X05iδ1 + δ2Attritioni + [X05i!Attritioni]δ3 + νi, 
where X includes individual and household characteristics, household owned 
agricultural land and asset index, log earnings in 2005, rural village attrition rate, and 
regional dummy variables. The test determines whether there exist statistically 
significant differences between the coefficient estimates for retained and attritted 
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individuals. The results presented in Table A4 show that the attrition dummy and its 
interactions are jointly statistically significant, and hence reject the null hypothesis 
that sample attrition is random and has no effect on coefficient estimates.20 
 
Table A4: BGLW Attrition pooling tests 
  (1) 
R-squared 0.3967 
All Interactions  
 (F-stat) 4.14*** 
(P-value) 0.000 
Attrition dummy (P-value) 0.260 
Log (earnings) 05 (P-value) 0.000 
A*log(earnings) 05 (P-value) 0.957 
No. of observationsa 6507 
      Variance-covariance matrices are clustered at sub-district level. 
   a Observations are dropped due to missing log earnings changes variable. 
 
 These tests suggest that non-random attrition could bias the main estimations. 
We use the inverse probability weighted method to correct for possible biases. 
Following Baulch and Quisumbig (2011), we create the ratio of predicted values from 
the restricted regression and unrestricted regression of reversed attrition probit where 
the dependent variable, RA = 1 if non-attrition, where the unrestricted regression 
include the same explanatory variables as the attrition probits in Table A3 column (2), 
while the restricted regression excludes the auxiliary variables (demographic 
variables, household asset variables, rural village attrition rate, and region dummies) 
in the first period. The inverse probability weights vary from 0.40 to 26.17 with mean 
0.92. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 If we regress changes in log earnings between the second and the third wave on the first 
wave explanatory variables, we also have very low R2 (around 0.016) and an insignificant F-
test statistic on the null that all interaction terms equal zero. However, the log earnings 
interaction coefficient estimate remains statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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 Tables A5 – A7 exhibit regression results that replicate the pooled OLS (with 
sub-district fixed effects), individual fixed effects, and Hausman-Taylor estimations, 
respectively, from the main body of the paper. Most of the coefficients and 
significance of individual coefficients are very similar. We therefore test whether 
coefficients with and without inverse probability weighted corrections differ 
statistically significantly for each of the three models. We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the parameters are equal with and without correction for attrition bias 
for both the pooled OLS and individual fixed effects models. A few variables’ 
coefficient estimates are statistically significantly different for the Hausman-Taylor 
estimations. Therefore, although attrition bias indeed appears to exist, it seems that it 
does not matter much to our estimation results and resulting inferences.  
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Table A5: Pooled OLS regressions of log earnings change on sector transitions  
and other covariates 
 
Dependent V: Δ ln yit (1) No Weight (2) Attrition weight  
  Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Log(earning (t-1)) -0.82*** 0.03 -0.79*** 0.05 
Log(earning (t-1))*t_06 -0.11 0.50 0.45 0.70 
Log(earning (t-1))*t_07 -4.26*** 0.34 -3.89*** 0.50 
Sector transitions 
    Farm to (farm: base) 
      NF self-employed 0.35*** 0.08 0.37*** 0.09 
  NF employee 0.66*** 0.06 0.84*** 0.15 
  NF employer 1.05*** 0.21 1.18*** 0.21 
NF self-employed to 
       Farm -0.0002 0.06 0.01 0.09 
   NF self-employed 0.46*** 0.05 0.53*** 0.06 
   NF employee 0.41*** 0.06 0.51*** 0.08 
   NF employer 0.72*** 0.10 0.85*** 0.12 
NF employee to 
       Farm -0.24*** 0.05 -0.05 0.10 
   NF self-employed 0.34*** 0.07 0.42*** 0.09 
   NF employee 0.59*** 0.04 0.68*** 0.06 
   NF employer 0.89*** 0.21 0.96*** 0.18 
NF employer to 
       Farm 0.02 0.21 0.07 0.22 
   NF self-employed 0.54*** 0.10 0.70*** 0.14 
   NF employee 0.34** 0.15 0.36** 0.16 
   NF employer 0.75*** 0.09 0.86*** 0.10 
Age 0.03*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 
Age2 -0.0004*** 0.0001 -0.0004*** 0.0001 
HH head 0.08*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 
Married 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Female -0.05** 0.02 -0.03 0.02 
Education (Less than primary school/none:base) 
    Primary school 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.07 
  Secondary school 0.15** 0.06 0.14* 0.08 
  High/Vocational school 0.27*** 0.07 0.32*** 0.09 
  College and above 0.61*** 0.07 0.63*** 0.09 
Total working months 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0003** 0.0001 
Family size -0.01* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Owned agricultural land 0.0005** 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 
Asset Index 0.18*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.02 
Time effect (2006) -0.11 0.50 0.45 0.70 
Time effect (2007) -4.26*** 0.34 -3.89*** 0.50 
Constant 7.76*** 0.38 7.37*** 0.61 
Adjusted R2 0.70 
 
0.71   
N. of observations 11,358  11,358   
   ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. Variance-covariance matrices are clustered at sub-district level. 
We omit the top and the bottom one percent of the sample used.  
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Table A6: Individual fixed effects regressions of log earnings change on  
sector transitions and other covariates 
 
Dependent V: Δ ln yit (1) No Weight (2) Attrition weight  
  Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Log(earning (t-1)) -0.93*** 0.02 -0.91*** 0.03 
Log(earning (t-1))*t_06 0.002 0.002 0.01** 0.003 
Log(earning (t-1))*t_07 0.01*** 0.002 0.01*** 0.003 
Sector transitions 
    Farm to (farm: base) 
      NF self-employed 0.22*** 0.08 0.16 0.15 
  NF employee 0.65*** 0.10 0.87*** 0.30 
  NF employer 1.00*** 0.37 1.10*** 0.38 
NF self-employed to 
       Farm -0.09 0.09 -0.12 0.24 
   NF self-employed 0.32*** 0.10 0.37** 0.19 
   NF employee 0.46*** 0.11 0.62*** 0.23 
   NF employer 0.23 0.14 0.29 0.20 
NF employee to 
       Farm 0.01 0.07 0.25 0.24 
   NF self-employed 0.47*** 0.10 0.57** 0.23 
   NF employee 0.65*** 0.10 0.77*** 0.24 
   NF employer 0.88*** 0.22 1.02*** 0.29 
NF employer to 
       Farm -0.14 0.23 -0.06 0.27 
   NF self-employed 0.13 0.20 0.22 0.24 
   NF employee 0.30** 0.14 0.41* 0.24 
   NF employer 0.13 0.25 0.22 0.28 
Constant 9.63*** 0.21 9.18*** 0.34 
Adjusted R2 0.54   0.54   
N. of observations 11,358   11,358   
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. Variance-covariance matrices are clustered at sub-district level. 
We omit the top and the bottom one percent of the sample used. 
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Table A7: Hausman-Taylor estimation of log earnings change on 
sector transitions and other covariates 
 
Dependent V: Δ ln yit (1) No Weight (bootstrapped) (2) Attrition weight  
  Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Log(earning (t-1)) -0.85*** 0.02 -0.82*** 0.01 
Log(earning (t-1))*t_06 0.004** 0.001 0.01*** 0.002 
Log(earning (t-1))*t_07 0.01*** 0.001 0.01*** 0.002 
Sector transitions 
    Farm to (farm: base) 
      NF self-employed 0.27*** 0.10 0.26*** 0.07 
  NF employee 0.78*** 0.08 1.06*** 0.05 
  NF employer 1.00*** 0.33 1.12*** 0.23 
NF self-employed to 
       Farm -0.08 0.08 -0.05 0.06 
   NF self-employed 0.46*** 0.09 0.66*** 0.07 
   NF employee 0.61*** 0.09 0.85*** 0.08 
   NF employer 0.47*** 0.14 0.65*** 0.16 
NF employee to 
       Farm 0.06 0.06 0.29*** 0.05 
   NF self-employed 0.62*** 0.09 0.81*** 0.07 
   NF employee 0.89*** 0.08 1.08*** 0.05 
   NF employer 1.08*** 0.25 1.13*** 0.23 
NF employer to 
       Farm -0.02 0.25 0.08 0.28 
   NF self-employed 0.35 0.23 0.56*** 0.18 
   NF employee 0.48*** 0.17 0.61** 0.25 
   NF employer 0.50* 0.28 0.69*** 0.22 
Age -0.05*** 0.01 -0.005 0.01 
Age2 0.0005*** 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
HH head 0.13*** 0.03 0.08** 0.04 
Married 0.11*** 0.04 0.16*** 0.03 
Female -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 
Education (Less than primary 
school/none:base) 
      Primary school -0.31*** 0.07 -0.27*** 0.07 
  Secondary school -0.34*** 0.08 -0.31*** 0.08 
  High/Vocational school -0.20** 0.08 -0.09 0.08 
  College and above 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 
Total working months 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
Family size -0.06*** 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 
Owned agricultural land 0.0006* 0.0003 0.001*** 0.0002 
Asset Index 0.33*** 0.02 0.29*** 0.02 
Constant 10.25*** 0.40 8.60*** 0.17 
Wald test 4373.30 
 
24373.81   
N. of observations 11,358  11,358   
   ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. Variance-covariance matrices are clustered at sub-district level. 
We omit the top and the bottom one percent of the sample used. 
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APPENDIX 2B 
ASSET INDEX 
 
 The asset index used as a proxy for household wealth was constructed using 
factor analysis based on the method of Sahn and Stifel (2003). Dummy variables for 
dwelling characteristics and number of durable goods owned are used in the analysis 
to obtain the first factor. All data come from the SES panel in 2005 (initial year). 
Table B1 reports summary statistics, factor loadings and scoring coefficients. 
  
Table B1: Asset index summary statistics, factors and scoring coefficients 
 
Variable Mean SD Factor loading Scoring coef. 
Number of rooms 2.73 1.30 0.48 0.09 
Housing materials (dummies)     
  Cement 0.33 0.47 0.27 0.05 
  Wood 0.34 0.47 -0.31 -0.06 
  Others: local/reused materials 0.33 0.47 0.05 0.01 
Having electricity 0.99 0.09 0.11 0.02 
Cooking fuel (dummies)     
  Gas 0.52 0.50 0.53 0.10 
  Others: Electricity, charcoal, 
wood 0.45 0.50 -0.52 -0.10 
Water supply (dummies)     
  Pipe 0.61 0.49 0.09 0.02 
  Underground water 0.35 0.48 -0.07 -0.01 
  Others: rain, open sources 0.04 0.19 -0.04 -0.01 
Toilet: flush 0.99 0.11 0.11 0.02 
Household items (number)     
  Microwave 0.08 0.28 0.49 0.09 
  Refrigerator 0.86 0.47 0.53 0.10 
  Air condition 0.09 0.40 0.51 0.09 
  Fan 2.08 1.28 0.61 0.11 
  Radio 0.71 0.61 0.49 0.09 
  VCD-DVD player 0.66 0.57 0.56 0.10 
  Washing machine 0.37 0.50 0.62 0.11 
  Television 1.13 0.59 0.65 0.12 
  Cable television 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.01 
  Satellite dish (for TV) 0.01 0.10 0.21 0.04 
  Landline 0.17 0.39 0.56 0.10 
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Variable Mean SD Factor loading Scoring coef. 
  Cell phone 0.77 0.85 0.65 0.12 
  Computer 0.09 0.31 0.62 0.11 
  Internet access 0.03 0.18 0.48 0.09 
     
Vehicles (number)     
  Motorcycle 1.08 0.82 0.36 0.07 
  Car 0.07 0.28 0.46 0.08 
  Mini-truck/Van 0.19 0.46 0.45 0.08 
  2-wheel tractor 0.22 0.44 -0.09 -0.02 
  4-wheel tractor 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.02 
  6-wheel or higher 0.01 0.14 0.20 0.04 
     
Owned livestock     
  Buffalo 0.04 0.48 -0.07 -0.01 
  Cow 0.05 0.61 -0.06 -0.01 	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Appendix Table C1: Multivariate regressions of earnings changes (level) 
 
Dependent V: Δ yit 
Unit: thousand baht/year 
(1) OLS 
(Bootstrap s.e.) 
(2) Individual 
fixed effects 
(3) Hausman-Taylor 
(random effects) 
  Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Earnings (t-1) -0.42*** 0.03 -1.20*** 0.03 -0.88*** 0.03 
Earnings (t-1)*t_06 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.001 0.02 
Earnings (t-1)*t_07 0.04 0.04 0.07*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.02 
Sector transitions       
Farm to (farm: base)       
  NF self-employed 12.78*** 3.69 7.54** 3.65 11.57*** 4.04 
  NF employee 23.88*** 2.17 19.84*** 3.49 31.01*** 2.37 
  NF employer 58.03*** 21.09 53.76** 22.27 57.47** 25.46 
NF self-employed to       
   Farm -9.72*** 3.24 -0.37 3.01 -2.26 3.47 
   NF self-employed 8.12*** 1.88 17.90*** 3.97 19.93*** 5.14 
   NF employee 10.37*** 3.76 19.96*** 4.73 29.40*** 4.18 
   NF employer 29.27** 13.82 34.30** 13.79 51.03*** 14.31 
NF employee to       
   Farm -21.28*** 2.26 2.96 2.88 1.67 2.25 
   NF self-employed -4.52 4.27 18.17*** 5.88 17.70*** 5.02 
   NF employee 18.05*** 1.90 33.09*** 3.25 49.61*** 3.14 
   NF employer 30.49** 14.50 58.54*** 13.96 60.66*** 14.25 
NF employer to       
   Farm -32.83* 16.84 -10.20 17.73 -3.58 19.23 
   NF self-employed 11.35 10.89 9.81 13.31 34.66** 16.25 
   NF employee -39.11** 16.93 3.16 16.61 5.00 17.21 
   NF employer 26.11** 10.70 13.63 25.35 55.37** 25.77 
Age 1.37*** 0.26   0.80 0.68 
Age2 -0.02*** 0.00   -0.01 0.01 
HH head 1.93* 1.03   7.49*** 2.11 
Married 2.67** 1.34   8.28*** 1.98 
Female -3.36*** 0.87   -5.36*** 1.77 
Education (Less than primary school/none:base)     
  Primary school 1.31 2.16   -7.17* 3.87 
  Secondary school 6.26** 2.65   -1.29 5.15 
  High/Vocational school 13.20*** 2.94   10.68* 5.72 
  College and above 56.91*** 5.61   89.05*** 8.58 
Total working months 0.02*** 0.01   0.02*** 0.00 
Family size -1.36*** 0.39   -4.07*** 0.60 
Owned agricultural land 0.24* 0.14   0.59** 0.26 
Asset Index 9.05*** 1.58   23.67*** 1.86 
Time effect (2006) 1.51 2.11     
Time effect (2007) 5.99** 2.48         
Individual fixed effects No  Yes  Yes  
Sub-district fixed effects Yes  No  No  
Constant -10.65* 6.22 62.81*** 2.14 28.99 17.74 
Adjusted R2 0.21   0.57       
Wald test (bootstrapped) 1033.32***       2205.58***   
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. Variance-covariance matrices are clustering at sub-district level for 
Model (1) and (2), and are bootstrapped for Model (1) and (3). Model (2) uses attrition weights. We 
omit the top and the bottom one percent of the sample used, yielding 11,634 observations used. 
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APPENDIX 2D 
DETERMINANTS OF OCCUPATIONAL SHIFTS 
 
We estimate multinomial logit models to predict occupational transition 
probabilities and then use those predicted values in place of observed transitions in 
estimating equation (2.1). The multinomial logit is a form of random utility model, 
based on the premise that an individual compares her expected utility under different 
occupations and her constrained conditions:  
    (D1) 
where Otj is an indicator variable for occupation in period t and j = 0, 1, 2, 3 indicate 
farming occupation, non-farm self-employment, non-farm employee, and non-farm 
employer, respectively,. The variable ln yt-1 represents the log earnings reported in the 
previous year, indicating whether individuals might consider a change in occupation 
according to their past income draw in last period’s occupation, Ot-1,j. Z denotes 
observed individual and household characteristics, just as in equation (2.1).  
In these multinomial logit regressions we include ΔV in order to capture 
changes in community variables such as infrastructure and agricultural circumstances 
that reflect evolving environmental conditions. Table D1 enumerates these community 
level variables from the rural community census survey (NRD) and describes the 
changes in these variables for the 363 villages in the Thai SES data that match with 
the NRD data. Recall that the NRD data do not include 2006 and 2008. So, we study 
occupational transitions between 2005 and 2007 and between 2007 and 2010 based in 
 Ut
e =U(Otj , ln yt−1,Z,ΔV |Ot−1, j )
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part on changes in community variables between 2005 and 2007 and between 2007 
and 2009, respectively, as a pooled panel to increase sample size. 
Hence, given individuals’ initial occupation, we estimate the multinomial logit: 
     (D2) 
where . To ensure model identification, 
is set to zero when individuals stay in their previous occupation, choice m. In 
particular, if the base case is 0 = staying as a farmer, then j = 1, 2, 3 refer to the shift 
from farm to non-farm self-employed, the shift from farm to non-farm employee, and 
the shift from farm to non-farm employer, respectively. The coefficients are then 
interpreted with respect to staying in one’s initial occupation, the base category. 
 The multinomial logit models are estimated separately for each initial 
occupation. The small number of observations of non-farm employers precludes 
estimation from that base position. Hence, the average marginal effects reported in 
Tables D2-D4 reflect only the transitions from farming, non-farm self-employment, 
and non-farm employee positions, respectively. The changes in village level variables 
jointly statistically significantly determine the transition probabilities.  
As one would expect, lower initial log earnings are strongly associated with 
occupational shifts.  People leave lower-paying jobs in search of better-paying ones. 
Women exhibit lower occupational mobility than men do. The main pattern we see in 
transitions from farming into non-farm activities is that household asset endowments 
are strongly and statistically significantly positively associated with transitions into 
 
Pr(y= j |m)= exp(XΓ( j))
1+ exp(XΓ( j))
j=1
3
∑
 XΓ( j)i = γ0 +γ1yt−1,i + Ziγ2 +ΔVcγ3 +νi
 Γ( j)i
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non-farm employer status but negatively associated with transitions into the farming 
and non-farm worker categories. Those with capital are clearly more likely to take 
their chances starting their own enterprise. On the other hand, owned agricultural land 
is positively correlated with transitions into farming, confirming that land is the main 
factor driving work in agriculture. 
Village-level variables also matter considerably. In particular, individuals 
living in areas lacking sufficient water for agriculture are more likely to shift from 
farm into non-farm employer sector. More year-round trafficable roads in the area 
fosters more shifts into rather than from farming. If road conditions are consistently 
reliable, farmers have less difficulty selling their products and hence remain on farm. 
Likewise, as access to electricity provided by the state increases to cover all 
households in a village, transitions from farm to non-farm self-employment become 
less likely, reflecting the importance of services to support economically viable 
farming.  
 Among those initially in the non-farm sector, fewer initial asset holdings 
increases the likelihood of moving into farming in the following year. Greater farm 
profitability in the area increases the likelihood of becoming a farmer and non-farm 
employer from self-employment, but increases the likelihood of becoming a non-farm 
worker. This reflects the linkage of agricultural prosperity to non-farm business 
growth. 
 Transportation infrastructure and employment conditions also play an 
important role in occupational transitions. Reduced travel time to the nearest district 
also induces a shift from non-farm worker to farming. More households working in 
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establishments or manufacturing in the village also encourages transition into 
entrepreneurship, likely reflecting the expanded market for one’s goods or services. 
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Table D1: Summary statistics of changes in village characteristics 
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Table D2: Multinomial logit estimation of determinants of transitions from farm work 
 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. We omit the top and the bottom one percent of the sample used. 
Inverse probability weight to correct attrition bias has been applied in the estimation. 
Variance-covariance matrices are clustered at village level. AME = average marginal effects. 	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Table D3: Multinomial logit estimation of determinants of transitions  
from non-farm self-employment 
 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. We omit the top and the bottom one percent of the sample used. 
Inverse probability weight to correct attrition bias has been applied in the estimation. 
Variance-covariance matrices are clustered at village level. AME = average marginal effects.	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Table D4: Multinomial logit estimation of determinants of transitions  
from non-farm employee 
 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. We omit the top and the bottom one percent of the sample used. 
Inverse probability weight to correct attrition bias has been applied in the estimation. 
Variance-covariance matrices are clustered at village level. AME = average marginal effects.	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APPENDIX 2E 
SELECTION BIAS CORRECTIONS BASED ON  
THE MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL 
 
Let the changes in log earnings in the sth alternative be given by 
      (E1) 
where Z contains the same covariates as in equation (2.1), including log earnings in 
the previous period. Let Δln ys be observed only if alternative s – an occupational shift 
to s given previous occupation – is chosen among four alternatives. Following the 
Heckman selection model, Dubin and McFadden (1984) and Bourguignon et al. 
(2007) include multiple correction terms to control for self-selection into the sth 
alternative instead of only an inverse Mills ratio term for self-selection correction. 
Hence, equation (E1) becomes 
,   (E2) 
where Pj is the probability that alternative j, j = 0, 1, 2, 3, will be chosen. Pj follows 
the multinomial logit model in equation (D2). Dubin and McFadden’s assume that 
, where ηj  is a disturbance term from equation (D1), 
conditional on the alternative s being chosen. Hence, (E2) becomes 
               (E3) 
 Δ ln ys =αs + Zsβs +us
 Δ ln ys =αs + Zsβs +h(P0,...,P3)+ es
 
E(us )= σs
6
π
rj η j −E(η j )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
j≠s
∑
 
Δ ln ys =αs + Zsβs +σs
6
π
rj
Pj ln(Pj )
1−Pj
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
+ rs ln(Ps )
j≠s
∑
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
+ es
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where rj is the correlation coefficient between disturbances us and ηj, and es is a 
residual with asymptotic mean zero. 
Equation (E3) is estimated in two steps. The multinomial logit model for each 
of occupational shifts given previous occupation as in (D2) is first estimated and the 
predicted probabilities are substituted into the selectivity correction terms. Then, the 
predicted log earnings changes of each occupational shift in the second stage are 
averaged and reported in Table 10. Tables E1 - E3 show estimation results in the 
second stage of each occupation transition. 
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Table E1: Second stage selection bias correction estimations of 
transitions from farm 
 
  
Remain in  
Farming (F) 
F to NF Self-
Employment (SE) 
F to Non-Farm 
Worker (W) 
  Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Log(earningst-1) -0.33*** 0.04 -0.29** 0.12 -0.46*** 0.03 
Log(earning (t-1))*t_07 0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.12 0.14*** 0.03 
Age 0.003 0.01 -0.003 0.05 -0.004 0.01 
Age2 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.00001 0.00 
HH head 0.04 0.03 -0.13 0.13 0.01 0.04 
Married -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.22 -0.03 0.06 
Female -0.01 0.02 -0.004 0.13 -0.07* 0.04 
Education 
      Less than primary school/none (base) 
      Primary school -0.01 0.04 0.17 0.48 -0.13 0.09 
  Secondary school 0.03 0.06 0.50 0.49 -0.11 0.11 
  High/Vocational school 0.08 0.05 0.27 0.54 -0.04 0.10 
  College and above 0.23 0.17 0.54 0.81 0.08 0.15 
Total working months 0.00002 0.0002 -0.0003 0.001 0.0003 0.0002 
Family size -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 
Owned agricultural land 0.004 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.005 0.005 
Asset Index 0.15*** 0.03 0.18 0.15 0.05 0.04 
Time dummy for 2007 -0.53 0.54 0.06 1.19 -1.51*** 0.25 
Correction terms 
        P(stay F) -0.77 0.47 -0.01 0.96 0.39** 0.18 
  P(F to SE) -0.22 0.50 -0.26 1.34 0.05 0.44 
  P(F to Wkr) -0.67 0.56 0.09 1.34 0.50* 0.30 
  P(F to E) -0.54 0.35 -3.73 2.32 0.50 0.56 
Constant 3.43*** 0.51 3.14* 1.69 5.22*** 0.36 
Adjusted R2 0.39  0.47  0.81  
N. of observations 2204  209  334  
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. P(.) is the coefficient of correction terms of PjlnPj/(1-Pj), j=1,2,3 
and lnP0. Estimation of transition from farm to NF employer is omitted since there are only nine 
observations. 
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Table E2: Second stage selection bias correction estimations of  
transitions from non-farm self-employment 
 
  ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. P(.) is the coefficient of correction terms of PjlnPj/(1-Pj), j=0,2,3 
and lnP1 
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Table E3: Second stage selection bias correction estimations of  
transitions from non-farm employee 
 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. P(.) is the coefficient of correction terms of PjlnPj/(1-Pj), j=0,1,3 
and lnP2 	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CHAPTER 3 
THE CORRELATES AND DYNAMICS OF RURAL HOUSEHOLD NON-FARM 
BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURIAL JOB CREATION IN THAILAND 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 A growing literature on entrepreneurship emphasizes the importance of the 
rural non-farm economy (RNFE) as a pathway out of poverty in low- and middle-
income countries. Yet the growth process of microenterprises or small-and-medium 
enterprises (SMEs)21 and the contribution of these enterprises to job creation have not 
been extensively investigated. Many empirical studies observe that most household 
businesses consist of one person working alone without paid, non-family employees, 
while most of the others are small-sized firms with limited capacity for expansion 
(Fafchamps 1994; Haggblade et al., 2007). While there is some business creation and 
expansion in any given period, there is also a contraction in firm size and the closure 
of others.  
This study explores the entry, expansion and the contraction of rural non-farm 
enterprises in Thailand. It also explores the characteristics of those non-farm 
household entrepreneurs who expand their businesses by hiring non-family members, 
as well as push and pull factors that play a role in supporting job creation within the 
rural non-farm economy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Definitions of firm size vary somewhat across countries and studies. With the primary 
dataset category for firm size used in this study, the definitions of enterprise size based on 
number of employees are as follows: microenterprise (1-9 workers), small enterprise (10-50 
workers), and medium enterprise (51-100 workers). 
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Subsistence self-employment could be a result of being pushed out of the 
agricultural sector due to natural calamities, illness and injury, or increased scarcity of 
land. Some people in this group might be waiting for other, better employment by a 
private company, nongovernmental organization (NGO), or a government agency. The 
non-farm sector provides them a temporary safety net to help keep them from falling 
into poverty and also offers an opportunity to diversify household income sources. 
This group might participate in the RNFE to sustain a small business with low 
productivity and low returns solely as a safety net, not as a growth opportunity. 
According to Mead and Liedholm (1998), most new rural businesses indeed begin at 
the least efficient and least remunerative firm size, one person, into which there are 
fewer barriers to entry, consistent with the view of RNFE entrepreneurial activity as 
largely a safety net. 
In contrast, those who create or join rural non-farm businesses due to pull 
factors could become transformational entrepreneurs, raising their own household 
incomes and creating employment within their region. This group tends to be linked to 
high-return urban manufacturers or export-oriented subcontractors (Hazell, et. al., 
2007; Liedholm, 2007). Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) point out that the rural non-
farm economy is driven by the interactions between farm and rural non-farm 
enterprises in the labor market. Unlike new start-up firms that reflect supply-push 
forces, existing firm expansion creates jobs that reflect demand-pull forces and 
increasing efficiency. On the other hand, the reasons for RNFE business closure are 
mostly due to lack of product demand and shortage of working capital. 
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Micro and small enterprises in developing countries face several constraints, 
such as access to capital and skilled labor, entrepreneurial ability, and government 
registry requirements.  Recent studies in the entrepreneurship literature find that the 
characteristics of those in subsistence self-employment differ from those of a potential 
entrepreneur who might create jobs for others, and that this is one reason why we 
observe a low transition rate from one-person firms to enterprises that hire non-family 
members (Mondragon-Velez and Pena-Parga, 2010; de Mel et al., 2008; Schoar, 
2010).  
Among push and pull factors for rural households to start and expand a 
business, one might expect capital access and thus household wealth to be the most 
important factor. Specifically, in the entrepreneurship literature, levels of household 
wealth often appear to determine the probability of becoming an entrepreneur instead 
of a wage worker (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Hurst 
and Lusardi, 2004; Paulson and Townsend, 2004). When a positive relationship 
between entry into entrepreneurship and wealth is found, it is often seen as evidence 
that borrowing constraints may impede business creation among the non-wealthy.  
An alternative view is that individual entrepreneurial ability, a hard-to-
measure, nontradable asset, is the key constraint to successful RNFE business 
creation. Buera (2009) addresses the endogenous determination of wealth that arises 
because an individual’s ability also influences wealth level and the decision to become 
the entrepreneur. Those who have relatively large stocks of entrepreneurial skill tend 
to have a larger incentive to save up for enterprise investment (Quandrini, 2000; 
Buera, 2009; Toth 2011). 
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The objective of this study is to improve our understanding of the dynamics of 
enterprise and job creation in the rural non-farm economy of middle-income countries 
such as Thailand. The study uses the Thai Socio-Economic Survey (SES) panel data 
between 2005-2007 and 2010. While the short period of the panel data limits our 
ability to make strong causal inferences, nonetheless, predetermined household 
attributes and exogenous variation from rainfall and sub-district data help us to 
address likely endogeneity issues that necessarily complicate inference from the 
observed associations between household attributes and enterprise creation and growth 
performance. 
We find wealth effects the likelihood of running or maintaining a RNFE 
business. We also observe far more reduction in firm size than business expansion. An 
ordered probit model is estimated to discover that push and pull factors around 
households are associated with the likelihood of operating non-farm business or hiring 
more workers in rural areas. The dynamics of rural non-farm business are then 
investigated using multinomial logit model to explore factors associated with entry, 
exit, and expansion of rural non-farm business. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an 
analytical framework to explain a household’s allocation of labor to non-farm business 
and its prospective hiring of non-family members. Section 3 describes the data and 
variable definitions used in the empirical analysis, and offers some descriptive 
evidence on rural non-farm businesses in Thailand. Section 4 specifies the 
econometric models and estimation strategy. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 
then provides the conclusion. 
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3.2 Analytical Framework 
3.2.1 A model for rural household decision on operating non-farm business 
We use a model that builds on familiar theories of occupational choice (Evans 
and Jovanovic, 1989; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Buera, 2009; Wang, 2010; Toth, 
2011; Nelson, 2011) although it will be somewhat different since the choice is not 
between becoming a wage employee or an entrepreneur. The rural household may 
diversify its activities by participating in farming or non-farm wage work, or it can 
start its own non-farm business. Any combination of these activities is possible, 
depending on how the household allocates its labor and capital. In this simple setup, 
we first normalize the household labor endowment to equal one, which can be 
allocated to work on farm (LF), as a non-farm employee (Lw), or to start or maintain a 
non-farm business (LNF); LF + Lw + LNF = 1. Household capital is used either in farm 
production (KF) or in non-farm business production (KNF). The household faces a 
credit constraint reflected in KF + KNF ≤ A + b, where A is household total assets, and 
b is net borrowing, which is assumed constrained to a maximum equal to household 
initial wealth, K0. If household i starts running a non-farm business in period t and 
hires non-family workers, lt, then there is profit from the 
business,  𝜋!"!!!" (𝑙!" , 𝐿!"!" ,𝐾!"!"), where 
 
πit+1
NF (lit , Lit
NF , Kit
NF ) = max
l ,LNF ,K NF
pi,t+1F(lit , Lit
NF , Kit
NF )−witl it−wit
H Lit
NF −rKit
NF      (3.1) 
         s.t.  0≤ Kit
NF ≤ Ait + bit−Kit
F ,  bit ≤ K0  
The opportunity cost of household labor time is greater than the wage that 
household has to pay if it hires non-family members, wH > w, in part because it must 
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supervise hired workers.22 Moreover, the marginal product of household members’ 
labor, LNF, is also higher than that of non-family members,	 lt. One could explicitly 
impose this assumption on the production function of non-farm business as  
 F(lit , Lit
NF , Kit
NF ) = F(Kit
NF ,αLit
NF + (1−α)lit )             (3.2)  
with  
 
∂F
∂lit
= (1−α)Fl (lit , Lit
NF , Kit
NF ) < ∂F
∂Lit
NF =αFL(lit , Lit
NF , Kit
NF ) . 
This assumption also reflects ideas of moral hazard for hired workers in the two-tiered 
labor market (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985).  
For the non-farm business, timing matters. At the beginning of period t, the 
business owner decides how many non-family laborers, lt, to hire. However, the owner 
will receive revenue from operating the business at the end of period t +1. This 
happens because in the process of non-farm production, products will be produced 
first before getting money back from customers. The same process can be applied to 
other non-farm services businesses where they have to manage inventory. Hence, the 
business owner needs household liquid assets or access to credit in order to be able to 
hire non-family laborers or to hire capital. In the case of unconstrained capital, the 
first-order condition with respect to 𝐾!"!" yields 𝐾!"!"  that solves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 I define wH here to differentiate wage for non-farm employees working for corporate 
company or government/state enterprise (permanent workers) in which they receive a higher 
wage rate than general workers (casual workers). In Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), there exist 
two-tier labor markets for permanent and casual workers where there is a moral hazard 
problem for hired workers. Permanent workers have more ability and do not burden 
employer’s on-the-job supervision, hence earning higher wage. This characteristic can be 
viewed the same way when a household business employs family members as its labors. 
α >
1
2  such that
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 pt+1FK (Kit
NF ,αLit
NF + (1−α)lit ) = rt . However, if the maximum capital accessible to the 
non-farm business owner is constrained such that  Kit
NF ≤ Ait + bit−Kit
F , then 𝐾!"!" < 𝐾!"!" . With diminishing marginal product of capital, we have 
 pt+1FK (Kit
NF ,αLit
NF + (1−α)lit ) > rt  where the marginal revenue product of capital is 
greater than the marginal cost of capital. Consequently, we also have 
 pt+1αFL(Kit
NF ,αLit
NF + (1−α)lit ) < wt
H and  pt+1(1−α)Fl (Kit
NF ,αLit
NF + (1−α)lit ) < wt . 
The household budget constraint will then determine whether the household 
operates a non-farm business or not. If the household engages in farm, non-farm 
employee and/or non-farm business activities, its cash, capital and labor constraints, 
and law of motion for assets are as follows: 
    cit = πit
F (Lit
F , Kit
F )+ wt
H Lt
W −wt lt −wt
H Lt
NF + bit          (3.3) 
ci ,t+1 = π i ,t+1
FW (Li ,t+1
F ,Ki ,t+1
F )+π i ,t+1
NF (lit ,Lit
NF ,Kit
NF )−wi ,t+1
H Li ,t+1
W −wt+1lt+1 −wi ,t+1
H Li ,t+1
NF − (1+ r)bit                  (3.4) 
     
Ai,t+1 = (1+ r) Ait −bit⎡⎣ ⎤⎦            (3.5) 
     0≤ Kit
F + Kit
NF ≤ Ait + bit            (3.6) 
0 ≤ LitF + Litw + LitNF ≤1             (3.7) 
where cit is consumption of household i at time t. Household income is composed of 
farm earning, wage and/or non-farm business profit, depending on household resource 
allocation. Thus, Lit*F,Lit*w,Lit*NF ∈ [0,1]  and  Kit
*F , Kit
*NF ∈ [0,  Ait + bit ] . Note that 𝑙!∗ > 0 
as labor supply is infinitely elastic. lt* = 0 and  Lt
NF*  > 0 means the household non-farm 
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business is self-employed without any non-family employees, while lt* > 0 means 
household is a non-farm employer. 
Suppose the household utility is a function of consumption, ct, and separable 
among periods. The household’s utility maximization problem is 
  max
ct ,LtF ,LtW ,LtNF ,KtF ,KtNF
 u(c) = β tu(ct )
t=0
∞
∑ ,         (3.8) 
subject to the aforementioned constraints, the household decision as to whether to 
operate a nonfarm business is described by  
 
max
lit ,Lit
NF ,Kit
NF
0,  πit
NF (lit , Lit
NF , Kit
NF ){ }        (3.9) 
Each period, the problem is to choose optimal l*(At,wt,wtH,rt,pt+1) and whether profits 
from starting/expanding business will be positive. The household thus needs to 
consider its endowments – labor and capital – and how to allocate them in order to 
maximize household utility. 
Suppose there are 2 periods: u(ct )+βu(ct+1) . The household decides whether to 
allocate its labor and capital based on the marginal returns to its resource allocation 
across sectors, compared to its inter-temporal marginal rate of utility by the following 
first order conditions: 
 
′u (cit )
β ′u (ci,t+1)
=
∂πit
NF ∂Kit
NF
∂πit
F ∂Kit
F ,   
∂πit
NF
∂Kit
NF = pt+1FK (Kit
NF ,αLit
NF + (1−α)lit )−rt
  
from {KitF,KitNF}         (3.10) 
 
′u (cit )
β ′u (ci,t+1)
=
∂πit
F ∂lit
wt
,  
∂πit
F
∂lit
= pt+1(1−α)Fl (Kit
NF ,αLit
NF + (1−α)lit )−wt   
from {lit}          (3.11) 
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′u (cit )
β ′u (ci,t+1)
=
∂πit
NF ∂Lit
NF
2wt
H ,  
∂πit
NF
∂Lit
NF = pt+1αFL(Kit
NF ,αLit
NF + (1−α)lit )−wt
H   
from  {Lit
W , Lit
NF }          (3.12) 
 
′u (cit )
β ′u (ci,t+1)
=
∂πit
NF ∂Lit
NF
∂πit
F ∂Lit
F + wt
H        
 from  {Lit
F , Lit
NF }          (3.13)  
Suppose  wt
H increases. Given a diminishing marginal product of labor and the capital 
constraint mentioned earlier, in order to maintain inter-temporal equalization of the 
marginal utility of consumption, the household would allocate less labor to the 
nonfarm business. So the non-farm enterprise responds to exogenous labor market and 
agricultural shocks in partial equilibrium. 
 
3.2.2 Implications for estimation 
We can have a profit function represent each household’s function of capital 
and labor, household characteristics, community characteristics, risk or shocks. From 
(8), we expect three scenarios for the household to decide whether to operate nonfarm 
business and whether to hire non-family members or just to use family members. 
- If  πt+1(lt > 0, Lt
NF > 0)≥πt+1(lt = 0, Lt
NF > 0)≥0 , then  lt
*  > 0 and  Lt
NF* > 0. This 
household operates a nonfarm business and hires non-family members. 
 - If  πt+1(lt = 0, Lt
NF > 0)≥0 , then  lt
*  = 0 and  Lt
NF* > 0. This household operates a 
nonfarm business, but hires no non-family members. 
- If  πt+1(Lt
NF > 0) < 0 , then  lt
*  = 0 and  Lt
NF* = 0. This household does not operate a 
nonfarm business. 
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This simple model assumes that the household decides simultaneously how to 
allocate its resources, whether to operate a non-farm business or not, and whether to 
hire non-family workers. Hence, we likely have endogenous regressors when using the 
current capital and labor allocations in estimations as these are the product of 
households’ available choices. With the five year panel data we have, however, we 
can use lagged asset stocks and the ratio of household labos allocated to each sector as 
instruments for current capital and labor allocations in order to make sure that these 
variables are independent of current decision. A set of predetermined, exogenous 
covariates is also included as controls in the estimations, including household head’s 
age and age squared, household head’s gender and marital status, education of 
household head, the number of household members, village average farm earnings and 
non-farm wage, average provincial rate of interest, ratio of households in the village 
receiving credits from financial institutions and government funds, rainfall risk, and 
other village infrastructure and conditions. 
In addition to household assets, agricultural land holdings also represent a 
sector-specific resource. Households possessing more agricultural land will be less 
likely to operate a non-farm business. However, it could be that there is a positive 
linkage between large farm and a non-farm business. Households with a larger farm 
might also run a non-farm business as a byproduct business or for additional product 
lines that use the same inputs. 
Household head’s age would be related to working experience, and the 
quadratic term captures life cycle effects. A married household head might be less 
likely to invest in a non-farm business since he/she has more family members to take 
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care of and needs to be more careful with his/her decision to earn more stable source 
of incomes. However, with more family members in the household, it could be 
beneficial to allocate labor to a non-farm enterprise. 
Agricultural earnings and non-farm wage earnings could potentially have a 
negative relationship with the likelihood of running a non-farm business as predicted 
from the model. Households enter a non-farm business when farming becomes 
unprofitable at the margin if the non-farm business is a source of diversification 
strategy of household. The wage of non-farm workers implies a higher opportunity 
cost of household labor. Hence, higher average wage should have negative effect on 
the likelihood of having a non-farm enterprise, both because household labor becomes 
more valuable elsewhere and because hired workers become more expensive. Finally, 
a higher interest rate reflects an increased cost of capital which should also have a 
negative correlation with the possibility of business startup. 
 To control for exogenous variation during the survey period, we add either 
variation in rainfall or rainfall shocks to the regressions. Weather shocks can be 
viewed as a push factor that forces rural households to withdraw labor from farming 
and to reallocated toward a non-farm business. Alternatively, the weather shock might 
itself affect a farm-related non-farm business. So weather shocks could have either a 
positive or negative effect on rural non-farm businesses.  
 
3.3 Data and Descriptive Evidence 
The Thai SES panel data were collected by the National Statistical Office 
(NSO) of Thailand in 2005 – 2007 and 2010. Beginning in 2005, NSO began tracking 
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households and split-off individuals from sample households to create proper panel 
data besides the well-respected repeated cross-section SES. The panel SES survey has 
two main segments: i) household information on every member in the household, and 
ii) individual information on household members aged 15 years or older. Part one 
includes general information on household members, household characteristics and 
assets, and income from agriculture. Part two includes survey questions on education, 
health care, employment, incomes, expenditures, financial status (debt and savings), 
migration, and opinions on public policies. The survey covers every province in 
Thailand and randomly selects blocks of districts, sub-districts and villages, and 
finally selects ten households per village as in a two-stage stratified random sampling. 
The initial round surveyed 6,000 households with a total of 16,310 individuals (3,600 
households in rural areas). Individuals were tracked in the following years’ surveys. 
Since this study focuses on household non-farm businesses, only rural households that 
have members actively employed in all four survey years are selected. There are 2,101 
such rural households encompassing.23  
In the employment section of the SES, respondents were asked for their 
primary occupation, work status, and company size. 24  The options for primary 
occupation in the survey are farmer/fisherman (crops, livestock, aquaculture, fishery, 
hunting and gathering), production (handicrafts and basic technology manufacturing), 
production (industry), merchandise/own business, government/state enterprise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Further explanation of the rural sample across years and attrition issues are provided in 
Appendix 3A. 
24 The company size represents the total number of workers including the owner. It is 
categorized as one worker (i.e., no employees), 2-9 workers, 10-50 workers, 51-100 workers, 
101-200 workers, 201-500 workers, or over 500 workers. 
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employee, company/business employee, and general worker/laborer. The options for 
work status in the question include employer, self-employed without employees, 
working without pay for household business, government employee, state enterprise 
employee, private company employee, and cooperative group. These two questions – 
primary occupation and work status – are used to separate non-farm activities from 
farm activities at the individual level. Households where any member was operating a 
non-farm business either in the production or merchandise sectors are considered as 
having a non-farm business. If the member who operated a non-farm business 
employed non-family members, his/her household is classified as an employer. If 
his/her business recorded a total number of 1-9 non-family workers, the household is 
recorded as a microenterprise owner. Any business where the number of recorded 
workers exceeds or equals 10 is considered a small-medium enterprise (SME). On the 
other hand, if the members operated a non-farm business and operated alone or used 
only household member labor without hiring paid employees, their household business 
is recorded as self-employed. In some cases, if a household has multiple businesses, it 
is treated as one non-farm business since the survey does not have disaggregated 
information on each business, only individual employment and earnings information. 
For example, if a household has an individual who is self-employed and another 
individual who works as non-farm employer with five non-family member employees, 
then this household is classified as having a microenterprise. The rest of the 
households, where members only work on farms or as non-farm wage workers or both, 
are grouped together as households having no non-farm business. 
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Table 3.1 shows a transition matrix of non-farm business size as defined 
above, based on the number of non-family paid employees between 2005 (row) and 
2010 (column). The percentage is calculated across all changes, compared to the total 
number of households in both periods. Almost 40 percent of rural households operated 
a non-farm business at some point in time during this period. The majority (about 90 
percent) of rural non-farm businesses in both years were self-employed without 
employees and this group rarely grew larger within this period. Meanwhile, around 31 
percent of households operating a non-farm business in 2005 exited the business by 
2010. We also observe a tendency for microenterprise and SME firm size to contract, 
similar to what Mead and Liedholm (1998) observed in African countries in the 1990s. 
 
Table 3.1: Non-farm household businesses dynamic between 2005 and 2010 
(report number of households for each group and percentages of transition out of total) 
 
  2010   
2005 No NF  SE MIE SME Total 
No NF  1,283 197 21 1 1,502 
% 61.07 9.38 1.00 0.05 71.49 
SE 183 330 21 5 539 
% 8.71 15.71 1.00 0.24 25.65 
MIE 13 18 20 1 53 
% 0.62 0.86 0.95 0.05 2.48 
SME 3 2 2 1 8 
% 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.38 
Total 1,482 547 64 8 2,101 
% 70.54 26.04 3.05 0.38 100 
No NF = No NF business, SE = NF self-employed without employee,  
MIE = NF business with employees < 10 (microenterprise),  
SME = NF business with employees >= 10 	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When considering the assets, wealth, savings and debt of these different groups 
of households, we observe some clear patterns. Since the data do not contain 
information on business assets, only on household and agricultural assets, an asset 
index using factor analysis is calculated following Sahn and Stifel (2003). 25 
Household wealth each year is also calculated in 2007 Thai baht, including the value 
of housing and vehicles, and minus debts when we refer to net-wealth. To tackle 
possible endogeneity issues, authors in the entrepreneurship literature tend to use 
initial assets or wealth five years or more prior to the survey date (Buera, 2009; 
Karaivanov, 2010) to measure ex-ante wealth. However, since the data do not allow us 
to do so, the levels reported in 2005 are considered the initial levels of assets and 
wealth for each household. We cannot rule out the possibility of endogeneity, that 
some unobservables might co-determine both wealth and entrepreneurship ability and 
thus enterprise status.  
Figure 3.1 shows kernel densities of the asset index and net wealth (in million 
baht) in 2005 by non-farm business status. The vertical line represents the mean of 
each distribution. It clearly shows that larger non-farm businesses have higher levels 
of household assets and net-wealth in the past. It also shows the same patterns if we 
plot the asset index distributions in 2006-2010 against non-farm business status in 
2010. Although net-wealth distributions show the similar pattern to asset index 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The estimation details of the asset index, constructed using factor analysis following Sahn 
and Stifel (2003), are reported in Appendix 3B. The index includes number of rooms, housing 
materials, electricity, cooking fuels, water supply, toilet, number of durable goods (e.g., 
microwave, refrigerator, air condition, fan, television, radio, VCD-DVD player, washing 
machine, cable television, cell phone, landline, computer and internet), number of vehicles 
(motorcycles, cars, trucks, tractors), and livestock. 
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distributions, they do not clearly distinguish across non-farm business types and 
exhibit right-skewed distribution.  When looking at the amount of debts, households 
operating a non-farm business have higher level of debts, on average. 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show graph box distributions of saving and debt in 2005, 
2007, and 2010, given non-farm enterprise status in 2010. The line in the box 
represents the median of the distribution while the lower and the upper ends of the box 
are the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively. At the end of the box’s arms are lower 
and upper adjacent values and dots above are outside values. Scatter plots of 
microenterprise and SMEs groups are illustrated as well since the numbers of 
observations in these two groups are very small. We can see that medians of saving 
and debts of microenterprises and SMEs are higher than those of the self-employed 
and the no non-farm business groups. There is not much of a change in saving over 
these years, but there were some changes in the distributions of debt for both 
microenterprises and SMEs. The debt amount on average for microenterprises and 
SMEs increased from 0.20 million baht in 2005 to 0.33 million baht in 2010. 
Compared to other households running a non-farm business, microenterprises are 
more likely to be burdened with debts. Although debt distributions by changes in non-
farm business status between 2006 and 2010 (no business, enter, exit, and remain) 
exhibit similar distributions across groups and time, households who maintain a non-
farm business bear a higher level of debts than the rest. On the other hand, households 
who had non-farm business in 2006, but did not operate in 2010, have lower level of 
debts (Appendix Table C1).  
 
	   112 
 
 	  The	  vertical	  line	  represents	  the	  mean	  of	  each	  distribution.	  Attrition	  weights	  are	  applied. 	  
Figure 3.1 Asset index and net-wealth distributions by non-farm enterprise status 
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Figure 3.2: Saving distributions by nonfarm business types in 2010 
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Figure 3.3: Household debt distributions by nonfarm business types in 2010 
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Table 3.2 shows summary statistics of the main variables used in the study, 
including household head and household characteristics, as well as community 
variables. On average, household heads in rural Thai are almost 50 years old and 
graduated from primary school. Most household heads are married and only 25 
percent are female. More people worked on farm than worked to earn a wage or 
salary, but wage earnings offer higher returns. Farm earnings and wages in the study 
variables are calculated at community level to represent reference market rates. 
Interest rates are calculated as provincial level means since some communities do not 
have households reporting interest rates. Rural community characteristics including 
road conditions, travel time, soil quality, water conditions, and ratio of household 
receiving credits are obtained from a rural development census, the National Rural 
Development (NRD) data set collected at the village level by the Community 
Development Department of Thailand. We use only the 2005 NRD survey. 
We also include monthly rainfall data from the Thai Meteorological 
Department for its main meteorological stations across the country (102 stations that 
are located closest to the sub-districts in our sample) from 1984-2009 (26 years). 
Thailand is located in a monsoon area where the rainy season occurs between mid-
May and mid-October. We first measure variation in rainfall as the coefficient of 
variation of monthly rainfall between 2005 and the end of 2009 (as the 4th SES wave 
was surveyed in January 2010). Since each part of Thailand is affected by monsoon 
and typhoons differently, to measure rainfall shocks, we base on the past 26 years of 
rainfall data. Excess rainfall and deficit rainfall are measured in terms of total yearly 
rainfall (in centimeter) deviations from the long run sub-district level means. Thailand 
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averages 161.06 centimeters  of rainfall per year. Excess (deficit) rainfall in year t is 
defined when total rainfall of year t is higher (lower) than one standard deviation from 
the long run sub-district mean. 
 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Asset index 05 2101 0.09 1.05 -1.95 12.43 
HH wealth 05 2101 0.50 0.85 0 15.56 
Owned agri land (100rai) 2101 30.66 72.92 0 2400 
Age HH head 05 2101 52.57 16.26 19 95 
HH members 05 2101 3.71 1.56 1 12 
Married 05 2101 0.76 0.43 0 1 
HH head: female 2101 0.25 0.44 0 1 
HH head Education 05 
     educ: primary 2101 0.68 0.47 0 1 
educ: secondary 2101 0.08 0.27 0 1 
educ: high school 2101 0.08 0.28 0 1 
educ: college/above 2101 0.04 0.19 0 1 
HH farm labor ratio  2005 2101 0.29 0.33 0 1 
HH NF worker ratio 2005 2101 0.23 0.28 0 1 
HH NF w/o pay ratio 2005 2101 0.03 0.10 0 1 
Average farm earnings 05 (10k baht) 2101 0.33 0.34 0 2.63 
Average NF wage 05 (10k baht) 2101 0.78 0.71 0.01 6.22 
Interest rate 05 (Provincial avg.) 2101 8.19 5.69 1 57.50 
Ratio of HH receiving credits 05 2101 0.69 0.26 0 1 
Excess rainfalls (ER) 2101 17.91 19.34 0 155.12 
Deficit rainfalls (DR) 2101 4.75 18.41 0 127.76 
CV of monthly rains during 2005-09 2101 0.17 0.12 0.04 0.95 
Rural characteristics 05 
     - Year-round well usable road 2067 0.54 0.50 0 1 
- Ratio concrete of convenient route 2056 0.95 0.17 0 1 
- Travel time to nearest city 2101 22.07 16.02 0 200 
- Bad soil 2093 0.28 0.45 0 1 
- Insufficient water for agri. 2093 0.45 0.50 0 1 
- Stagnant flood 2093 0.17 0.38 0 1 
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3.4 Empirical Framework 
The analytical framework of section 2 mainly explains many household 
decisions with respect to operating a non-farm business. In this section, we explain 
how we test the hypotheses implied by that model, as well as how we extend it to 
explore the dynamics of household non-farm enterprise operations. We estimate two 
different models to test the predictions of the analytical model. The first one is a non-
farm business participation model, investigating the household decision to run a non-
farm business or not. The second one estimates the likelihood of households having 
different types of non-farm business as they find the optimal number of employees. 
Given data limitations, we classify businesses into three size groups: self-employed 
(no paid employees), microenterprise (< 10 employees), and small-medium firm (≥ 10 
employees). In the final, dynamic part of the analysis we explore the relationship of 
initial household asset/wealth to changes in household non-farm business status 
between 2006 and 2010, whether a household runs a non-farm business in both years, 
enters into non-farm business, ceases non-farm business, or stays out of non-farm 
business in both years. 
 
3.4.1 Which households run rural non-farm businesses? 
 A binary response model enables us to identify a household’s decision between 
running and not running a rural non-farm business. If the household decided to work 
as a non-farm entrepreneur, then Y1 = 1; otherwise, Y1 = 0. The households are 
assumed to maximize their earnings subject to a set of constraints as in section 2. Let 
be a threshold value of utility (as a function of earnings) above which households Vi*
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operate a non-farm business if . Define  an index 
function, where X denotes the observable covariates, mainly household assets and 
endowments, other household characteristics, village characteristics and weather 
shocks. The model is represented by the following equation: 
    (3.14) 
We look at households running a non-farm business in 2010 by using 
household characteristics, assert index/net wealth and labor allocation in 2005 so as to 
obviate potential endogeneity problems. Quandrini (2000), Gentry and Hubbard 
(2004), and Buera (2009) mention that entrepreneur households tend to have higher 
ability to save, resulting in potentially higher wealth accumulation. Lagged wealth, 
from five years prior, is hopefully enough to disentangle wealth from current 
decisions. From the analytical model, farm earnings, non-farm wage, and labor 
allocations (represented by labor ratio in farm work, non-farm wage worker, and non-
farm without pay) determine household decision on running non-farm business. All 
these variables are also simultaneously determined with the household decision. The 
use of pre-determined variables should lessen the endogeneity problem in the 
estimated association between all of these variables and non-farm business activity. 
But the coefficient estimates reported below should nonetheless not be interpreted as 
causal. 
 
 
 
 vi =Vi−Vi
* > 0  vi = ′Xiβ+εi
Y1 =
1  if  !X1β +ε1 > 0
0  if  !X1β +ε1 ≤ 0
#
$
%
&%
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3.4.2 Who hires employees? 
The SES survey data enable us to distinguish among non-farm businesses that 
are self-employed (no paid employees), microenterprise (<10 employees), and SME (≥ 
10 employees). Hence, we estimate an ordered probit model specified as follows. 
Y2 =
0  if  Y2* ≤ a1,                                        no non-farm business
1  if  a1 <Y2* ≤ a2,          self-employment without employees
2  if  a2 <Y2* ≤ a3,         microenterprise with <10 employees
3  if  a3 <Y2*,          small-medium sized with ≥10 employees
#
$
%
%%
&
%
%
%
,      (3.15) 
  where  .  represents a latent variable that determines optimal non-
farm business size. As  passes the a1 threshold, it becomes optimal to start a self-
employed non-farm business.  When  passes the a2 (a3) threshold, it becomes 
optimal to graduate to employing paid, non-family labor in a microenterprise (SME).26 
 
3.4.3 Changes in non-farm business operating status 
  We explore the relationship between household wealth and the dynamics of 
household non-farm business status. To minimize endogeneity problems, we use 2005 
variables to explain observed changes in non-farm business status between 2006 and 
2010. Hence, given household non-farm business status in 2006, we estimate the 
multinomial logit:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 I also tried to estimate an ordered probit model using semi-nonparametric estimation. 
However, there are some problems with starting points (for maximum likelihood) for the same 
model setup used for the parametric ordered probit model. If I change the dependent variable 
to 2007 business status, there is no problem running the program. I will try to see if there are 
other ways to solve this problem. 
 Y2
* = ′X2β2 +ε2
€ 
Y
2
*
€ 
Y
2
*
€ 
Y
2
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   (3.16) 
where   , Xi includes household characteristics, asset index or 
wealth, past labor allocations, other village characteristics in 2005. j  = 0, 1, 2, 3 refer 
to households not participating in non-farm business, entering non-farm business, 
exiting from non-farm business, and remaining operating in non-farm business, 
respectively. 
We might alternatively view non-farm business participation in 2006 and 2010 
as two related successful events after conditioning on covariates. Since we do not have 
data during 2008-2009 to ascertain whether households ran a non-farm business or 
temporarily discontinued during one or more years, we can alternatively treat 2006 
and 2010 as two distinct participation model observations. That suggests a bivariate 
probit specification allowing for correlation of the error terms from the index-function 
formulation of the binary outcome model. The two outcomes are determined by two 
unobserved latent variables (different time periods in our model) where errors of 
outcomes 1 (running non-farm business in 2006) and 2 (running non-farm business in 
2010) are jointly normally distributed with means of 0, variances of 1, and correlations 
of rho, and we observe the two binary outcomes. There are four mutually exclusive 
outcomes: (P1=0,P2=0) for never having a non-farm business, (P1=0,P2=1) for entering 
into non-farm business between 2006 and 2010, (P1=1,P2=0) for exiting the non-farm 
business between 2006 and 2010, and (P1=1,P2=1) for having a non-farm business in 
both periods. 
 
 
Pr(s= j)= exp(XΓ( j))
1+ exp(XΓ( j))
j=1
3
∑
 XΓ( j)i = γ0 + Xiγ1 +νi
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3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 Rural non-farm business participations 
 Table 3.3 reports the estimates from linear probability model (LPM) in which 
the dependent variable is a binary variable that takes value one if the household ran a 
non-farm business in 2010, and zero otherwise. I separate the asset index and wealth 
into three ranges of the distribution: low range for 1-25th percentiles, middle range for 
25-90th percentiles, and high range for above the 90th percentiles. All three ranges are 
statistically significant when asset index or wealth enters the LPM in a linear 
relationship. Asset index positively associates with the likelihood of operating non-
farm business, but the positive association falls with higher asset index values. Figure 
3.4 (a) shows predicted probabilities associated with the asset index, given other 
variables at means while figure 3.4 (b) shows predicted probabilities on a scale of one 
hundred percentiles of the asset index. On the percentile scale, the predicted 
probability of operating a non-farm business, on average, is highest over the middle 
range of the asset index. 
 On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between wealth and the 
likelihood of operating a non-farm business in the lower range of wealth distribution. 
Figures 3.5 (a) and (b) clearly show the negatively slope relationship within the first 
25th percentiles of the wealth distribution, which reflects household liquidity. It is 
likely that these liquid assets are used for other activities rather than running a non-
farm business.  
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 (a) Asset index                       (b) Percentiles of asset index  
 
Figure 3.4: Predicted probability (LPM) of non-farm participation against asset index 
and asset index percentiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Household wealth         (b) Percentiles of household wealth  
 
Figure 3.5: Predicted probability (LPM) of non-farm participation against wealth and 
wealth percentiles. 
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Table 3.3: Linear probability model estimates 
Binary dependent variable:      (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 
Running NF biz in 2010 Coeff./se Coeff./se Coeff./se Coeff./se 
Asset index 05 0.1454*** 0.1091    
  
 
(0.0243) (0.0806)    
  Asset index*(middle25-90) -0.0636* 0.0069    
  
 
(0.0378) (0.0843)    
  Asset index*(top90) -0.1121*** -0.0712    
 (0.0306) (0.0996)      
Asset index2 05  -0.0421      
  (0.0573)      
Asset index2*(middle25-90)  -0.0154      
  (0.0787)      
Asset index2*(top90)  0.0389      
  (0.0584)      
Wealth 05 
  
-1.3363*** 0.0555    
   
(0.3641) (1.6026)    
Wealth *(middle25-90) 
  
1.4137*** 0.1995    
   
(0.3423) (1.5163)    
Wealth *(top90) 1.3475*** 0.0282    
   (0.3580) (1.5887)    
Wealth 2 05    -9.8829    
    (14.0401)    
Wealth 2*(middle25-90)    9.7444    
    (13.9823)    
Wealth 2*(top90)    9.8726    
    (14.0392)    
Owned agri land  -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004** -0.0004**  
(100Tarang-wa) (0.0002) (0.0002)    (0.0002) (0.0002)    
age HH head 05 0.0145*** 0.0149*** 0.0156*** 0.0150*** 
 
(0.0044) (0.0045)    (0.0044) (0.0046)    
age2 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000)    (0.0000) (0.0000)    
HH members 05 -0.0321*** -0.0321*** -0.0270*** -0.0280*** 
 
(0.0075) (0.0075)    (0.0075) (0.0075)    
Married 05 0.0755** 0.0716**  0.0902*** 0.0820**  
 
(0.0353) (0.0357)    (0.0348) (0.0351)    
HH head: female 0.0619* 0.0625*   0.0678** 0.0606*   
 
(0.0320) (0.0323)    (0.0321) (0.0319)    
HH head Education 05     
educ: primary 0.0162 0.0152    0.0211 0.0225    
 (0.0468) (0.0466)    (0.0473) (0.0468)    educ: secondary -0.0400 -0.0402    -0.0152 -0.0202    
 
(0.0585) (0.0581)    (0.0588) (0.0582)    
educ: high school -0.0304 -0.0275    -0.0018 -0.0098    
 
(0.0568) (0.0568)    (0.0587) (0.0569)    
educ: college/above -0.1641** -0.1631**  -0.1194* -0.1461**  
 
(0.0674) (0.0681)    (0.0706) (0.0678)    
HH farm labor ratio 2005 -0.5260*** -0.5277*** -0.5619*** -0.5573*** 
 
(0.0432) (0.0435)    (0.0434) (0.0436)    
HH NF worker ratio 2005 -0.5200*** -0.5228*** -0.5224*** -0.5137*** 
 
(0.0475) (0.0480)    (0.0491) (0.0503)    
HH NF w/o pay ratio 2005 0.5512*** 0.5522*** 0.5732*** 0.5637*** 
 
(0.1245) (0.1251)    (0.1262) (0.1250)    
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          (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 
  Coeff./se Coeff./se Coeff./se Coeff./se 
Average farm earnings 05  -0.0733** -0.0719**  -0.0666** -0.0705**  
(10k baht) (0.0295) (0.0297)    (0.0291) (0.0290)    
Average NF wage 05  -0.0326 -0.0314    -0.0265 -0.0293    
(10k baht) (0.0213) (0.0215)    (0.0218) (0.0220)    
Interest rate (Provincial avg.) 0.0022 0.0022    0.0021 0.0025    
 
(0.0017) (0.0017)    (0.0018) (0.0017)    
Ratio of HH receiving credits 0.0946** 0.0917**  0.0925** 0.0951**  
 
(0.0428) (0.0430)    (0.0436) (0.0425)    
Excess rainfalls (ER) -0.0010* -0.0010*   -0.0008 -0.0008    
 
(0.0005) (0.0006)    (0.0005) (0.0005)    
Deficit rainfalls (DR) 0.0001 0.0001    0.0001 0.0001    
 
(0.0005) (0.0005)    (0.0005) (0.0005)    
Rural characteristics 05 
    - Year-round well usable road 0.0127 0.0125    0.0111 0.0112    
 
(0.0234) (0.0236)    (0.0233) (0.0232)    
- Ratio concrete of  0.0122 0.0133    0.0110 0.0117    
convenient route (0.0621) (0.0620)    (0.0590) (0.0585)    
 - Travel time to nearest city -0.0010 -0.0009    -0.0012* -0.0012*   
 
(0.0008) (0.0008)    (0.0007) (0.0007)    
- Bad soil -0.0605** -0.0598**  -0.0678** -0.0662**  
 
(0.0273) (0.0274)    (0.0271) (0.0271)    
- Insuff water for agri. 0.0022 0.0020    0.0083 0.0066    
 
(0.0245) (0.0245)    (0.0246) (0.0245)    
- Stagnant flood -0.0084 -0.0109    -0.0047 -0.0034    
 
(0.0310) (0.0310)    (0.0300) (0.0299)    
R2 0.246 0.245    0.236 0.238    
N. of obs 2045 2045    2046 2046    
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. Inverse probability weights to correct attrition bias are applied in the 
estimation. Variance-covariance matrices are clustered at village level. 
 
Table 3.4 reports the estimated average marginal effects of probit estimates on 
the binary variable of whether the household operates a non-farm business in 2010 
based on asset index or household wealth, and other covariates, in 2005. All estimates 
use inverse probability weights to correct for attrition as stated in Appendix 3A. In 
columns (1) and (2), the asset index in 2005 has a statistically significant, increasing 
but concave relationship with a rural household having a non-farm business in 2010. 
The turning point for the concave relationship is at an asset index value of 1.98 which 
is approximately the 95th percentile of the asset index. An increase of 100 Tarang-wa 
(400 square metres) statistically significantly reduces the likelihood of operating non-
	   125 
farm business by 0.07 percentage points, on average. The probability of having a non-
farm business also increases with the age of household head, at a decreasing rate. The 
maximum predicted probability is at the age of 88 and 45 years old for columns (1) 
and (2), respectively, when holding other variables constant at their mean. If 
household heads graduated from college or above, their household would be less likely 
to operate a non-farm business. This implies that if households have a high level of 
education, there might be better opportunities in wage employment, depressing the 
probability of owning a non-farm business, ceteris paribus. More family members do 
not always increase the probability of running a non-farm business. If households 
allocate their labor to farming and/or wage work, fewer resources are left to run the 
non-farm business. On the other hand, when households have labor left for their own 
business, it increases the likelihood of operating a non-farm business. Earnings from 
other sources could be seen as the opportunity cost of operating non-farm business. 
However, if more family members work in farming or wage sector, other sources of 
earnings could help smooth income flow when non-farm enterprise does not do well. 
High earnings would tend to increase the probability of becoming an entrepreneur 
(Holtz-Eakin et. al, 1993). Here we have a negative sign which is more likely to imply 
the opportunity cost and resource competition within household, similar to what we 
have from the analytical framework in Section 3.2. No estimated marginal effects on 
wages and prices are statistically significant. 
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Table 3.4: Average marginal effects of probit estimation of operating nonfarm 
business in 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   127 
 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. Inverse probability weights to correct attrition bias are applied in 
the estimation. Variance-covariance matrices are clustered at village level. Other variables include 
provincial dummies. Columns (1) – (4) contain all sample while columns (5) and (6) include only 
households that do not have non-farm business in 2005. 
 
 Weather risk from rainfall shocks does not have a strong significant effect 
overall. Column (1) uses total excess and deficit rainfalls during 2005-2009, and 
shows that extreme weather has a negative correlation with the probability of having a 
non-farm business. When we use coefficient of variation in column (2), it also shows 
that areas with high weather risk have a lower likelihood of having a non-farm 
business although the estimated effect is statistically insignificant. This negative 
relationship could imply non-farm business linkages with the agricultural sector. We 
also interact rainfall variables with asset/wealth, agricultural land holdings, and 
earnings variables. However, these interactions are not statistically significant. 
 Rural infrastructure and related community-level conditions show the expected 
associations, but the estimates are not statistically significant. A usable road with good 
year-round condition and quality road increase the likelihood of operating a non-farm 
business. More travel time to the nearest city reduces that likelihood. Bad soil quality 
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and the presence of water problems lower the possibility of operating a non-farm 
business, but only statistically significantly in the case of soil quality.  
Columns (3) and (4) use the household wealth level instead of the estimated 
asset index.27 The likelihood of having a non-farm business statistically significantly 
increases with wealth, increasing at a decreasing rate. The estimated turning point is at 
wealth equal to 4.8 million baht, which is at the 100th percentile of wealth distribution.  
The rest of the results when using household wealth are likewise similar to those of 
columns (1) and (2). 
Columns (5) and (6) use only observations that reported no non-farm business 
in 2005, hence the smaller number of observations.28 Overall, the results are similar to 
columns (1) and (2), with less statistically significant point estimates, due quite 
possibly to the smaller sample size. Conditional on no non-farm business in 2005, the 
non-farm wage is now strongly negatively associated with the likelihood of starting a 
non-farm business by 2010. The non-farm wage could be crucial to household 
decisions as to whether to allocate labor to starting a non-farm business or not. 
Moreover, the estimated average marginal effects of credit availability in the 
community on starting non-farm business are higher for households without a non-
farm business in 2005 than for the full sample, which seems to signal liquidity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 If we use household net-wealth, the average marginal effects are not statistically significant. 
We see from data descriptive analysis in Section 3 that net wealth distributions are not much 
different across non-farm business groups, but that household wealth and debts are different. 
28 Columns (1)-(4) pay attention only to the non-farm business status in 2010; non-farm 
business status in 2005 does not matter. Columns (5) and (6) select only households with “no 
non-farm business” status in 2005 so as to see if these households have started a non-farm 
business by 2010. 
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constraints. Insufficient water agriculture also increased the likelihood of household 
starting non-farm business in 2010. 
 
3.5.2 Ordered probit estimations of non-farm business types  
Table 3.5 shows the estimated average marginal effects of the ordered probit 
estimations of household decision in running non-farm business based on firm size. As 
discussed previously, we have four ordered firm size groups, with no non-farm 
business as a base, non-farm business without employees, then microenterprise (1-9 
employees), and then SME (10 or more employees). Each column within the panel 
presents the estimated average marginal effects for each type of non-farm business in 
2010, including no non-farm business. Panel (1) uses rainfall shocks while panel (2) 
uses the coefficient of variation of rainfall. The estimated average marginal effects on 
the likelihood of having non-farm business show the same signs with smaller 
magnitude for higher household business size since we have a smaller number of 
observations associated with those larger businesses. The signs of the base case’s 
average marginal effects are all opposite to the signs of the higher non-farm business 
size. Most of the statistically significant estimated average marginal effects show 
similar results as when we estimate probit models of non-farm business participation. 
Assets are statistically significantly related to who runs a non-farm business 
and hires more non-family labors. The turning point for the concave relationship 
(convex case for no non-farm business), holding other covariates constant, is at asset 
index equal 2.53 for the first three orders, and 2.44 for SME, all of which all at 
approximately the 97th percentile of the asset index. So the likelihood of operating a 
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non-farm business of any size is effectively increasing throughout the asset holding 
distribution. 
In the ordered probit model, however, two additional variables show statistical 
significance, compared to the probit model. First, households in a higher average wage 
earnings area are less likely to operate a non-farm business in 2010. A ten thousand 
baht increase in the average non-farm wage reduces the probability of having a non-
farm self-employed business by 2.9 percentage points, on average.  The other 
additional significant variable is excess rainfall. More rainfall increases the likelihood 
of having no non-farm business. Likewise, households in the areas with more 
exposure to rainfall risk are less likely to operate a non-farm business. Based on these 
results, non-farm business does not seem to be a way to secure household earnings 
from weather risk exposure. 
Coefficient estimates are reported in Appendix Table C2. The latent non-farm 
enterprise size variable is increasing with the asset index at a decreasing rate and 
decreasing with agricultural land holdings. The threshold parameters are statistically 
significantly different from each other. A likelihood ratio test of interaction terms 
between rainfall shocks (or cv) and asset index, agricultural land holdings and average 
earnings does not support the unrestricted model as opposed to restricted model 
without interactions with rainfall shocks. Figure 3.6 illustrates the predicted 
probabilities of each non-farm business group plotted against the household asset 
index. The predicted probabilities of operating a non-farm SME increase with the asset 
index while the predicted probabilities of having no non-farm business show the 
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opposite pattern. The predicted probabilities of the other two cases show an inverted-U 
shape. 
 
	  	  
Figure 3.6: Predicted probability of non-farm business types against asset index 	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3.5.3 Multinomial logit results of changes in non-farm business status. 
In Table 3.6, we explore the relationship of asset/wealth and dynamics of 
household non-farm business status on startup, exit, and maintaining business between 
2006 and 2010. We treat each change in non-farm business status independently by 
the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), an assumption 
supported by Hausman tests (without clustering standard errors) and Wald tests. The 
estimated average marginal effects of asset index in panel (1) are positively correlated 
with entering and maintaining a non-farm business, but negatively correlated with no 
non-farm business and exiting the sector. The turning point in the response probability 
for each change in non-farm business status is at different asset index value: 1.92 
(minimum), 0.81 (maximum), 0.69 (minimum), 2.65 (maximum) for no non-farm 
business, entry, exit, and remaining, respectively. It needs more assets for household 
to maintain their status in operating non-farm business. Households with agricultural 
land holdings are more likely to have no non-farm business or to leave non-farm 
business in 2010. A college degree increases the likelihood that a household remains 
in the no non-farm business status. Households that have previously allocated labor to 
farming or non-farm employment are more likely to stay the same, having no non-
farm business in both 2006 and 2010, indicating occupational persistence.  But if 
households with no non-farm business in 2006 previously experienced working in 
non-farm wage sector, they have more chance to operate non-farm business in 2010. 
Higher average wage rates in the non-farm sector increase the chance that households 
will stop operating a non-farm business and move to work in the wage sector. 
Households in the community with more credit access are more likely to start a non-
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farm business, emphasizing the importance of credit in business startup and possibly 
implying the existence of credit constraint. Exposure to excess rainfall increases the 
possibility not to start running a non-farm business which could imply that rural non-
farm businesses are affected by rainfall shocks. We estimated a model with the cv of 
rainfall, but the average marginal effects are not statistically significant. Panel (2) uses 
household wealth instead of asset index. The results are similar to panel (1). 
 As mentioned earlier, we also estimated bivariate probit models to test for 
correlation between 2006 and 2010 non-farm business operation. A Wald test rejects 
the null hypothesis that the error terms of the two binary participation models are 
uncorrelated. Appendix Table C3 reports estimated average marginal effects for each 
combination of events. The results are very similar to the multinomial logit 
estimations in Table 3.6.  So we do not elaborate on them here but interpret these only 
as a robustness check on the multinomial logit results. 
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3.6 Conclusions 
This study explores the correlates and dynamics of rural non-farm businesses 
in Thailand. We find strong household wealth effects on the likelihood of running a 
rural non-farm business. Wage rates are also strongly negatively related to small 
business creation and maintenance. We also observe more reduction than growth in 
rural non-farm firm size over the period studied.  
Ordered probit model estimations show that both push and pull factors are 
associated with the likelihood of households operating a non-farm business or hiring 
more workers in rural Thailand. Non-farm businesses who hire more workers have 
more household assets, smaller agricultural land holdings, and lower opportunity costs 
of labor related to other household activities. Besides household constraints on labor 
allocation, average non-farm wage within community reflects an opportunity cost of 
household in allocating labors to operating non-farm business. Higher non-farm wage 
increases the likelihood of households discontinuing non-farm business operation, but 
households also need higher degree of education, particularly college level, to be able 
to move to non-farm wage sector. Credit availability also plays an important role in 
starting business, reflecting borrowing constraint that rural households facing. 
Moreover, rural non-farm businesses in Thailand are likely to be affected by exposure 
to rainfall risk. Excess rainfall discourages households to start non-farm business. 
Hence, rural non-farm business might not be a good decision in diversifying income 
strategies, compared to working for (skilled) non-farm wage sector. Although the 
study has a limitation in explaining these factors in casual interpretation, it can give 
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some insights in explaining rural non-farm business state and dynamics in rural 
Thailand. 
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APPENDIX 3A 
ATTRITION ANALYSIS 
 
This appendix explains how this study addresses attrition and selection problems in 
the study. Total rural households surveyed in an initial round compose of 3,600 households. 
However, after meeting our criteria (having at least one family member employed in all 4 
waves), only 2,101 households appear in all four waves. A concern that non-random attrition 
might bias inferences based on this balanced panel might rise. Moreover, we restrict our 
sample to households whose members were employed in all four rounds to be consistent with 
the first paper (avoid conflating transitions between unemployment and employment with 
transitions among occupations). As a consequence, selection bias could still be an 
issue if there are significant differences in characteristics between original households 
and remaining households. 
 When household characteristics between households in the retained subsample 
and those who were initially surveyed in 2005 are statistically significantly different, 
suggesting that the subsample might not be a representative of the original survey. To 
solve this problem, we follow the procedure suggested by Baulch and Quisumbing 
(2011), estimating an attrition probit regression, and using inverse probability weights, 
as suggested by Fitzgerald et al. (1998) and Wooldridge (2002) in adjusting all 
regressions. 
We first run a probit regression where the dependent variable takes the value of 
zero for a household having at least one member employed and remained in all four 
waves, and takes the value of one for a rural household registering in 2005 survey, but 
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missing after the first wave or becoming unemployed. Then, we regress that 
dichotomous dependent variable on baseline variables that could affect the likelihood 
of attrition. The attrition probit regressions showed in Table A1 include household 
characteristics, household owned agricultural land and asset index, log earnings in the 
initial survey round, rural village attrition rate,29 dummy variables for each of the five 
main regions in Thailand. The pseudo R2 statistic can be interpreted as the proportion 
of attrition that is non-random. Wald tests are then performed to test whether 
observables jointly explain the predicted attrition probability. As shown in Table A1, 
the pseudo R2 values are relatively low. Log household income in 2005 and 
demographic variables are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level, and jointly explain the attrition rate. We can strongly reject the null hypothesis 
that attrition is unrelated to household characteristics. These tests suggest that non-
random attrition could bias the main estimations. We then use the inverse probability 
weighted method to correct for possible biases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Village attrition rate is the ratio of total individuals dropped out of the survey after the first 
wave to total individuals in the village in 2005. 
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                                  Table A1: Attrition probit regressions 
  (1) 
Pseudo-R2 0.2309 
Wald Tests 
 
Rural village attrition rate (P-value) 0.000 
Log (HH income) 05 (P-value) 0.000 
Assets (P-value) 0.115 
Demography and Educationa (P-value) 0.000 
Other variablesb (P-value) 0.000 
No. of observations 3,600 
a Demography and education variables include household head’s age, age2, marital status, number of 
household members, ratio of female members, and dummies for household head’s highest educational 
achievement. b Other variables include demographic and education variables, asset variables, and region 
dummies. Variance-covariance matrices are clustered at sub-district level. 
 
Following Baulch and Quisumbig (2011), we create the ratio of predicted 
values from the restricted regression and unrestricted regression of reversed attrition 
probit (RA = 1 if non-attrition, where the unrestricted regression include the same 
explanatory variables as the attrition probits in Table A1, while the restricted 
regression excludes the auxiliary variables (demographic variables, household asset 
variables, rural village attrition rate, and region dummies) in the first period. The 
inverse probability weights vary from 0.47 to 53.35 with mean 0.88.  
Table A2 exhibits probit results of having non-farm business in 2010, 
comparing the models using a survey weight and an inverse probability weight. The 
results show similarity on both models with higher pseudo R2 on the attrition weight 
models.  Although attrition bias indeed appears to exist, it seems that it does not matter 
much to our estimation results and resulting inferences. 
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Table A2: Probit estimations of non-farm business participation 
  Survey weights 
Attrition 
weights Survey weights 
Attrition 
weights 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se    
Asset index 0.1057*** 0.1087*** 
  
 
(0.0145) (0.0148) 
  Asset index2 -0.0256*** -0.0183*** 
  
 
(0.0059) (0.0057) 
  Net wealth (million baht) 
  
0.0427** 0.0270*   
   
(0.0218) (0.0153)    
Net wealth2 
  
-0.0035 -0.0003    
   
(0.0028) (0.0022)    
Owned agri land (100rai) -0.0006** -0.0005* -0.0007** -0.0005**  
 
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)    
HH head age 0.0158*** 0.0084* 0.0198*** 0.0118**  
 
(0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0056) (0.0050)    
HH head age2 -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0001*   
 
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)    
HH members -0.0132* -0.0237*** -0.0073 -0.0188*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0069) (0.0076) (0.0068)    
Married 0.0422 0.0596** 0.0571* 0.0761*** 
 
(0.0313) (0.0280) (0.0318) (0.0289)    
HH female ratio 0.1274** 0.1267** 0.1850*** 0.1827*** 
 
(0.0528) (0.0526) (0.0538) (0.0536)    
HH head Education (Less than primary school/none:base) 
 educ: primary 0.0365 0.0225 0.0501 0.0127    
 
(0.0438) (0.0331) (0.0475) (0.0342)    
educ: secondary -0.0157 -0.0218 0.0237 0.0012    
 
(0.0544) (0.0452) (0.0590) (0.0468)    
educ: high school -0.0183 -0.0589 0.0419 -0.0144    
 
(0.0522) (0.0448) (0.0565) (0.0455)    
educ: college/above -0.1227* -0.1882*** -0.0653 -0.1322**  
 
(0.0704) (0.0607) (0.0744) (0.0631)    
Farm income (10k baht) -0.0406* -0.0501** -0.0211 -0.0271    
 
(0.0208) (0.0223) (0.0205) (0.0216)    
Wage income (10k baht) -0.0121 -0.0147 -0.0036 -0.0028    
 
(0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0109) (0.0104)    
HH farm labor ratio -0.4620*** -0.4915*** -0.5203*** -0.5645*** 
 
(0.0429) (0.0429) (0.0449) (0.0452)    
HH NF worker ratio -0.4552*** -0.4897*** -0.4799*** -0.5242*** 
 
(0.0583) (0.0561) (0.0572) (0.0530)    
HH NF w/o pay ratio 0.3801*** 0.4538*** 0.4853*** 0.5456*** 
 
(0.1448) (0.1318) (0.1490) (0.1382)    
N. of obs 2101 2101 2101 2101    
Wald chi2 268.93 310.93 266.90 298.08 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.2204 0.2133 0.1979 0.1904 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. Variance-covariance matrices are clustered at village level. 
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APPENDIX 3B 
ASSET INDEX 
 
 The asset index used as a proxy for household wealth was constructed using 
factor analysis based on the method of Sahn and Stifel (2003). Dummy variables for 
dwelling characteristics and number of durable goods owned are used in the analysis 
to obtain the first factor. All data come from the SES panel in 2005 (initial year). 
Table B1 reports summary statistics, factor loadings and scoring coefficients. 
  
Table B1: Asset index summary statistics, factors and scoring coefficients 
 
Variable Mean SD Factor loading Scoring coef. 
Number of rooms 2.73 1.30 0.48 0.09 
Housing materials (dummies)     
  Cement 0.33 0.47 0.27 0.05 
  Wood 0.34 0.47 -0.31 -0.06 
  Others: local/reused materials 0.33 0.47 0.05 0.01 
Having electricity 0.99 0.09 0.11 0.02 
Cooking fuel (dummies)     
  Gas 0.52 0.50 0.53 0.10 
  Others: Electricity, charcoal, 
wood 0.45 0.50 -0.52 -0.10 
Water supply (dummies)     
  Pipe 0.61 0.49 0.09 0.02 
  Underground water 0.35 0.48 -0.07 -0.01 
  Others: rain, open sources 0.04 0.19 -0.04 -0.01 
Toilet: flush 0.99 0.11 0.11 0.02 
Household items (number)     
  Microwave 0.08 0.28 0.49 0.09 
  Refrigerator 0.86 0.47 0.53 0.10 
  Air condition 0.09 0.40 0.51 0.09 
  Fan 2.08 1.28 0.61 0.11 
  Radio 0.71 0.61 0.49 0.09 
  VCD-DVD player 0.66 0.57 0.56 0.10 
  Washing machine 0.37 0.50 0.62 0.11 
  Television 1.13 0.59 0.65 0.12 
  Cable television 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.01 
  Satellite dish (for TV) 0.01 0.10 0.21 0.04 
  Landline 0.17 0.39 0.56 0.10 
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Variable Mean SD Factor loading Scoring coef. 
  Cell phone 0.77 0.85 0.65 0.12 
  Computer 0.09 0.31 0.62 0.11 
  Internet access 0.03 0.18 0.48 0.09 
     
Vehicles (number)     
  Motorcycle 1.08 0.82 0.36 0.07 
  Car 0.07 0.28 0.46 0.08 
  Mini-truck/Van 0.19 0.46 0.45 0.08 
  2-wheel tractor 0.22 0.44 -0.09 -0.02 
  4-wheel tractor 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.02 
  6-wheel or higher 0.01 0.14 0.20 0.04 
     
Owned livestock     
  Buffalo 0.04 0.48 -0.07 -0.01 
  Cow 0.05 0.61 -0.06 -0.01 	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APPENDIX 3C 
ADDITIONAL TABLES 
 
Appendix Table C1: Summary statistics of household’s wealth, saving, and debt by 
changes in business status between 2006 and 2010. 
 
Business status 
 
Wealth (million) Saving Debt (million) 
2006 vs. 2010 
 
mean sd mean sd mean sd 
No NF business 2005 0.44 0.78 1957.18 4435.15 0.14 0.53 
 
2006 0.42 0.59 2226.74 6781.05 0.13 0.35 
 
2007 0.43 0.64 2017.27 3852.09 0.13 0.34 
 
2010 0.51 0.61 2508.29 7056.55 0.16 0.38 
        Enter 2005 0.44 0.73 1688.78 2616.61 0.10 0.19 
 
2006 0.44 0.72 1349.00 2569.79 0.10 0.19 
 
2007 0.43 0.55 2073.41 3618.29 0.11 0.19 
 
2010 0.49 0.49 3007.87 7485.21 0.21 0.79 
        Exit 2005 0.60 1.33 2169.96 4814.76 0.20 0.74 
 
2006 0.63 1.44 1923.86 4025.20 0.12 0.22 
 
2007 0.47 0.55 2227.55 3989.68 0.19 0.86 
 
2010 0.59 0.71 2469.82 5837.54 0.14 0.29 
        Remain 2005 0.69 0.86 2432.15 6799.86 0.21 0.64 
 
2006 0.72 0.95 2542.54 4219.93 0.17 0.34 
 
2007 0.81 1.17 2993.92 4724.30 0.18 0.39 
  2010 0.83 0.94 3476.09 5617.21 0.20 0.41 
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***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. Variance-covariance matrices are clustered at village level. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
INTERSECTORAL AND GENDER HETEROGENEITY IN THE MARGINAL 
EARNINGS GAINS ASSOCIATED WITH EDUCATION IN INDONESIA 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 The role of education in sector-specific and overall economic growth is a 
longstanding theme in development economics. According to Schultz (1964), human 
capital, in the form of education of rural workers and especially farm managers, is 
important for agricultural productivity as it facilitates technological change. Lewis 
(1954) saw the nonfarm sector as potentially dynamic and expanding. In his view, and 
in subsequent dual economy models that build on his insights, excess supply of farm 
labor with low marginal returns provides a surplus labor supply available to employers 
in the industrial sector who pay a higher wage because labor is more productive when 
mixed with industrial capital. In the course of structural transformation, higher labor 
productivity in agriculture allows households to allocate more time to non-farm 
activities or to migrate to the urban industrial sector (Timmer, 2009). Anticipating this, 
rural households invest their profits from agriculture in human capital formation, 
education in particular, also raising non-farm labor productivity. All these mechanisms 
lead to a growing rural nonfarm sector and gradual shrinkage in the intersectoral 
differences in the marginal returns to labor (Barrett et al., 2010).  
 Investment in human capital affects labor productivity and therefore earnings. 
In human capital theory, the optimal human capital investment is at the point where 
the expected present value of marginal gain in private returns equals the present value 
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of marginal opportunity cost. As described by Card (1999), studies of the role 
education plays in determining earnings almost always employ the human capital 
earnings function formulation of Mincer (1974). While the standard Mincerian model 
is often applied in a way that implicitly assumes that returns to schooling are constant 
across grade years and for all persons (conditional on other covariates), recent studies 
on the estimated returns to schooling allow returns to vary systematically across 
individuals due to individual and family characteristics, as well as to skills that are 
innate or that develop during early life (Card, 2001; Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 
2001; Carnerio, Heckman, and Vytlacil, 2011; Carneiro et al., 2011).  
 In low- and middle-income countries additional sources of heterogeneity in the 
marginal gains from education may arise because of intersectoral differences in the 
marginal returns to labor. If the marginal product of human capital is low in farm 
production but relatively high in nonfarm wage work, then the agricultural household 
will typically increase the share of its labor stock allocated to nonfarm work (Huffman 
and Orazem 2007). But household ownership of sector-specific fixed factors of 
production, like farmland or farming skills, combined with spatially heterogeneous 
access to public schools, transportation and communications infrastructure that affect 
labor productivity could impede rural individuals’ ability and willingness to invest in 
education and to reallocate labor intersectorally. The result can be persistent 
differences both in the likelihood of adult employment in different sectors and in the 
earnings gains from education across sectors. These joint differences remain 
unexplained in the literature, however. This paper, therefore, explores how individual 
earnings respond to added educational attainment given intersectoral labor market 
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heterogeneity and gender differences, as well as the potential signaling that comes 
from educational credentialing in the job market.  
Estimation of those prospective intersectoral differences in the earnings gains 
from education is complicated by two empirical regularities of developing country 
labor markets. First, educational attainment plays a key role in sorting on the job 
market, by influencing employability in different sectors. For example, farmers and 
lawyers have markedly different educational requirements. In societies where many 
people do not complete primary or secondary school, a large share of the workforce 
effectively lacks access to salaried or waged jobs in the formal private and public 
sectors by virtue of their limited education and must rely on self-employment in the 
agricultural or non-farm sectors. Under such circumstances the marginal impact of 
education on the probability of formal sector employment may be as or more 
important than the effect of education on earnings within any given sector. Put 
differently, education may play a role both in sorting workers among sectors and in 
determining their earnings within a sector.  
Second, rates of self-employment are especially high in developing countries. 
At least since Spence (1973) it has been well known that in the presence of 
asymmetric information about individuals’ imperfectly observable ability, individuals 
invest in education not merely to increase their marginal productivity and thereby their 
future earnings, but also to signal ability or other unobservable characteristics that are 
exogenous to schooling and that employers might reward (Riley 1979). Especially if 
education matters to the probability of employment in sectors that reward labor more 
in economies with imperfect intersectoral labor market integration, then the signaling 
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function of schooling may play a disproportionately large role in determining the 
correlation between earnings and education. Since the need for signaling arises due to 
asymmetric information between an individual and her prospective employer, 
signaling effects are necessarily absent among the self-employed. Perhaps we can and 
should therefore distinguish between the earnings gains from education that is not due 
to signaling by differentiating between the gains from education among the self-
employed and among the employed.   
In this paper we combine these three ideas: education affects the probability of 
sorting into different employment sectors, it may be associated with different marginal 
earnings gains in each sector, and the differences in marginal earnings gains may 
reflect in part gains due to signaling associated with educational attainment, as distinct 
from any true productivity gain from education. Non-farm employment is generally a 
more remunerative sector than farming and education is required to secure stable high 
wage employment. However, higher education is an investment that needs funding and 
time, as well as foregone earnings during school years. If parents who expect their 
children to take over the family farm perceive that the earnings gains from education 
in farming are less than in the non-farm sector, and they understand that the child will 
not need education as a signal of ability if she is to be self-employed, then they are 
likely to invest less in schooling for their children than would parents who expect their 
children to pursue a non-farm career as a salaried civil servant or firm employee, other 
things equal. In equilibrium, heterogeneous educational attainment might be an 
equilibrium outcome for individuals whose parents have different expectations 
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regarding their likely ultimate sector of employment and between employed or self-
employed status. 
In this study, we focus on exploring variation in the Mincerian, private 
earnings gains associated with education, differentiating between the farm and non-
farm sectors of employment and between employment and self-employment (i.e., farm 
self-employment, farm worker, non-farm self-employment, and non-farm employee). 
This approach does not estimate the true returns to education in so far as it necessarily 
omits the costs of education under the assumption that the cost of education are only 
the earnings foregone while in school or that the direct costs and unmeasured earnings 
while in school cancel out each other (Fields, 1980). Under these assumptions, the 
estimated coefficients on educational attainment in the earnings function can be 
interpreted as private gross rates of return, as per the education and labor literatures, or 
more precisely as private gross gains from education. However, these estimates must 
be carefully interpreted as we focus on descriptive explanation of earnings 
differentials as differences of coefficients on the schooling variables across the four 
employment sectors, allowing as well for variation by gender in those differences. 
An obvious challenge in estimating the Mincerian returns to education 
disaggregated by sector of employment is that sector and earnings are jointly 
determined by educational attainment. We therefore need a credible strategy to 
instrument for sector of employment. Because parents provide references, job 
information, and social connections that benefit children in the labor market 
(Magruder, 2010), we use parental information on occupation and education, as 
instruments influencing children’s occupation selection. We then use the resulting 
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predictions of sector of employment to estimate the marginal earnings gains associated 
with education conditional on sector of employment.  
We find evidence of both sheepskin effects associated with completion of 
multi-year stages of schooling and, most importantly, pronounced inter-sectoral 
differences in the marginal earnings gains from schooling. This obviously has 
significant implications for parents’ optimal educational investments in their children 
if not all children are equally likely to enter all careers. However, within the nonfarm 
or farm sectors, only those workers who graduate at higher grades of schooling earn 
more than the self-employed. We furthermore find that this reflects the signaling effect 
of secondary and tertiary education in non-farm employment Moreover, females with 
a high school or college degree benefit more from their schooling as their earnings 
increase substantially when they graduate at least from high school. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
data and Indonesian educational context. Section 3 describes the econometric model 
and estimation strategy. Section 4 reports empirical findings on both the occupational 
attainment and the earnings equations. Section 5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Data and descriptive analyses 
The data used in this study are from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS). 
The IFLS is a household and community level panel survey, conducted over four 
rounds in 1993-94, 1997, 2000, and 2007-08. The original round in 1993-94 (IFLS1) 
surveyed 7,224 households with 33,081 individuals in 13 provinces, representing more 
than 80% of Indonesians. The original households were re-sampled in the subsequent 
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rounds and the split-offs from the original households were tracked and included in the 
survey. Hence, the number of individual records increases every round. By the 2007-
08 round (IFLS4), the survey covers 13,536 households with 50,579 individuals. 
Overall, 87.6 percent of households participating in first IFLS wave were interviewed 
in all four rounds (Strauss et al., 2009). However, there are still many missing values 
on many variables. We look carefully at attrition issues in Appendix 4A.  
Sectors of employment are classified based on respondents’ reported primary 
job. The sample used consists of individuals aged 15-70 years old with self-reported 
earnings and schooling information, excluding unpaid family workers. The survey 
asked salary/wage (including the value of all benefits) and net profit (i.e., gross 
revenues less all business expenses) that wage workers and self-employed individuals 
received during last month and last year, respectively.30 No wage is reported for 
unpaid family workers. Hence, self-employed earnings refer to earnings that result 
from entrepreneurial effort regardless of having family or non-family workers. We 
only use earnings from individuals’ primary job, not including other sources of 
income. Years of schooling is defined as the highest grade completed. Since there are 
some conflicting reports of years of schooling across survey waves, for those age 25 
years or older in IFLS1 with no reports of attending school in subsequent survey 
rounds, we use their schooling reports from IFLS1. We assume that the earliest replies 
are the most accurate recall information for the older people given that they reported 
no further schooling thereafter. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 We use yearly earnings in our analyses as yearly earnings have fewer negative values than 
monthly earnings and obviate seasonality issues. 
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Information on parental education and occupational history, and agricultural 
land are extracted from IFLS1-2 (1993 and 1997) and then merged with individual 
earnings records from IFLS4 (2007-8). We thus have data (at least) ten years apart for 
determinants of ultimate sector of adult children’s occupation and current earnings in 
IFLS4. Parental information on occupation and highest grade of schooling comes from 
three sources. First, data on parents who were living in the same household in IFLS4 
were tracked back from IFLS1-2 self-reports. Second, information on parents non-
coresident with the adult child in 2007 is only used for deceased parents. We do not 
include the group of parents who were not in the same household but still alive since 
their reports of occupation refer to their current occupation which might be 
endogenous to the sector of work of the grown child. Third, if there is no information 
whether their parents lived in the same household or not in IFLS4, or if their parents 
were still alive but did not live in the same household, we trace back to their 
relationship reports as a son/daughter of the household head and wife/husband and use 
the IFLS1 information of household head and wife/husband as their parents’ 
information. Agricultural land value (in 2007) is also drawn from the earlier of IFLS1 
or IFLS2 depending on the earliest information we have. 
Table 4.1 shows summary statistics for the subsamples from IFLS1 and IFLS2 
that we use and the IFLS4 sample. Sample 1, the full sample, contains non-missing 
values of schooling, occupation, and earnings variables for 15-70 year-old individuals, 
totaling 12,675 observations. Sample 2, the estimation sample, includes only 
households with non-missing values for all variables listed in the table, after matching 
all parents’ information, totaling 6,486 individuals. Balancing tests on key variables 
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between each of samples 1 and 2 show mostly statistically significant differences. The 
missing values do not appear randomly. Appendix 4A explores attrition using inverse 
probability weights to correct for sample attrition from merging the IFLS4 data with 
parental data and value of agricultural land data from the earlier survey rounds. 
Although our results indicate that attrition is likely non-random, the OLS estimates of 
the earnings equations when using survey weights and attrition weights are statistically 
insignificantly different. Nonetheless, we use the attrition weights in all of our 
estimations. 
Table 4.2 shows the distribution of sample observations across years of 
schooling completed, sectors of employment and gender as of 2007. In Indonesia, the 
elementary level includes grades 1-6, junior high school includes grades 7-9, senior 
high school includes grades 10-12, and years 13 and higher are university or college 
level. A majority of individuals complete no more than an elementary school 
education. These tables show clearly that the probability of working in farming, 
especially farm self-employment moves inversely with educational attainment while 
the probability of working in the non-farm employee sector increases with education, 
for both genders. This relation is as expected since the non-farm employee sector 
involves more professional training. Females with less than an elementary school 
education, however, tend to work in non-farm self-employment more than male 
elementary school dropouts do. Men comprise 63% of the actively explained sample, 
earn more than women, on average, in each sector, and are more likely to have 
completed at least junior secondary school. On average, nonfarm workers earn the 
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most per year, followed by non-farm and farm self-employment, while farm workers 
earn the least.  
 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of each sample used in the study 	  
  
     Sample 1: 
    Full sample 
       Sample 2:  
Estimation sample 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Years of schooling 7.49 4.63 7.30** 4.60 
log earnings 2007 15.19 1.36 15.11** 1.35 
Age 41.51 13.03 41.99** 14.18 
Female  0.36 0.48 0.38** 0.49 
HH head 0.58 0.49 0.53*** 0.50 
Dmomse 
  
0.24 0.43 
Dmomwkr 
  
0.17 0.38 
Ddadse 
  
0.48 0.50 
Ddadwkr 
  
0.38 0.48 
Mom elementary 
  
0.26 0.44 
Mom Jr.high sch 
  
0.04 0.20 
Mom Sr. high sch 
  
0.03 0.17 
Mom University 
  
0.01 0.08 
Dad elementary 
  
0.33 0.47 
Dad Jr.high sch 
  
0.06 0.23 
Dad Sr. high sch 
  
0.06 0.23 
Dad University 
  
0.02 0.12 
Value of agri land 
  
22.24 102.40 
Durban_07 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50 
No of obs 12,675 
 
6,486 
 Survey weights are applied. ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10 for tests of the equal means 
null hypothesis between samples 1 and 2. Sample 1 contains non-missing values of non-
missing values of schooling, occupation, and earnings variables for 15-70 year-old individuals, 
totaling 12,675 observations. Sample 2 contains non-missing values of all variables on the list, 
including parental information. 
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Table 4.2: Years of Schooling by sectors of employment and gender, 2007 
 Years  
Male 
Farm worker Farm SE NF worker  NF SE 
N P N P N P N P 
0 54 0.06 210 0.22 65 0.07 65 0.07 
1 33 0.11 76 0.26 27 0.09 36 0.12 
2 42 0.08 143 0.26 76 0.14 78 0.14 
3 33 0.06 142 0.27 77 0.15 76 0.14 
4 41 0.07 124 0.22 97 0.17 86 0.15 
5 38 0.09 103 0.24 63 0.14 55 0.13 
 Primary 6 177 0.07 482 0.19 599 0.23 363 0.14 
7 20 0.08 35 0.14 76 0.31 39 0.16 
8 10 0.04 41 0.16 93 0.36 54 0.21 
Jr. high 9 93 0.06 186 0.12 503 0.32 270 0.17 
10 4 0.03 10 0.08 54 0.41 26 0.20 
11 5 0.04 20 0.14 55 0.39 24 0.17 
Sr. high 12 89 0.03 176 0.06 1,327 0.45 435 0.15 
13 
 
0.00 9 0.10 35 0.41 12 0.14 
14 1 0.01 1 0.01 36 0.47 16 0.21 
15 1 0.01 1 0.01 38 0.42 17 0.19 
University 16 6 0.00 21 0.02 540 0.43 131 0.11 
Total 647 0.05 1780 0.14 3761 0.30 1783 0.14 
log earnings 14.9191   14.9384   15.6583   15.6483   
std. dev. 1.1954  1.2070  1.2940  1.2005  
CV 0.0801   0.0808   0.0826   0.0767   
 
 Years  
Female 
Farm worker Farm SE NF worker  NF SE 
N P N P N P N P 
0 106 0.11 106 0.11 101 0.11 227 0.24 
1 21 0.07 27 0.09 27 0.09 51 0.17 
2 33 0.06 39 0.07 50 0.09 94 0.17 
3 25 0.05 34 0.06 48 0.09 90 0.17 
4 35 0.06 17 0.03 58 0.10 101 0.18 
5 26 0.06 27 0.06 37 0.08 87 0.20 
Primary 6 95 0.04 83 0.03 332 0.13 418 0.16 
7 6 0.02 1 0.00 30 0.12 37 0.15 
8 6 0.02 5 0.02 19 0.07 31 0.12 
Jr. high 9 24 0.02 32 0.02 265 0.17 218 0.14 
10 2 0.02 0 0.00 17 0.13 18 0.14 
11 
  
2 0.01 20 0.14 14 0.10 
Sr. high 12 17 0.01 25 0.01 603 0.20 286 0.10 
13 1 0.01 0 0.00 23 0.27 6 0.07 
14 0 0.00 1 0.01 17 0.22 5 0.06 
15 0 0.00 0 0.00 24 0.26 10 0.11 
University 16 8 0.01 2 0.00 468 0.38 66 0.05 
Total 405 0.03 401 0.03 2139 0.17 1759 0.14 
log earnings 14.1184   14.1456   15.2390   14.9064   
std. dev. 1.2869  1.3039  1.3921  1.3027  
CV 0.0912   0.0922   0.0914   0.0874   
         N = number of observations, P = proportion in sector 
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4.2.1 Indonesia education background 
Between 1973-1974 and 1978-1979, more than 60,000 new primary schools 
were constructed under the INPRES program. The program targeted children who had 
not previously been enrolled in school (Duflo, 2001). Children born after 1962 
therefore enjoyed at least partial exposure and benefited from increased access to 
primary schools in Indonesia. The enrollment rate in primary school indeed increased 
from 72 percent in 1975 to nearly universal coverage by 1995. The enrollment rate in 
junior high school rose from 18 percent in the 1970s to approximately 62 percent in 
2005, while senior high school enrollment rate increased to around 40 percent by 2005 
(Granado et al., 2007). A higher enrollment rate in primary school reduces the 
enrollment gap across income groups. However, inequalities remain at the junior and 
senior high school levels. Suryadarma and Suyrahadi (2010) also find that children 
from poor households are less likely to graduate from junior secondary school. 
Moreover, regional differences are strongly associated with the enrollment gaps in 
income levels as the richest quintile in Papua still has lower enrollment rates than the 
poorest quintile in Sumatra (Granado et al., 2007) 
 
4.2.2 Differences in unconditional earnings distributions across employment 
sectors 
Work in the non-farm sector, either in self-employment or as an employee, is 
significantly more remunerative, on average, than farming. The top panel of Figure 4.1 
shows the cumulative distributions of log earnings in 2007 by sector. The farm worker 
earnings distribution is first-order stochastically dominated by both non-farm self-
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employment and wage employment, while farm self-employment and both non-farm 
occupations are not statistically significantly different in dominance ordering, per the 
Davidson and Duclos (2000) test.  Since earnings differences are negligible up through 
completion of junior high school, we combine all these who did not complete below 
senior high school in these simple descriptives. A plot of the cumulative earnings 
distributions for each completion level clearly shows that the earnings distributions of 
college graduates first-order stochastically dominate the earnings distributions of 
lower schooling level graduates. But only a small number of individuals graduated 
from college, we combine all those individuals who completed at least senior high 
school. As referenced in the bottom panel of Figure 4.1, nonfarm workers’ log 
earnings distribution statistically significantly first-order stochastically dominates farm 
workers’ log earnings distribution among this better-educated subpopulation. For high 
school and university graduates, we can clearly distinguish the earnings distributions 
of workers between the nonfarm and farm sectors, reflecting the intersectoral 
differences in labor returns that underpin dual economy models and other lines of the 
development literature. 
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Figure 4.1: Cumulative distributions of log earnings across employment sectors 
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4.2.3 Differences in education-conditional earnings distributions within each 
sector 
When estimating kernel densities (not shown here) for each sector of 
employment, all of log earnings distributions shift rightward with successively higher 
levels of education. These results confirm that higher education is associated with 
increased earnings irrespective of sector. But these shifts vary by sector of 
employment. Figure 4.2 depicts log earnings distributions by education level for each 
sector of employment. The conditional earnings distribution for any education level up 
to senior high school is statistically first-order stochastically dominated by the 
conditional earnings distribution for those with university level education in each 
sector of employment. The nonfarm employee sector (bottom left panel) clearly shows 
the greatest difference in education-conditional earnings, exhibiting the first-order 
stochastic dominance of earnings distribution at the university and senior high school 
levels relative to lower levels of educational attainment. In both the farm and non-farm 
sectors, the shift in earnings distributions associated with increased educational 
attainment is far greater among the employed than the self-employed, consistent with 
the hypothesis that signaling effects play an important role in labor markets.  
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative distributions of education- conditional log earnings, by sector 
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4.3 Econometric strategy 
Ultimately, we want to estimate a Mincerian earnings equation to explore the 
(private) marginal earnings gains from educational attainment, allowing for variation 
between the farm and non-farm sectors so as to accommodate structural differences 
typical of developing economies, between self-employment and wage employment so 
as to distinguish between the marginal earnings gains and the signaling effects of 
education on earnings, and between men and women, especially in a predominantly 
Muslim society where gender may affect labor market access. The econometric 
challenge is that including employment sectors in the Mincerian earnings equation 
raises concerns about bias due to both the prospective endogeneity of schooling 
choices and to selection effects into sector of employment.  
We worry less about the endogeneity of schooling choices. In Duflo (2001), 
OLS estimates of the returns to schooling are 7.8 percent per year in Indonesia while 
two-stage least squares estimates, using policy change in access to primary schooling 
as instruments, indicate returns of 7-10 percent. Duflo’s results do not support the 
view that OLS estimates of returns to education in developing countries are biased 
upward by endogenous schooling choices. Oyelere (2010), using the exogenous timing 
of policy change in free primary education across regions in Nigeria, also shows 
estimated returns to education similar in both OLS and IV estimates. Given that 
endogenous schooling choices might not be a significant source of bias, we then focus 
on selection into sector of employment.  
OLS estimates of the earnings equation could be biased if selection into 
employment sectors were correlated with regressors in the earnings equation. 
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Siphambe (2000) and Lassibille and Tan (2005) emphasize the endogenous choice of 
sector of employment and therefore correct for selection effects using an Inverse Mills 
ratio correction from the multinomial logit estimator adapted by Lee (1984) from 
Heckman (1979). Here we use a more efficient correction following Dubin and 
McFadden (1984) and modified by Bourguignon et al. (2007). Comola and Mello 
(2013), using Indonesian labor market survey data (Sakernas), apply a multinomial 
selection for three labor market statuses (inactivity, wage earner, and nonsalaried 
work) and instrument educational attainment in both the earnings and selection 
equations. They estimate returns to education of 9.0-10.8 percent depending on 
whether one applies a multinomial selection procedure or treats schooling years as 
endogenous. 
Magruder (2010) investigates intergenerational networks between parents and 
their children and finds that network connections of fathers increase employment rates 
of their sons. Hellerstein and Morrill (2010) show that about one-third of sons and 
one-fifth of daughters work in the same occupation as their father. Kramarz and Skans 
(2011) use Swedish employer-employee data to show that family networks, not their 
classmates, play an important role in searing for boys their first job, particularly in 
areas that people have low educational attainment on average. The underlying idea in 
these studies is related to intergenerational mobility (Becker and Tomes, 1979; Black 
and Devereux, 2010). Parents’ race, ability, education, occupation, and other 
characteristics influence their children’s adult work environment. Many studies 
therefore use parental education as an instrument for child education. We use parents’ 
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occupation and education to instrument for their adult child’s sector of employment in 
2007 in the first stage estimation. 
Given these concerns, we explore the Mincerian returns to education following 
two distinct estimation strategies. First, we estimate by ordinary least squares (OLS), 
under the naïve assumption that sectors of employment are exogenous, with 
interactions among sectors, gender, and education in order to test the heterogeneity of 
marginal earnings gains hypotheses. Second, we treat sorting into each employment 
sector as a selection problem. We then account for the sector-conditional probability 
of multinomial selection estimated in the first stage, using parental variables as 
instruments for sector selection. We then estimate the earnings equations separately 
for each sector, correcting for the selection terms following Dubin and McFadden 
(1984) and Bourguignon et al. (2007). We caution, however, that although the sector 
selection is instrumented, the estimated marginal earnings gains from schooling cannot 
be interpreted as causal estimates of the effects of education on earnings because the 
schooling variable is still potentially endogenous. But, mentioned previously, several 
prior studies show that the estimated returns to schooling are very similar for both 
OLS and IV estimations, suggesting that such bias is likely small and that these 
selection-corrected estimates are likely close to the true causal parameter estimates.  
 
4.3.1 Multinomial occupational attainment estimations 
Parents provide their children with references, job information, and social 
connections that benefit children in the labor market.  In this study, we use dummy 
variables for father’s and mother’s working status as a worker or self-employed to 
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capture the influence of parents’ occupation on child’s sector of employment. 
Unfortunately, the information for dead parents only reports working status, with no 
information on farm or nonfarm sector, so we cannot separate parents by sector of 
employment. Parental education is defined as dummy variables for completed 
elementary, junior high school, senior high school, and university, with less than 
completion of elementary school as a base. We expect that parents with higher 
educational attainment are likely to work in the nonfarm sector, implying that parental 
education here could identify sector of employment for their children. Individual’s 
schooling is assumed to be exogenous as we want to explore how education is related 
to sorting into each sector. Based on the multinomial logit model, we define 
 
Pr(O = j) = exp(XΓ( j))
1+ exp(XΓ( j))
j=2
4
∑
	  
where    
XΓ( j)i = γ 0 + γ 1Sit + ′Ciγ 2 + γ 3 female+ ′C ⋅ female ⋅γ 4 + γ 5agei + γ 6agei2
             + ′Diγ 7 + γ 8eik + ′Xiδ +ν i
(4.1) 
 
To ensure model identification, is set to zero when the individual job is farm 
worker (a base case). Then, O is occupational choice in 2007 and j = 2, 3, 4 refer to 
farm self-employment, non-farm worker, and non-farm self-employment, respectively. 
Si is the highest year of school completion and Ci is a set of dummies for degree 
completion. Di is a vector of dummy variables of father’s and mother’s occupation as 
worker or self-employed, and for parents’ highest schooling level. ek is a sector-
specific capital endowment (family agricultural land holdings) and Xi is a vector of 
 Γ( j)i
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other controls (used in the second stage), including household head, urban area, and 
provincial dummies. 
 
4.3.2 Earnings equation estimations 
We estimate the education-earnings relationship and differences across sectors 
of employment and gender. We follow two distinct estimation strategies, as described 
above. First, we assume that sectors of employment are exogenous. Second, allowing 
for the prospective endogeneity of sector of employment, we estimate a selection 
model of employment sectors. 
 
4.3.2.1 Treating sector of employment as exogenous 
If we assume that sector of employment is exogenous, we estimate the earnings 
equation including interactions between years of schooling, sectors of employment, 
as well as gender, so as to explore the differences in (private) returns to education 
across sectors and genders. We also add degree effects or ‘sheepskin effects’ – i.e., a 
dummy variables for highest degree completed (Hungerford and Solon, 1987; Belman 
and Heywood, 1991) – as we see further rightward shifts of earning distributions in 
each education degree level. The baseline model is defined as follows: 
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ln yi =αi +β1Si + φ jC ji
j=1
4
∑ +β2Si femalei + φ jf C ji
j=1
4
∑ femalei
           + γkOki
k=1
3
∑ + γkf Oki ⋅ femalei
k=1
3
∑ + γ jk
j=1
4
∑ Oki
k=1
3
∑ C ji + γ jkf
j=1
4
∑ Oki
k=1
3
∑ C ji ⋅ femalei
           + γk
sOki
k=1
3
∑ Si + γkfsOki
k=1
3
∑ Si ⋅ femalei +β3agei +β4agei2 + ′Xiδ+εi
 
                   (4.2) 
where ln yi is natural log of earnings of individual i; Si is completed years of 
schooling; age is individual age (instead of years of potential experience and the 
quadratic term for capturing the life cycle effect); Oki is a dummy for employment 
sector where k = 1,2,3 for farm self-employment, nonfarm employee, and nonfarm 
self-employment, respectively. Then, all interaction terms are added for both 
intercepts and slopes, interpreting γs and γfs as additional earnings gains associated 
with schooling from the base case of male farm worker and female farm worker. Cji is 
a dummy for degree completion to reflect sheepskin effect in a cumulative way, so C1i 
= 1 for those who completed grade 6 (primary school graduates), C2i = 1 for grade 9 
graduates (junior high school graduates), C3i = 1 for grade 12 graduates (senior high 
school graduates), and C4i = 1 for university graduates. We also interact degree effect 
terms with sectors and gender. Xi is a matrix of control variables, including household 
head, household agricultural land value, urban area, and provincial dummies. Standard 
errors are clustered at community level and attrition weights are applied.31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Given the findings in Duflo (2001), we also introduced dummy variables to split cohorts 
into three groups: i) cohort1 is a young generation, born after 1972 (indirect exposure to the 
INPRES program); ii) cohort2 is a generation aged 2-12 in 1974 (direct exposure to the 
INPRES program); and iii) cohort3 is an older generation, aged 13+ in 1974 (no exposure to 
the program). These cohort variables shows positive correlations between log earnings and 
older cohorts, representing age cohort effects rather than the result of more access to primary 
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4.3.2.3 Selection-corrected estimates of the marginal earnings associated 
with education 
We can also use the selection correction methodology developed by Dubin and 
McFadden (1984) and modified by Bourguignon et al. (2007). The method seeks to 
estimate the earnings function for each sector separately, but correcting for 
prospective selection bias based on multinomial logit instead of the usual Heckman 
selection model based on a probit estimator. Here, let log earnings in the sth alternative 
is given by 
            (4.3) 
where Z contains the main covariates as in equation (4.2), except sector variables and 
their interactions. Let ln ys be observed only if alternative s – occupational choice s – 
is chosen among three alternatives. Following the Heckman selection model, Dubin 
and McFadden (1984) and Bourguignon et al. (2007) include multiple correction terms 
to control for self-selection into the sth alternative instead of only an inverse Mills ratio 
term for self-selection correction. Hence, equation (4.3) becomes 
,         (4.4) 
where Pj is the probability that alternative j, j = 1, 2, 3, 4 will be chosen. Pj follows the 
multinomial logit model in equation (4.1).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
schooling from the INPRES program. We therefore omit these structural breaks in the 
reported estimates. 
 ln ys =αs + Zsβs +us
 ln ys =αs + Zsβs +h(P0,...,P3)+ es
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Dubin and McFadden (1984) assume that , where ηj  
is a disturbance term from random utility maximization, conditional on the alternative 
s being chosen. Hence, (4.1) becomes 
         (4.5) 
where rj is the correlation coefficient between disturbances us and ηj, and es is a 
residual with asymptotic mean zero. Equation (4.5) is estimated in two steps. We first 
estimate the multinomial logit model for each of occupational choice in (4.1) and then 
the predicted probabilities are substituted into the selection correction terms in 
equation (4.5). Standard errors are bootstrapped with 1000 replications to account for 
the generated regressors. 
 
4.4 Empirical findings 
 Table 4.3 reports the estimated average marginal effects from the multinomial 
logit in equation (1). Parents’ occupation and education indeed influence the 
employment status of individuals. These variables statistically significantly jointly 
determine the estimated probability of an adult child’s sector of employment.  
Individuals whose father was self-employed are more likely to be self-employed and 
less likely to work as an employee either in the farm or nonfarm sectors. If father was 
an employee, an adult child is more likely to be a nonfarm employee as well. Mother’s 
self-employment is positively related to her children’s choice of nonfarm self-
employment and negatively related to their likelihood of becoming a farm worker. 
 
E(us )= σs
6
π
rj η j −E(η j )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
j≠s
∑
 
ln ys =αs + Zsβs +σs
6
π
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Pj ln(Pj )
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Parents’ educational attainment generally correlates strongly with individual’s sector 
of employment increasing(decreasing) an adult child’s probability of working in the 
nonfarm (farm) sector. University graduate parents, especially the mother, sharply 
increase the likelihood that an individual works in the nonfarm sector.  
The value of owned agricultural land from the past 10 years, representing a 
farm sector specific-capital endowments, statistically significantly increases the 
likelihood of farm self-employment. Intuitively, schooling is positively (negatively) 
associated with the likelihood of working in the nonfarm (farm) sector. A high school 
degree strongly increases the probability of non-farm employment. A university 
degree has an especially large, positive effect on non-farm employment, but 
statistically significantly only for women. The effect of age is nonlinear, but 
statistically significant only for the nonfarm sector, concave (convex) for self-
employment (employee). The age of the maximum predicted probability for non-farm 
self-employment is 52 whereas the maximum predicted probability for non-farm 
employee is reached at the age of 20 and is getting lower probability when 
approaching 70 years old. Younger individuals are likely to work as nonfarm 
employees while older people, with more experience, have a higher likelihood to 
operate their own self-employed business. Women are more likely to operate a 
nonfarm self-employed business rather than a farm. As expected, rural individuals 
work disproportionately in the farm sector whereas urban individuals mainly work in 
the nonfarm sector. 
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Table 4.3: Average marginal effects for multinomial logit 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. Standard errors are clustered at community level and 
attrition weights are applied. Provincial dummy variables are included but not shown.	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 OLS coefficient estimates of earnings equation (2), assuming exogenous 
sectors of employment, are reported in Appendix Table B1. We report the estimated 
average effects of schooling, including sheepskin effects, in Table 4.4 by calculating 
estimated average log earnings changes from an additional year of schooling for each 
gender – occupation cohort, evaluated at the means of the other control variables. The 
results in column (1) suggest that, on average, females gain more from schooling than 
males do. Earnings gains from schooling are likewise greater in the nonfarm sector 
than in the farm sector; nonfarm employees enjoy the highest statistically significant 
marginal earnings gains from schooling, for both males (10.6%) and females (36.7%). 
 
 
Table 4.4: Average effects of schooling, including sheepskin effects, on earnings  
from OLS and 2-stage estimation correcting for selection in the first stage 
 
     OLS Selection 
      (1)     (2) 
Male farm worker -0.091 -0.184 
Male farm self-employed -0.014 0.024* 
Male NF worker 0.106*** 0.144*** 
Male NF self-employed 0.078* 0.080* 
Female farm worker 0.316** 0.019 
Female farm self-employed 0.264* 0.026 
Female NF worker 0.367** 0.154*** 
Female NF self-employed 0.344 0.100* 
No. of observations 6,486 6,486 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. 
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Table 4.5 reports results from the second stage selection models based on the 
first stage multinomial logit model in Table 4.3. Not all selection terms are 
individually statistically significant, but there exist selection effects in each sector and 
these selection terms are statistically jointly statistically significant only for farm and 
non-farm worker equations. Both negative and positive correlations of the selection 
terms exist in all equations, implying that unobserved parts relating to the probabilities 
of selection into that sector could bias the estimated marginal earnings of education in 
the absence of this two-stage selection estimation strategy.32 
The estimated coefficients on years of schooling for male vary from -0.095 to 
0.148, with the highest estimates consistently associated with nonfarm employees. 
High school and college degrees are positively associated with earnings from non-
farm occupations. Although coefficients on schooling variables are not statistically 
significant for all sectors, they are statistically jointly significant, except in the farm 
self-employment equation. Other coefficients on individual characteristics are 
statistically significant and show the expected relationship with log earnings: life cycle 
effects, lower earnings for female, and higher earnings for household heads if they are 
in the nonfarm sector. On average, the highest log earnings occur at the estimated age 
of 67 years old for farm workers, 58 years old for farm self-employed, and 43 years 
old for the non-farm occupations. If farm workers had agricultural land, each 
additional one million rupiah of the land value is associated with an 0.4 percent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Exclusion restriction tests are shown in Appendix Table C1. Although the joint test for all 
instruments are statistically significant in determining the earnings equations, mother’s 
occupation variables are always statistically insignificant. We have at least a set of variables 
that is valid for being instruments. 
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increase in earnings. However, the equivalent agricultural land effects are tiny – only 
0.01 percent increase in earnings – for the farm self-employed. 
 We also summarize the average effects of schooling on wage differentials after 
correcting for selection in the rightmost column of Table 4.4 as estimated average 
differences in log earnings. Firstly, there are considerable differences between the 
OLS estimates and the selection correction estimates, potentially bias introduced from 
failure to control for selection into sector of employment. The marginal earnings gains 
from schooling are substantial higher for females in the OLS model while they are 
approximately in the same range between males and females in the selection model.  
Secondly, both models show a sharp intersectoral difference in the marginal earnings 
associated with education, with higher gains in the non-farm sector than in the farm 
sector. In the selection model, the marginal earnings gains from schooling for 
individuals in the non-farm sector vary from 8.0-15.4 percent while those in the farm 
sector are approximately around zero. Thirdly, there are also significant signaling 
effects, as reflected in higher marginal earnings associated with education for non-
farm workers than non-farm self-employed (14.4 percent compared to 8.0 percent for 
males, and 15.4 percent compared to 10.0 percent for females). Lastly, gender 
differences are comparatively modest. This is likely because men enjoy higher 
marginal earnings from education up through junior high school, and with sheepskin 
effects women start to enjoy higher marginal earnings from junior high school. 
In addition, we graphically illustrate these results combining education and 
sheepskin effects plus the differences for three-way comparisons between farm-
nonfarm sector, self-employed/employee, and gender, varying years of schooling, 
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sector of employment and gender, given the means of other control variables in figures 
4.3-4.5. Figure 4.3 compares between workers and the self-employed, conditional on 
sector, so as to explore the prospective signaling effects of education. When we 
correct for selection into sector of employment, the signaling effect is striking for 
female graduating from junior high school and working in the non-farm sector. With 
no schooling or low levels of schooling, non-farm self-employed men earn more than 
non-farm workers. With a higher rate of marginal earnings gains from schooling (14.4 
compared to 8.0 percent), male non-farm workers’ earnings increase considerably with 
higher levels of education and eventually catch up their self-employed earnings after 
graduating from college.  
Figure 4.4 compares between farm and nonfarm sectors, given an individual 
working as a worker or as a self-employed business owner. The non-farm sector yields 
higher expected earnings after primary school completion for workers, and over the 
full range of schooling years for the self-employed, with both higher gains for each 
extra year of schooling and more positive sheepskin effects. The differences in log 
earnings between the non-farm and the farm self-employed are statistically significant. 
For workers, these higher gains are statistically significant after graduating from 
primary school, reflecting more professional training required in the formal job 
markets. 
Figure 4.5 compares between genders. Male-female differences in log earnings 
consistently favor men among the nonfarm self-employed, but otherwise favor men 
only at lower levels of educational attainment and women at higher. The graphs show 
a crossover point after graduating from senior high school (grade 12) for farm 
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workers, from college for farm self-employed individuals, and from junior high school 
(grade 9) for non-farm workers. This suggests that sheepskin effects play a larger role 
for females in higher levels of schooling attainment, and that secondary and tertiary 
education have a more pronounced effect on women’s labor market outcomes than on 
men’s.  
The log earnings differences between the non-farm and the farm sectors, and 
between males and females, are more pronounced and mostly statistically significant 
in the selection corrected models, as compared to the OLS estimates. This could 
indicate that correcting for occupational selection isolates more clearly the differences 
in gains across sectors and between the sexes. Education, meanwhile, seems to play a 
more prominent role in sorting workers among sectors than in determining earnings 
within a sector through signaling effects. 
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Table 4.5: Earning equations correcting for selection on employment sector (Eq. 4.5) 
 
Dependent variable: log earnings Farm wkr Farm SE NF wkr NF SE 
Years of schooling -0.095 0.043 0.148*** 0.041 
 (0.059) (0.050) (0.036) (0.044) 
Fem* years schooling 0.132* 0.051 -0.041 -0.012 
 (0.072) (0.074) (0.050) (0.052) 
Completed grade 6 0.006 -0.009 -0.197 -0.140 
 (0.226) (0.189) (0.167) (0.167) 
Completed grade 9 0.059 -0.168 0.076 0.041 
 (0.274) (0.161) (0.138) (0.188) 
Completed grade 12 0.172 0.017 0.001 0.133 
 (0.243) (0.219) (0.131) (0.192) 
Completed grade 16 -1.489** -0.232 0.057 0.593** 
 (0.598) (0.452) (0.154) (0.233) 
Female*Completed grade 6 -0.379 -0.382 0.362 0.155 
 (0.433) (0.415) (0.249) (0.243) 
Female*Completed grade 9 -0.225 -0.497 0.515** 0.118 
 (0.435) (0.423) (0.252) (0.263) 
Female*Completed grade 12 -0.041 0.201 -0.127 -0.097 
 (0.532) (0.472) (0.186) (0.260) 
Female*Completed grade 16 2.352*** 0.588 0.061 0.281 
 (0.879) (1.076) (0.227) (0.369) 
Age 0.134*** 0.116*** 0.172*** 0.086*** 
 (0.035) (0.029) (0.015) (0.023) 
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Female -0.872*** -0.587** -0.214 -0.725*** 
 (0.284) (0.292) (0.212) (0.196) 
Head -0.049 -0.479 0.296*** 0.210** 
 (0.218) (0.298) (0.067) (0.100) 
Agricultural land value 0.004*** 0.0001 0.00001 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Urban -0.404 0.052 0.291*** 0.212 
 (0.272) (0.297) (0.091) (0.134) 
Selection terms:     
- Farm worker 0.159 0.889 -1.338*** -0.090 
 (0.117) (0.820) (0.291) (0.461) 
- Farm self-employed -0.456 -0.091 -0.428 -0.246 
 (1.065) (0.181) (0.336) (0.459) 
- NF worker -2.449** -0.757 -0.121 0.508 
 (1.013) (0.715) (0.120) (0.489) 
- NF self-employed 0.708 0.925 0.356 -0.256** 
 (0.762) (0.674) (0.310) (0.112) 
Constant 10.629*** 13.252*** 10.693*** 14.117*** 
 (1.276) (1.086) (0.347) (0.896) 
Joint test for schooling variables 15.85** 8.16 191.91*** 23.46*** 
Joint test for female completed degrees  10.75** 2.78 8.92* 1.04 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.15 0.34 0.17 
N 550 1,190 3,012 1,734 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. Standard errors are clustered at community level and 
attrition weights are applied. Provincial dummy variables are included but not shown. 
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(a) Farm sector: worker vs. self-employed 
 
 
 
(b) Non-farm sector: worker vs. self-employed 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Uncovering signaling effects: estimated log earnings by years of schooling, gender, 
and farm/non-farm sector, correcting for selection into sectors of employment 
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(a) Worker: farm vs non-farm sectors 
 
(b) Self-employed: farm vs. nonfarm sectors 
 
Figure 4.4: Uncovering intersectoral differences: estimated log earnings by years of schooling 
across sectors and gender, given occupation, correcting for selection into sectors of 
employment 
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(a) Farm: male vs. female 
 
(b) Nonfarm: male vs. female 
 
Figure 4.5: Uncovering gender differences: estimated log earnings by years of schooling, 
gender, and sector of employment, correcting for selection into sectors of employment 
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4.5 Conclusions 
Educational attainment can influence individual earnings through multiple 
pathways, especially by impacting marginal productivity or by signaling unobservable 
characteristics to prospective employers. These effects may differ between the farm 
and non-farm sectors and between men and women if labor markets are not fully 
integrated, as is likely the case in developing countries such as Indonesia.  This paper 
explores the possibility that the marginal earnings gains associated with educational 
attainment vary significantly between the farm and non-farm sectors, between men 
and women, and between the employed and the self-employed.    
We find that selection into sector of occupation – farm self-employed, farm 
worker, non-farm self-employed, or non-farm employee – is strongly affected by 
parental occupation and educational attainment, in ways that are quite intuitive. 
Moreover, failing to correct for these selection effects leads to considerable bias in the 
estimated marginal earnings gains associated with added educational attainment.  
Once one corrects for selection into sector of occupation, we find sharp 
intersectoral differences in the marginal earnings gains associated with education, 
strongly favoring those in the nonfarm sector, and much more modest gender 
differences in the marginal earnings gains from schooling, seemingly because men 
tend to enjoy higher marginal earnings from educational up through junior high 
school, and women enjoy higher marginal earnings thereafter. There also appear to be 
important job market signaling effects, as reflected in the difference between the 
marginal earnings enjoyed by employees versus otherwise identical self-employed 
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individuals. And significant sheepskin effects emerge in secondary and tertiary 
education, consistent with the signaling hypothesis. 
These findings carry important implications for understanding patterns of 
private investment in education. If parents who expect their children to take over the 
family farm perceive that the earnings gains from education in farming are modest or 
negligible and they understand that the child will not need education as a signal of 
ability if she is to be self-employed, then they are likely to invest less in schooling for 
that child than would parents who expect their child to pursue a non-farm career as a 
salaried civil servant or firm employee, other things equal. Observed significant 
differences in the marginal earnings gains associated with educational attainment 
might help explain heterogeneous educational investment patterns in equilibrium. 
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APPENDIX 4A 
ATTRITION AND SELECTION ISSUES 
 
Although IFLS is well-known for its high overall participation rate across 
survey rounds, when combining specific survey modules together across years, many 
missing values arise, resulting in attrition from the estimation sample. Some survey 
questions are not applicable to all individuals, hence missing values. Moreover, in our 
study, we focus on employed individuals whose earnings and schooling are reported, 
resulting in sample selection problem. Moffitt, Fitzgerald, and Gottschalk (1999, 
hereafter MFG), and Wooldridge (2002) suggest using inverse probability weighting 
(IPW) to deal with attrition and selection problems in a more general model. The IPW 
approach, it is assumed selection on observables such that, there is a set of auxiliary 
variables, z, affecting attrition and selection propensities that is related to the density 
of a dependent variable of interest, y, conditional on x. 
As IFLS can be analyzed as cross-sectional data, we use IFLS4 (year 2007) 
earnings values as our main dependent variable and only track back to the earlier 
survey waves for instrumental variables.  We then treat IFLS4 observations as the 
baseline, (yi1, xi1), Ai = 0 if we have schooling-earnings data and match with parental 
data and/or agricultural land data from IFLS1-2 (non-missing data in all variables), 
and Ai = 1 otherwise (including both attrition and selection). Table 1A presents testing 
results from the attrition probit regression for the full sample and the estimation 
subsample, as in Table 1. For the full sample, attrition exists for the log earnings and 
reported years of schooling that we use for this study. The auxiliary variables include 
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log household asset value, attrition rate at community level, dummy for existing in all 
four waves, dummy for demography variables, including Islam race, age and age 
squared, female, household head, and household size, and geography variables, 
including urban and provincial dummies, all in 2007. The pseudo R2 statistic can be 
interpreted as the proportion of attrition that is non-random. Wald statistics are then 
performed to test whether observables jointly explain the predicted attrition 
probability. As we have high pseudo R2 and all Wald tests are statistically significant, 
attrition appear related to household, demographic, and geographic characteristics. 
 
Table A1: Attrition probit regressions 
  
Full sample 
(1) 
Estimation sample 
(2) 
Pseudo R2 0.2270 0.1929 
Wald test (p-value report) 
    log(household asset) 0.000 0.000 
  Village attrition rate 0.000 0.000 
  Exiting in all 4 waves 0.000 0.000 
  Demographya 0.000 0.000 
  Geographyb 0.000 0.000 
No. of observations 28,047 28,047 
Columns (1) and (2) are according to samples 1 and 2 as reported in Table 1. aDemographic 
variables include household size, dummy for islam race, age and age squared, female, and 
household head. bGeographic variables include urban and provincial dummies. Wald tests for 
demography and geography variables are joint tests. Standard errors are clustered at 
community level and survey weights correcting for survey attrition are applied. 
  
Following MFG and Baulch and Quisumbing (2011), we use the inverse 
probability weighted method to correct for possible biases. We create the ratio of 
predicted values from the restricted regression and unrestricted regression of the 
reversed attrition probit, where the dependent variable, RA = 1 for nonattrited 
observations. The unrestricted regression includes the same explanatory variables as 
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the attrition probit regressions, while the restricted regression only includes log 
household asset, household size, and dummies for urban and provincial variables. We 
create inverse probability weights specifically for each sample group as each sample 
has a different set of non-missing observations. The IPW vary from 0.15 to 87.19 with 
mean 1.01 for sample 1, and from 0.09 to 32.47 with mean 1.02 for sample 2. 
Table A2 compares the OLS regressions between the model using inverse 
probability weights and the model using survey weights. Their coefficients are 
statistically insignificantly different from each other. 
 
 
Table A2: OLS estimates of log earnings equation with interactions among schooling, gender,  
and occupation 
 
OLS log(earnings) (1) Attrition weights (2) Survey weights 
Years of schooling 0.036* 0.043** 
 (0.019) (0.017) 
Fem*yearsch07 0.068*** 0.042 
 (0.023) (0.027) 
Farm self-employed 0.046 0.069 
 (0.128) (0.113) 
NF employee 0.009 0.235** 
 (0.130) (0.106) 
NF self-employed 0.509*** 0.573*** 
 (0.121) (0.104) 
Farm SE *fem 0.277 0.173 
 (0.217) (0.229) 
NF wkr *fem 0.453** 0.290 
 (0.186) (0.197) 
NF SE *fem 0.402** 0.394** 
 (0.185) (0.192) 
Farm SE *yearsch -0.033** -0.029* 
 (0.017) (0.015) 
NF wkr *yearsch 0.020 0.013 
 (0.015) (0.013) 
NF SE *yearsch -0.027* -0.026** 
 (0.015) (0.013) 
Farm SE*fem*sch -0.051 -0.025 
 (0.037) (0.037) 
NF wkr*fem*sch -0.042* -0.011 
 (0.024) (0.028) 
NF SE*fem*sch -0.071*** -0.049* 
 (0.025) (0.028) 
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OLS log(earnings) (1) Attrition weights (2) Survey weights 
Completed grade 6 0.149** 0.086 
 (0.071) (0.064) 
Completed grade 9 0.183*** 0.143** 
 (0.066) (0.056) 
Completed grade 12 0.181*** 0.191*** 
 (0.060) (0.055) 
Completed grade 16 0.323*** 0.377*** 
 (0.073) (0.067) 
Age 07 0.116*** 0.122*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Age2 07 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female 07 -0.928*** -0.869*** 
 (0.166) (0.176) 
Head 07 0.163*** 0.187*** 
 (0.044) (0.038) 
Durban 07 0.129*** 0.130*** 
 (0.045) (0.046) 
Constant 12.209*** 11.877*** 
 (0.191) (0.197) 
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.29 
N. of obs      12,675     12,675 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. Standard errors are clustered at community level. Other variables 
not showing are dummies for provinces. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   197  
	   198 
 
	   199 
 
Table C1: Exclusion restriction tests 
 
    (1)     (2) 
  F/p-value F/p-value 
All 3.96*** 3.42*** 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
Parents’ occupation 4.40** 4.13*** 
 
0.0017 0.0028 
Mother’s occupation 1.59 1.71 
 
0.2047 0.1818 
Father’s occupation 5.09*** 5.41*** 
 
0.0066 0.0048 
Parents’ education 3.11*** 2.79*** 
 
0.0008 0.0025 
Mother’s education 1.98* 1.77 
 
0.0817 0.1187 
Father’s education 1.53 2.16* 
  0.1807 0.0577 
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, and *P<0.10. Model (1) uses employment sector variables as 
solely dummy variables for each sector in the earning equations. Model (2) uses both 
employment sector dummy variables and their interactions with degree completion and 
gender variables, the same model as Table B1. 
 
